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Notes on

Ingersoll,

BY

REV. L. A. LAMBERT.

One Hundredth Thousand.

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NOTES ON INGERSOLL.

BY

REV. L. A. LAMBERT,

OF WATERLOO, N.Y.

PREFACE

BY

REV. PATRICK CRONIN.

EIGHTH EDITION.

TORONTO:

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PREFACE.

THESE "Notes on Ingersoll," by the Reverend Louis A. Lambert, of Waterloo, New York, have already appeared in the columns of the *Buffalo Union and Times*, much to the delight of readers of that journal; they have also been extensively copied and commented upon by the Catholic press throughout the country. They are, unquestionably, the most crushing reply yet made to that notorious little fraud—Ingersoll—who so loves to pose as a profoundly original thinker; and who lives, moves, and has his being, in the laughter and applause which his fescennine buffoonery provokes. Regarding them as a complete annihilation of the pretentious scoffer, and desirous that they should reach a much larger public than could be secured by any newspaper, however widely circulated, the present writer pointed out to the author the advisability of having just such writings as the "Notes" spread broadcast in the interest of Religion, especially at this time; and earnestly urged their publication in the present form.

Would that those, whose minds have been poisoned by the specious pen and brilliant rhetoric of our American arch-blasphemer, could read these "Notes"! They would then see how untruthful in statement, illogical in reasoning, dishonest in inference, vile in innuendo, and malevolent in purpose, is the man upon whose every utterance they hung with delight. With cold, relentless cruelty, Father Lambert pursues Ingersoll, in these pages, step by step, piercing him with keen Damascus blade at every turn;—aye, dissecting him to the very marrow of his bones—and then holds him up, like another unmasked Mokanna, to the contempt and scorn of mankind.

Herein, too, is shown that this profoundly original thinker is the veriest of plagiarists, palming off, as his own, the worn-out objections of the infidels of other days, which have been answered hundreds of times. Yea, verily, this valiant knight, of the theological tournament, is nothing but a fraudulent peddler of old infidel junk. He pretends to bring to the polemical market jewels rich and

rare, but they are only well-worn paste, which, even when new, were worthless.

Oh! that we had to-day more Father Lamberts, especially in these United States, to give us opportune pamphlets like this; and thus make short work of the blatant revilers of all revealed truth, who, like the reptile brood, hiss forth their venom against Christ and his Church. Liberty, honor, heroism, self-sacrifice, and similar high-sounding phrases, are continually on the lips of these sophists; whilst they would fain persuade the world that the Christian religion is something that enslaves and degrades. But there is no slavery so galling as the slavery of unbelief. It is the truth that makes us free. Neither is there intolerance like unto the intolerance of Infidelity. And as for honor, self-sacrifice, heroism, and those other natural virtues that ennoble human nature—destroy the belief in a Hereafter, deny future rewards and punishments—and how long will they flourish? Infidelity knows no standard of Right and Wrong; and such standard is the corner-stone upon which society rests.

As may be observed, these "Notes" are written from the broadest Christian standpoint; so that they ought to be as welcome to all who believe in Jesus Christ, and in the revelation He has made, as to Catholics. We need scarce add the hope that they may have a large circulation; and we ask all, who glory in the triumph of Christian truth, to aid in spreading this pamphlet.

PATRICK CRONIN.

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NOTES ON INGERSOLL.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE *North American Review* for August, 1881, published an article on the Christian Religion, by Robert G. Ingersoll, together with a reply to it by Jeremiah S. Black of Washington city. In the November number of the same *Review*, Mr. Ingersoll replied to Black's defence, and there the controversy came to an abrupt end.

This sudden termination of the debate caused no little surprise. Mr. Ingersoll's admirers rejoiced at what they considered Black's defeat, and those Christians who took an interest in this passage-at-arms between the two lawyers were disappointed at Mr. Black's silence. They began to think that he had entered into a field of action for which he was not well equipped by education and mental structure. They were not, however, left long in doubt as to the reason of his silence. This reason he gives, in a letter addressed to the *American Christian Review*, a weekly religious paper published in Cincinnati.

"From the beginning," says Mr. Black, "it was distinctly understood that my defence was to be published with the accusation. * * * At the time of the publication I agreed that if Mr. Ingersoll had any fault to find with the result, it might seem cowardly to refuse him another chance on the same terms. I was not afraid of any new assault he might make, if he was not afraid of my defence.

"Three months afterwards fifty pages of the foulest and falsest libel that ever was written against God or man, was sent to me. I was entirely willing to treat it as I had treated the other; that is, give it the answer I thought it deserved, and let both go together. But it came when I was disabled by an injury from which I could not hope to get well for some weeks, and I so notified the

editor. To my surprise I was informed that no contradiction, correction, or criticism of mine, or anybody else, would be allowed to accompany this new effusion of filth. It was to be printed immediately, and would occupy so much space that none could be spared for the other side. I proposed that if its bulk could not be reduced so as to admit of an answer in the same number, it should be postponed until a reply could be made ready for publication in the next succeeding number. This and divers other offers were rejected, for the express reason that 'Mr. Ingersoll would not consent.' Finding the *Review* controlled by him to suit himself, I do not think I was bound to go further."

This explanation puts the affair in a light which reflects little credit on Mr. Ingersoll and the *North American Review*. If Mr. Ingersoll had perfect confidence in the strength of his position, there is no conceivable reason why he should consent to take this snap judgment on the counsel for the defence. If his purpose had been to stop the controversy, on finding himself in an intellectual combat with a strong man, he could not have devised a better method. Mr. Black was certainly not bound to go further and trust himself or his case to a *Review* that had outraged his rights, or to a man who had taken advantage of an accident which had temporarily disabled his antagonist.

Mr. Ingersoll, in his reply, indignantly accuses Judge Black of personal detraction, and says, very justly, that "The theme (the Christian Religion) is great enough to engage the highest faculties of the human mind, and, in the investigation of such a subject, vituperation is singularly and vulgarly out of place."

Nothing can be truer than this, but is it not a new departure for Mr. Ingersoll? Vituperation of an individual, or of a class, of the living or of the dead, is unrelieved vulgarity, and singularly out of place when treating of a subject that demands the exercise of the highest faculties of the intellect, and which involves the destiny of man. Man's life is a tragedy, his first utterance is a cry of pain, his last, the groan of death. It is indeed no subject to make merry over. Be man's future what it may, it is an awful subject, from whatever point of view we may consider it. It has occupied the attention of the greatest intellects that ever lit on this earth, and it arouses anxiety

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But does not Mr. Ingersoll's protest against Mr. Black sound strangely, coming, as it does, from one who, for years past, has been making the Christian Religion, its doctrines, institutions, and sacred personages, the butt of his vituperation and ridicule? Judaism and Christianity have been burlesqued by him on the stage of the lecture-hall. The ministers of the Old and the New Covenant have been exhibited as cunning and unprincipled tricksters, vicious knaves and tyrants. Everything held sacred by every Christian heart has been made the subject of his gibes, and of laughter for his audience. And all this time, while he has been combining the professions of the philosopher, the humorist, and the ghoul, he has talked sweetly of delicacy, refinement, sentiment, feeling, honor bright, etc. All this time he has delighted in tearing and wounding and lacerating the hearts and faith and feelings of those by whose tolerance he is permitted to outrage the common sense and sentiment of Christendom. Truly, a protest against vulgarity and vituperation, coming from such a source, is a surprise—a case of *locus a non lucendo*.

What is the cause of this sudden change?

The orator of "laughter and applause" is unexpectedly confronted by a lawyer like himself, who deals with him unceremoniously, but who yet treats him with more consideration and decency than he treats the great Hebrew lawgiver, Moses, and what is the result? He stops his clatter, and pauses in his ribaldry, to give his opponent a lecture on delicacy, propriety and politeness! If Black has had the bad taste to make use of Ingersoll's methods, Ingersoll should be the last person to complain.

You may outrage Christian sentiment, you may laugh at and burlesque Moses and Christ, but you must be genteel and polite and "nice" when you speak of Mr. Ingersoll. Judge Black forgot this, and hence the indignant protest.

"The theme," says Mr. Ingersoll, "is great enough to engage the highest faculties of the human mind."

It may be well asked: What faculties of his mind has he thus far employed on this great theme? Has it been the faculty of reason, or the faculty of ridicule?

Our great American wits have been content to allow their peculiar faculties to play on those subjects proper

for the exercise of them, and, in doing this, they afford us amusement and lighten the burdens of life. The best of them have carefully observed the proprieties, and never passed the boundary line that separates the sacred from the profane. Mr. Ingersoll found the legitimate field of wit and drollery pre-occupied by Artemus Ward, Mark Twain, and others with whom he could not compete. He sought new fields, and, with indecent audacity, selects that which the civilized world has always held as sacred—Religion. In this new line (new at least for an American humorist) he is not content with trying to be a wit; he pretends to be a philosopher, a moralist, a theologian learned in the Scriptures, a hermeneutist, and a historian. If his claims to all these qualifications can be made good, he is certainly well equipped for business. But he lacks the intense earnestness and masculine vigor of Tom Paine, the learning and wit of Voltaire, the philosophical penetration of Hobbes and Bolingbroke, the analytical faculty of Herbert Spencer, the industry of Tyndall and Huxley, and the comprehensiveness and incisive logic of John Stuart Mill. All these are masters in their way, whom Mr. Ingersoll has not succeeded in imitating or understanding. Wanting in originality, he draws liberally from the writings of Paine, Voltaire, Bolingbroke and others for his points and arguments. He has not succeeded in advancing anything new against Christianity. Perhaps it is doing him injustice to expect it of him. Infidels, from the time of Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian, have exhausted, in vain, the resources of human invention to discover implements to undermine the sublime fabric of Christianity. We must, therefore, not expect anything new from a modern infidel or atheist. All we can reasonably look for is a revamping of the old and often-refuted sophistries of the past. By means of a ready tongue and a grotesque imagination, Mr. Ingersoll succeeds in galvanizing these sapless corpses into a momentary appearance of life, but they will sink, as they sank before, into oblivion, as the Christian world moves on.

If Mr. Black has been guilty of personal detraction, as Mr. Ingersoll insinuates, he has done wrong: but in attacking a live man, like Mr. Ingersoll, he has shown more courage and manliness than the latter has exhibited in his detractions of Moses, dead. The living can retort; the

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dead can only listen and be silent. He who attacks the dead need not look for an answer in the next *Review*. If Black had outraged the character and misrepresented the words of Ingersoll, as the latter has outraged the character and misrepresented the words of Moses, he would have disgraced the cause he defended, and no condemnation would be severe enough for the unchristian offence. Black attacked a living foe, with shield and spear in rest; that was at least brave. Ingersoll strikes at the great and honored dead, the leader and lawgiver of the most remarkable nation that ever rose and flourished and fell. The jackal can gnaw, in safety, the tongue of the dead lion, and the field-mouse play its antics in his footsteps on the plain.

The character and moral code of Moses are as impervious to his attacks as are the pyramids of Egypt to the javelin of the wandering Arab, who strikes their base as he passes, and disappears, while they remain the objects of wonder to future generations.

The proper way to meet Mr. Ingersoll is, not to defend Christianity against his scattering, inconsequent, illogical and unphilosophical attacks, but to make his article the subject to be considered; to analyze, with careful scrutiny, every statement he makes, every argument he adduces, every inference he draws; to grant nothing, and take nothing for granted.

The Christian is not bound, at the call of Mr. Ingersoll, or any one else, to reprint the proofs of Christianity that are to be found in the writings of the great Christian philosophers and theologians. These proofs are on record, and Mr. Ingersoll's ancestors in atheism and unbelief, from Anaximander, Epicurus, and Lucretius, down to d'Holdach, Laland, Cabanis, Hobbes, and Paine, have never answered them.

It will be time to think of new defences when the old have been captured. Mr. Ingersoll's ignorance of those arguments is not sufficient reason why they should be repeated. I do not propose to repeat them, as it is not Christianity that is on trial, but Mr. Ingersoll's article. It is to be examined with analytical care, and then left to the reader to determine what it is worth.

It has been well said by some keen observer, that, whatever else a man writes, he always writes himself. This is conspicuously true of Mr. Ingersoll. His writings

are a mere evolution of himself on paper. The glitter, sophistry, the bad faith, verbal *leger-de-main*, the pervading egotism, the assumed infallibility, and the brazen audacity of statement, so conspicuous in his writings, are the full bloom and blossom of his character.

In these Notes I shall follow him through his tortuous windings as closely as possible. And, that I may not misrepresent him, or fall, even unintentionally, into unfairness, I intend that Mr. Ingersoll shall always speak for himself in his own very words. From this out, then, it will be a dialogue between him and his commentator.

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CHAPTER I.

MR. INGERSOLL'S "IDEA," AND WHAT COMES OF IT.

INGERSOLL—"The universe, according to my idea, is, always was, and forever will be. * * It is the one eternal being—the only thing that ever did, does, or can exist."

COMMENT—When you say "according to my idea," you leave the inference that this theory of an eternal universe never occurred to the mind of man until your brain acquired its full development. Of course you did not intend to mislead or deceive; you simply meant that your "idea" of the universe, is, like most of our modern plays, adapted from the French, or elsewhere. Your philosophy, like those plays, wants the freshness and flavor of originality, and suffers from bad translation. The old originals, from whom you copy, thought it incumbent on them to give a reason, or, at least, a show of reason, "for their idea." In this enlightened age you do not deem this necessary. It is sufficient for you to formulate your "idea." To attempt to prove it would be beneath you. Is this the reason why you do not advance one single argument to prove the eternity of matter? Have you got so far as to believe that your "idea" has the force of an argument, or that the science of philosophy must be re-adjusted because you happen to have an "idea"?

When you say: The universe is the one eternal being, you, of course, mean this visible, material, ever-changing universe of matter. Inasmuch as you have given your "idea" without any reason or argument to support it, it would be a work of supererogation to attempt to refute it. It is sufficient to oppose my idea to yours. But I will go further and see if your idea of eternal matter does not involve a contradiction. Of course you know that a statement or proposition, that involves a contradiction, cannot be true. You affirm the eternity of matter. On this I reason thus:

That which is eternal is infinite. It must be infinite, because, if eternal, it can have nothing to limit it.

But that which is infinite must be infinite in every way. If limited in any way, it would not be infinite.

Now, matter is limited. It is composed of parts, and composition is limitation. It is subject to change, and change involves limitation. Change supposes succession, and there can be no succession without a beginning, and, therefore, limitation. Thus far we are borne out by reason, experience, and common sense.

Then—

Matter is limited, and therefore finite; and if finite in anything, finite in everything; and if finite in everything, therefore finite in time, and, therefore, not eternal.

The idea of an eternal, self-existent being, is incompatible, in every point of view, with our idea of matter. The former is essentially simple, unchangeable, impassable, and one. The latter is composite, changeable, passable, and multiple. To assert that matter is eternal, is to assert that all these antagonistic attributes are identical—a privilege granted, by sane men, to lunatics only.

INGERSOLL—"The universe, according to my idea, is, always was, and forever will be."

COMMENT—We have seen that this "idea" involves a contradiction as absurd as to say that parallel lines can meet, or that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time. But other important consequences follow from your "idea."

If this universe of matter alone exists, the mind, intellect or soul must be matter, or a form of matter. Sublimate or attenuate matter to an indefinite extent, it yet remains matter. Now, if the mind is matter, it must obey the forces that govern and regulate the action of matter.

The forces that govern matter are invariable. From this it follows that every thought of the philosopher, every calculation of the mathematician, every imagination and fancy of the poet, are mere results of material force, entirely independent of the individuals conceiving them!

The sublime conceptions and creations of Shakespeare and Milton, the wonderful discoveries of Newton, Arago, and Young, the creations of Raphael and Angelo, are nothing more than the flowering and blooming of carnal vegetation. Are all the externs of lunatic asylums prepared to accept this philosophy?

But let us go a little further: You are proud of your philosophy and your wisdom. But why should you be so

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if your idea are the mere results of the forces that govern matter? And why should you try to convert the world to your way of thinking if the world must be governed by the unalterable laws of matter? I believe in the Holy Scriptures. Is that the result of material forces? If so, why try to persuade me to the contrary? If your materialistic theory is true, how can I help being a Christian? If I am the victim of unalterable forces or laws, why try to convince or persuade me? Do these material forces compel you to try to persuade me to assent to your notions, and, at the same time, compel me to reject them? Why condemn kings as tyrants, and priests as hypocrites, if they are the helpless victims of the unalterable forces of matter?

You are an apostle of liberty. If there is anything of value in this world it is liberty. You thrum this tune till your readers get tired of it. Now, if there is nothing but matter, and if matter is governed by invariable laws, *there can be no liberty whatever*. Materialism destroys human liberty and free agency, leaving man the victim of physical forces. You who prize liberty so highly should repudiate a theory that destroys it. If man is not free, and he cannot be according to your materialistic doctrine, you are inconsistent when you appeal to his intelligence. You are equally inconsistent if you expect your reasonings to convince him, since his conviction must depend on material forces independent of him and you. If you understand your principles, you are bound, by the force of logic, to be silent and wait in patience the outcome of those forces which are unalterable, irresistible, and unavoidable. If men's thoughts are the result of mere physical forces, it is insanity to reason with them. As well might you reason with a clock for running too fast, with fire for burning, or with a tree for growing.

CHAPTER II.

SOMETHING ABOUT THE LAWS OF NATURE, AND HOW MR. INGERSOLL "GATHERS" AN IDEA—HIS IDEA OF HYDRAULICS.

INGERSOLL—"We know nothing of what we call the laws of nature, except as we gather the idea of law from the uniformity of phenomena springing from like conditions. To make myself clear: Water always runs down hill."

COMMENT—We acquire a knowledge of the laws of nature by observing the effects of the forces of nature; but we do not gather "an idea of law" from the study of these forces and their effects. The idea of law, in general, is, and must be, prior to the idea of particular laws.

We cannot assert a law in a given case without having an idea of law in general. We say a particular law is a law because it corresponds with the norm of law which exists intuitively in the mind. The idea of law, then, does not come from observing phenomena. These phenomena enable us to acquire a knowledge of particular laws, but not of law. The laws of nature, in the last analysis, are that intimate and invariable connection which exists between natural causes and effects. This idea of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, as it is called, is the basis on which we make our deductions from phenomena. A stone, thrown up, falls to the ground. The mind, referring to its own intuition of causality, asks: What caused it to fall? The experiment is repeated with a like result. The mind here does not "gather an idea of law" but begins instinctively to seek *the* law in the case. To seek for a law presupposes the idea of law, for we do not seek for that of which we have no idea.

To talk about "gathering an idea of law from phenomena" is unphilosophical. We conclude or deduce laws from phenomena, but we cannot "gather an idea of law" from anything. To *gather an idea* is like gathering a huckleberry, or an Ingersoll. It is not customary to gather a unit. You confound idea with judgment or deduction.

The illustration you give, to make yourself clear, is unfortunate. You say:

INGERSOLL—"To make myself clear: Water always runs down hill."

COMMENT—How, then, did it get up hill? Or is there a perennial spring up there? Water does not always run down hill. To run down hill is an exception to the general mode of the action of water. In the present condition of the physical world, the tendency of water is upward and outward. This will be admitted of water in the form of steam or vapor. The water that falls as rain has been first taken up by the sun's heat. Water runs up in the capillary tubes of every vegetable that grows. More water ascends in the capillaries of the vegetable world in one day than falls over Niagara in a year. Water runs up in all rivers that run toward the equator. The Mississippi river carries its waters up an inclined plane, a perpendicular distance of about four miles. The same is true of a portion of the Nile. This earth on which we live and play the wise and the foolish, is not a sphere, but a spheroid. It is flattened at the poles. The *lowest* places on the earth are the regions about the North and South poles. The equator, *all around the earth, is a mountain thirteen miles higher than the surface at the poles.* The polar regions are vast sunken valleys. Now I ask: If "water always runs down hill," why do not the waters of all the vast oceans flood with impetuosity toward the poles? Why do not those waters seek their level equi-distant from the centre and make the earth a perfect sphere? Two-thirds of the earth's surface consists of water. These multitudinous waters do not run down hill—do not flow down towards the valleys of the poles. On the contrary, they remain on a vast slope, that rises toward the equator, a perpendicular height of thirteen miles. They remain there on that inclined plane—on that hill-side forever. You may say this is caused by the rotation of the earth. I do not care what causes it. The fact of it disproves your statement that water always runs down hill. What you wanted to say was this: Water, like matter in all its other forms, yields to the stronger force. In the present case the centrifugal force is the stronger, and hence the waters of the earth tend up hill towards the equator.

You saw, somewhere, a bit of water running down a hill,

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and you "gathered the idea" that it always does so. Your view was too narrow and local. It wanted breadth and comprehensiveness. You misinterpreted nature as you misunderstood and misinterpreted Moses and revealed religion. You have proved yourself an incompetent interpreter of nature, and you cannot be relied on when you presume to interpret, criticize, condemn, or deny that which is above nature.

INGERSOLL—"The theist says this (water runs down hill) happens because there is behind the phenomenon an active law."

COMMENT—We have seen that you misunderstand nature, and from what you now say it is evident that you do not understand what the theist means. The theist does not say there is behind the phenomenon an *active law*. He repudiates the stupidities you attribute to him. What the theist does say is this: Behind, prior to, and concomitant with the phenomenon, there is a static or permanent force which is manifested when the proper conditions are placed. A stone, thrown up, falls. The power or force that brought it down was there before it was thrown up, and continues, after it has fallen, to keep it down. The relation between the stone and the force is constant and permanent. This force asserts itself permanently, but is manifested to us only under certain conditions. This force, sometimes improperly called a law, is what we understand by gravitation. It was projected into nature when God created nature.

INGERSOLL—"As a matter of fact, law is this side of the phenomenon."

COMMENT—That depends on what you mean by law. If by the word you mean that force which actuates the phenomenon, your statement is not correct, and your play on the word "law" is beneath the dignity of a philosopher.

INGERSOLL—"Law does not cause the phenomenon, but the phenomenon causes the idea of law in our minds."

COMMENT—If, by law, you mean the force I have spoken of, it does cause the phenomenon. If you mean, by law, a mere verbal formula, or statement of what a given force will do, under given circumstances, you are trifling with the intelligence of your readers. Phenomena may enable us to acquire the knowledge of a law, but, as we have already seen, they cannot cause or originate the idea of law in our minds. You confound the *idea* of law with the

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knowledge of laws. A philosopher should not write with looseness of expression and indeterminateness of thought. *Law*, in our language, has more than one meaning. When speaking of nature, it may mean the action of natural forces, or it may mean a verbal formula or statement of what that action is or will be in given circumstances. Your purpose required that these two meanings should be confounded, and you, accordingly, confounded them.

Phenomena do not cause the idea of law. The mental faculty of associating like events and referring them to a common cause, together with the faculty of generalization, enables us to formulate laws. A series of like phenomena may suggest a law to the mind already possessed of the idea of law, but it does not and cannot, in the nature of things, "cause the idea of law." The idea of law must precede the knowledge of a law.

INGERSOLL—"This idea (of law) is produced from (by?) the fact that, under like circumstances, the same (a like?) phenomenon always happens."

COMMENT—A series of like phenomena suggests the *existence of force*, not the idea of law; and when like phenomena always happen under like circumstances, we are led to conclude that it is the *same force* that is acting in each case. Further observation of this force's manifestation—and all phenomena are the manifestation of force—enables us to distinguish it from other forces, to identify it by its invariable act, and to associate it with its effects. Having arrived at this degree of familiarity with a force and its act, we formulate in words what it will do under given circumstances. These formulas are called laws of nature. In this sense these laws are purely subjective, that is to say, they exist only in the mind apprehending them, and not in nature. There is an inherent principle in the forces of nature which causes them to act in the same manner under the same circumstances. This, however, is not a law, but the nature of the forces themselves. The laws of nature, then, as commonly understood, are the *uniform action of natural forces expressed in words*. When physicists speak of the laws of nature, they refer to the forces of which the laws are but the verbal expression. They suppose philosophers have sufficient intelligence to understand this fact; and yet it appears that they are sometimes mistaken. In all you say on this subject you confound *law* with *force*;

whether this is done intentionally or through ignorance, I need not stop to consider.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black probably thinks that the difference in the weight of rocks and clouds was created by law."

COMMENT—God indirectly created natural effects when He created the natural forces which cause them. When God created the forces of nature, He, by His *will*, gave them their modes of action—or laid down laws for them. Hence the difference in the weight of rocks and clouds arises from the action of those forces to which God gave modes or laws of action, and hence, again, this difference in weight is truly caused by the law, or will of God. So what you imagined to be a patent absurdity is an undeniable truth. If God had not given to the force, called gravitation, its known mode of action, there would and could be no difference in the weight of rocks and clouds—for weight is nothing more than the measure of gravitation's force. Eliminate this force from your rocks and clouds and their weight would be *nil*; and as they would have no *weight* they would, of course, have no *difference* in weight. But to return: the difference between the weight of rocks and clouds arises from the fact that, although the same force acts on both of them at the same time and in the same manner, it does so under different, and not like, circumstances. Density is a circumstance in the case and that of the rock is greater than that of the cloud. Thus, while the same force is acting on both, and in the same manner, it does so under different circumstances, and hence the difference in weight. This difference is to be traced back to the *will* of God when He gave modes of action to nature's forces.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black probably thinks that parallel lines fail to unite only because it is *black*."

COMMENT—Mr. Black "probably thinks" that, when you trifle in this way, you are not exercising the higher faculties of your mind to any great extent. You speak much of "candor" and "honor bright." Do you intend what you have said here as an illustration of those virtues?

INGERSOLL—"It seems to me that law cannot be the cause of phenomena, but is an effect produced in our minds by their succession and resemblance."

COMMENT—It would seem that it seems so to you, since you have repeated that idea three times in half a page of

your article. But granting that it seems so to you, are you so simple as to advance that as an *argument*? Your quibbles on the word "law" have been already exposed. *Force* is the cause of phenomena. The *law* is the mere statement of what the force will do in a given case.

CHAPTER III.

A TOUCH OF METAPHYSICS; WITH A TAIL-PIECE ABOUT "HONEST THOUGHT."

INGERSOLL—"To put a God back of the universe, compels us to admit that there was a time when nothing existed except this God."

COMMENT—It compels us to admit nothing of the kind. The eternal God can place an eternal act. His creative act could, therefore, be co-eternal with His being. The end of the act, that is, creation, could be co-existent with the eternal act, and, therefore, eternal. To deny this is to affirm that there could be a moment when the eternal and one omnipotent God could not act, which is contrary to Christian teaching. Christianity does not teach that the universe was actually created from eternity, but reason teaches that it could have been so created. But, granting that the universe is not an eternal creation, your conclusion would not follow. For in this hypothesis, as time began with creation and is the measure of its endurance, it follows that before creation was, time was not. Hence, God did not exist in time before creation. God IS. To Him there is neither past, present, nor future—only eternity. God is alone before creation was. But granting that God is alone before creation was, what follows?

INGERSOLL—"That this God lived from eternity in infinite vacuum and absolute idleness."

COMMENT—If God lived in it, it could not have been vacuum. A vacuum is that in which *nothing* is. In the hypothesis that God is, He is something; He is infinite, and hence an infinite vacuum is infinite nonsense. But the word has a gross, material sense, and you used it for a purpose,

INGERSOLL—"And in absolute idleness."

COMMENT—Christian philosophy teaches us that God is *pure act*, the source of origin of all activity and life. To say that such a being can, under any circumstance, be in absolute idleness, or non-action, is simply an expression of human ignorance.

You may say this theory of Christian philosophy is erroneous. But that is nothing to the purpose until you have demonstrated the error of it, which is what you undertook to do. You attack that philosophy, and you must meet its oppositions as they are, not as you would make them appear, and overthrow them if you can.

INGERSOLL—"The mind of every thoughtful man is forced to one of two conclusions: Either that the universe is self-existent, or that it was created by a self-existent being. To my mind there is far more difficulty in the second hypothesis than in the first."

COMMENT—It is to be regretted that you did not take the time and space to show the difference in the weight of those difficulties—to show how the existence of an eternal self-existent Creator presents more difficulties to the mind than does the existence of eternal matter. The existence of an eternal Creator is not *contrary* to reason. While the existence of eternal matter, as we have seen, involves the co-existence of mutually destructive attributes in the same subject at the same time, and is, therefore, contradictory to reason.

There have been many men of thoughtful minds who did not see that they were forced to adopt either of your two conclusions. The pantheists of ancient and modern times, of India and of Europe, held that the universe was neither eternal nor created, but that it was an *emanation* from God, having no real existence of its own—a mere transient mode of God's being. These philosophers were more radical than you. They believed that God alone is real, and that all else is phantasm. In believing that God is more immediately cognizable to the intellect than the material universe is, they showed a more profound philosophical sense than is exhibited by your school. The Gnostics, two thousand years ago, held this same doctrine of emanation. The Neo-platonists, like some of our German philosophers, denied the objective reality of the universe. Spinoza held that God alone has real existence,

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and that things are but forms of His extension. Kant held that we can have absolute certainty of nothing; which is equivalent to a denial of both God and the universe. Fichte taught that nothing exists but the *me*—individual consciousness—and that all things else are but the forms or manifestations of this *me*. Schelling, Hegel, and other philosophers of the German pantheistic school, held the same as Fichte. The French eclectics, led by Cousin, denied the creation, and held that the universe is a mere apparition by which the divine Being is exteriorly manifested—the mere ghost of the Infinite. All these are pantheists, some holding *emanation*, others divine evolution, or *Das Werden*, as Spinoza called it, and others still, *idealism*. Now, none of these are included in either of your two necessary conclusions. You will see that thoughtful men have pondered long on this subject before you directed your attention to it, and that they did not come to the conclusion you did. They wrote many books to elucidate what you dismiss in a half dozen lines. They erred in denying the reality of matter: you err in asserting its eternal existence. To assert God and deny matter shows a higher philosophical culture than to assert matter and deny God. The ontological conceptions of the Hindoos and Chinese of 8,000 years ago, were, therefore, profound, and more in keeping with Christian philosophy than are the ill-digested notions of our modern infidels. The former grasped the idea of necessary being, but failed to recognize the real in the universe. The latter have the ability to apprehend the reality of the visible, tangible world, but cannot rise above it—to a conception of necessary being.

INGERSOLL—"Of course, upon questions like this, nothing can be absolutely known."

COMMENT—To know anything absolutely is to know it in all its relations with the universe and with God, with the necessary and the contingent. The infinite intelligence alone can know things in this way, and, therefore, on "questions like these," or any other questions, we cannot have absolute knowledge, because our minds are finite. But this does not prevent us from knowing *with certainty* what we do know. We know not God absolutely, but we know, with certainty, that He is.

INGERSOLL—"What we know of the infinite is almost infinitely limited, but little as we know, all have an equal right to give their honest thought."

COMMENT—Has any man the right, common sense being the judge, to talk about that of which his knowledge is almost infinitely limited? All may have an *equal* right to give their honest thought, but none have the right to give their honest thought on all subjects and under all circumstances. Common sense and decency forbid it. The honesty of a thought does not give weight or importance or truth to it. If so, lunatics would be the best of reasoners, for none are more honest in their thoughts than they. Thought must be judged with reference to its truth, and not with reference to the honesty of him who thinks it. This plea of honesty in thinking is a justification of every error and crime, for we must, in the very nature of the case, take the thinker's word for the honesty of his thought. Guiteau, if we can believe him, expressed his honest thought by means of an English bulldog revolver, and, if your theory be true, he had a right to do it.

The right to give an honest thought implies the right to realize that thought in action and habit. If it means less than this, it means simply the right to gabble like an idiot. I assume that it is not this latter right you claim. Then, in claiming the right to give your honest thought, you claim the right to realize that thought in act and practice, and cause it, as far as you can, to permeate, and obtain in human society. If your claim for liberty of thought means less than this, it is the veriest delusion.

I take it, then, that, in claiming the right to give your honest thought, you claim the right to promulgate that thought, and to put it in practice in the affairs of life. Now, in view of this claim of yours, I ask, by what right do you interfere with the slaveholder's honest thought, or the Mormon's honest thought? Your plea for the right of expressing honest thought is a miserable pretense, or else by it you mean that only those who *agree with you* have the right of expressing it in word or action. The doctrines of our loquacious liberals, when analyzed, will be found to mean precisely this and nothing more.

CHAPTER IV.

SOMETHING ABOUT THE DESIGN OF THE UNIVERSE; AND INGERSOLL'S "CURIOUS AND WONDERFUL THING."

MR. INGERSOLL next proceeds to show that the argument for the existence of God drawn from the plan or design of the universe is not conclusive. As Mr. Black did not advance this argument I am at a loss to understand why it was introduced by Mr. Ingersoll, unless it was to give us a specimen of his ability in the way of metaphysical skyrocketing. Let us hear him.

INGERSOLL—"It will not do to say that the universe was designed, and, therefore, there must be a designer."

COMMENT—"Why not, if all have a right to give their honest thought?"

INGERSOLL—"There must be proof that it was designed."

COMMENT—"Certainly, and the proof is to be found in every work on theology and philosophy that treats of the subject. As a lawyer, you know that proofs are not to be thrown out of court by a mere stroke of the pen. It was incumbent on you to examine those proofs and show that they are not conclusive, or accept them. Instead of this you very cunningly leave the inference that no such proofs exist. If you knew of those proofs you should, in all candor, have met them fairly; if you were ignorant of them, you should have informed yourself of the arguments on the other side before you undertook to answer them. You have said "candor is the courage of the soul." Let us have courage.

The proofs given by theologians and Christian philosophers that evidences of plan and design exist in this physical universe have never been met by you. According to the rules of logic they are good until you meet and overthrow them. This you must do by reason, and not by bald assertion.

INGERSOLL—"It will not do to say that the universe has a plan, and then assert that there has been an infinite maker."

COMMENT—Of course it will not do to merely say it without any proofs to back the statement, as you say so many things, and, therefore, Christian scholars invariably supply those proofs. The proofs being good until refuted, it does and must follow that there is an infinite planner, designer, Creator.

INGERSOLL—"The idea that a design must have a beginning, and that a designer need not, is a simple expression of human ignorance."

COMMENT—On the contrary it is one of the highest reaches of human reason. But you have evidently lost the thread of the argument you are trying to refute. Christian philosophy does not assert that the plan or design of the universe had a beginning. On the contrary, it teaches that the plan or design existed in the mind of God from all eternity, and is the eternal archetype of all created things. The universe is the eternal idea of God realized in time and space by the creative act. To say that the design of this earth had a beginning is truly a simple expression of human ignorance. As the design is eternal, the designer must be eternal; as the design had no beginning the designer has none. The designs of finite minds must have a beginning, because they partake of the nature of their designer, but we must not measure God's capacity by man's incapacity, an error you seem incapable of avoiding.

INGERSOLL—"We find a watch, and we say: So curious and wonderful a thing must have had a maker."

COMMENT—The Christian does not assert that it had a maker because it is curious and wonderful, but because it shows evidence of having been *made*. The curiousness and wonderfulness of the watch suggests the idea of an *intelligent* maker. A mud-pie will suggest the idea of a maker equally as well as a gold chronometer.

INGERSOLL—"We find the watchmaker and we say: So curious and wonderful a thing as man must have had a maker."

COMMENT—Yes, but not because he is curious and wonderful, but because he is, and is finite. Verily, it would be unfortunate for Christianity if you were permitted to present its case.

INGERSOLL—"We find God, and we then say: He is so wonderful that he must *not* have had a maker."

COMMENT—You say this, but "we" don't. When we find God, we find the self-existent Being, infinite and eternal, and therefore we say, He must *not* have had a maker. This is the way the Christian reasons, and it is somewhat different from the childish nonsense you would put into his mouth

INGERSOLL—"In other words, all things a little wonderful must have been created."

COMMENT—You use that word "wonderful" as a boy uses a toy drum, to the disgust of all who hear it. All things have been created, not because they are curious and wonderful, but because they exist and are finite. The microscopic grain of sand that is wafted by the winds and the waves proves the existence of a Creator as clearly as does this vast and wonderful universe. It is not, then, as you say, the *wonder* of the thing that suggests the idea of creation, but the *existence* of the thing.

INGERSOLL—"One would suppose that just as the wonder increased, the necessity for a creator increased."

COMMENT—The one who would so suppose must be supposed to have a very limited knowledge of philosophy or a very limited intellect. If Christian philosophy were as silly as you have represented, or rather misrepresented it above, it would, indeed, be contemptible. Candor and honor require that when you attack a system or an institution, you should attack it in its own position, and not make fictitious and absurd positions for it, and then proceed with show of logic to demolish the nonsense engendered in your own brain and presented to the public as the principles of Christian philosophy. To misrepresent Christian philosophy is a confession of weakness, an admission that it must be misrepresented before it can be successfully assailed.

INGERSOLL—"Is it possible that a designer exists from all eternity without a design?"

COMMENT—Yes, the idea of a self-existent, eternal designer excludes the idea of a design prior to or independent of him. This is so self-evident that it needs only to be stated. The philosopher who asks such an absurd question is like his watchmaker, a "curious and wonderful thing."

INGERSOLL—"Was there no design in having an infinite designer?"

COMMENT—None whatever, since there cannot be anything back of the infinite and eternal designer. There can be nothing more infinite than the infinite, nothing prior to the eternal. It is as if you should ask: Is there anything more circular than a circle, or anything squarer than a square?

INGERSOLL—"For me it is hard to see the plan or design in earthquakes and pestilences."

COMMENT—This is not surprising, since you have, with commendable humility, admitted that what you know about questions like these is almost infinitely limited. Until you see or understand the design, it is inconsistent in you to condemn it. A boy stood near the railway gazing philosophically at a passing train. A burning cinder from the smoke-stack struck him in the eye. He mused on the incident in this way: "For me it is hard to see what design or plan this great corporation could have had in spending vast sums of money to throw that cinder in my eye. It is somewhat difficult to discern design or benevolence in it." Who will say that boy was not a philosopher and an egotist, or that a fortune does not await him when he is old enough to take the lecture-field?

INGERSOLL—"It is somewhat difficult to discern the design or the benevolence in so making the world that billions of animals live only on the agonies of others."

COMMENT—Until you prove that God so made the world that billions of animals live on the agonies of others, you are not called upon to discern design or benevolence in this agonizing state of things. It does not follow because agony and suffering exist, that God designed it to be so. It is for you to prove that God designed the suffering before you attribute it to Him. You should be just—even to God.

Whence, then, the sufferings of this world?

Crime is the result of human liberty—though not a necessary result—and suffering is the result of crime. Physical evil is the result of moral evil, and moral evil is the result of a perverse use of liberty, which is good in itself. God made man a free agent, not that he might abuse his freedom, but that he might use it to assist Him in His beneficent design, which is the happiness of His creatures. But man abused the gift of liberty, and, in doing so, produced discord in universal harmony. The

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free agent man proved himself untrue to his trust. He betrayed it, and thus became a victim of the disorder he himself produced. The agent is responsible to his principal, and a failure to perform the duties assigned him brings upon him punishment and disgrace. The pagan philosopher Plato understood this when he wrote: "He (the wrongdoer) is not able to see that evil (suffering), *ever united to each act of wrong*, follows him in his insatiate cravings for what is unholy, and that he has to drag along with him the long chain of his wrongdoings, both while he is moving along upon this earth, and when he shall take, under the earth, (in hell we would say), an endless journey of dishonor and frightful miseries."

Evils, that are the results of man's perversion of liberty, cannot be attributed to the design of God; and those who so attribute them are as reasonless as the shipwrecked mariners who condemn the captain for the sufferings which they brought upon themselves by their disobedience to his commands, or as the criminal who attributes his punishment to the judge, when it is the result of his own crime.

While admitting the existence of evils and sufferings in the world, the Christian does not, and is not bound, by his principles, to admit that they are the result of the design or plan of God in creating the universe.

To those who see in man's nature and destiny nothing higher than that of the grasshopper or the potato-bug, who believe that man's life ends with the death or decomposition of his outer shell, there must be something inexplicable in the sufferings of this life.

But to the Christian who looks upon this life and its vicissitudes as a mere phase of man's immortal career, who considers this world of time as the womb of the eternal years, the sufferings of this life are but the temporary inconveniences of the weary traveler on his homeward voyage. Their weight is lightened and their sharpness blunted by the thought of home with its comforts and its rest. He suffers with patience and resignation to the will of his eternal Father, with the consoling hope that, when he is freed from the body of this death, he will pass into the eternal day where death and pain are known no more forever. Buoyed up by faith and hope he says in his inmost soul:

NOTES ON INGERSOLL.

"Beyond the parting and the meeting
I shall be soon;
Beyond the farewell and the greeting,
Beyond the pulse's fevered beating
I shall be soon.

Beyond the frost chain and the fever
I shall be soon;
Beyond the rock-waste and the river,
Beyond the ever and the never,
I shall be soon.
Love, rest, and home!
Sweet home!
Lord, tarry not, but come."

CHAPTER V.

ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD—A FUTURE STATE—SOME SPECIMENS
OF THE COLONEL'S "HONEST" METHODS.

INGERSOLL—"The justice of God is not visible to me in the history of this world."
COMMENT—Might not this strange circumstance arise from intellectual Staphyloma? Grant that it is not visible to you, does it follow that it is not in this world? Does your failure to see it demonstrate that it is not? When you make your limited vision the measure of God's justice you usurp the attributes of the infinite, put your judgment above His, and attempt to assume His place. Men have been kindly, but firmly, consigned to insane asylums for such philosophy; and curious visitors meet with them almost every day. It is in the last analysis a question of God's existence, for if there is an infinite self-existent Being, He must, from His very nature, be infinite in everything, and if in everything, infinite in His justice. To assert that He is not infinitely just is to deny His existence. But your statement supposes His existence and therefore grants His infinite justice. If then that justice which exists by the logic of your position, is not visible to you, you should doubt, not it, but the powers of your vision. This is difficult to a man of almost infinite self-assertive capacity, but it is wisdom.
INGERSOLL—"When I think of the suffering and death, of the poverty and crime, of the cruelty and malice, of the

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heartlessness of this 'plan' or 'design' where beak and claw and tooth tear and rend the quivering flesh of weakness and despair, I cannot convince myself that it is the result of infinite wisdom, benevolence, and justice."

COMMENT—As you are not required by Christian philosophy to believe that the evils you describe were a part of God's plan or design in creating the universe, you are not called upon to reconcile those evils with God's wisdom, benevolence, or justice. If you have been laboring under the notion that God planned and designed the miseries of this world, and under that delusion have tried to reconcile the original plan of this infinitely just God with the facts of life, you have been exhausting your energies in a very foolish piece of business. Your very effort in that direction proves that you have not grasped the situation. In the article of yours that I am now commenting on, you confess your ignorance of the divine plan or design, and yet you presume to attribute suffering, death, crime, cruelty and malice to that plan. Above all things it behooveth a philosopher to be consistent. It is unphilosophical to attribute to a plan objectionable features when you confess ignorance of that plan.

INGERSOLL—"Most Christians have seen and recognized this difficulty (that of reconciling the miseries of this life with the justice of God), and have endeavored to avoid it by giving God an opportunity in another world to rectify the seeming mistake of this."

COMMENT—When the position of "most Christians" is properly and truthfully stated there is no difficulty to see or avoid. The other world exists without reference to man's innocence or guilt, happiness or misery in this. Your insinuation that Christians invented the future state shows either discreditable ignorance of the history of human thought, or a desire to misrepresent. There is no middle way out of the dilemma for you. Ignorance is a crime in one who assumes the office of a teacher of his fellow-men, and misrepresentation is, as you would say, "singularly and vulgarly out of place" in treating of a subject that requires the exercise of the highest faculties of the human mind.

The doctrine of a future state of existence has been universally believed, especially by the well-informed of mankind in all ages and places. History clearly shows

that the united voice of ancient nations proclaimed this doctrine. The Egyptians, the Persians, the Hindoos, both Brahmists and Buddhists, the Chinese, whether the followers of Lao Tse, Confucius, or Gautama; the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Scythians, Celts and Druids, as well as the Greeks and Romans, believed in a future state. There is not an ancient nation or tribe of which history furnishes an account, which did not, with greater or less clearness, believe in a future state. The notions of many of them were very obscure and unsatisfactory, embracing much that was ridiculous and absurd; but still, though shadows and darkness and clouds rested upon their minds, their hopes had penetrated the gloomy future, giving evidence of an internal consciousness of the insufficiency of the present world to satisfy the ardent aspirations of their souls. Our American Indians believe in a future state. The human race, then, in all times, has believed in a future state, and yet, in the face of this Mississippi current of human thought, you have the unutterable audacity or ignorance to say that Christians *invented* it to give God a chance to rectify the mistakes of this! Are these the kind of weapons you hope to destroy the Christian religion with? Can you afford thus to play with the credulity of your readers, and with your own reputation? Honor bright!

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black, however, avoids the question by saying: We have neither jurisdiction nor capacity to rejudge the justice of God."

COMMENT—To state a truth is not to avoid the question. You, however, avoid the question by not admitting Black's proposition, or disproving it. It is the hinge on which the argument turns, and you should not have avoided it. If Mr. Black's statement is true then you are wrong in attempting to judge of God's justice. If his statement is false, then you are right in so judging.

The statement of Mr. Black, instead of avoiding the question, brought it to a direct issue. His proposition, reduced to its simplest form, is this: The finite cannot be the measure of the infinite. God's justice is infinite; the human mind is finite; hence the latter cannot be the measure of the former—in other words, we have not the capacity, and, for a stronger reason, not the jurisdiction to rejudge the justice of God. This is the clear issue Mr.

Black made with you, but, instead of meeting it squarely, as candor would dictate, you proceed to avoid it by misstating it. Thus you say:

INGERSOLL—"In other words, we have no right to think upon this subject—"

COMMENT—This is neatly done. But it will not succeed. Mr. Black did not say we have no right to *think*. He said we have no right to *judge*, and it seems to me that any adult, whose intellect is not below the average, will see a difference between *thinking* and *judging*. You honor the truth in Mr. Black's proposition when you try to torture it out of shape before you attempt to answer it.

INGERSOLL—"—no right to examine the questions vitally affecting human kind."

COMMENT—Here you are again. This is the pettiest kind of thimble-rigging. Mr. Black did not say we have no right to *examine* these questions. He said we had no right to *rejudge* the justice of God. You need not be told that there is a difference between *examining* and *judging*. I cannot believe, in view of your knowledge of the English language, that you change these words without a purpose, even though you hold that "candor is the courage of the soul."

INGERSOLL—"We have simply to accept the ignorant statements of the barbarian dead."

COMMENT—We accept neither the ignorant statements of the barbarian dead, nor the ignorant statements of the atheistic living. We are averse to accepting ignorant statements from any man, be he an ancient barbarian or modern pagan. The question between you and Mr. Black, as to whether the finite can be the measure of the infinite, is one that cannot be settled by the statements of anyone, ignorant or otherwise. It is a question of pure reason, and anyone gifted with the use of reason, who comprehends the meaning of the terms *finite* and *infinite* will know that the former cannot include the latter—in other words, that the finite mind has not the capacity or jurisdiction to rejudge the ways of the infinite intelligence.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD—LOGIC AND LEGAL TENDERS—QUEER ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON.

INGERSOLL—"This question cannot be settled by saying that it would be a mere waste of time and space to enumerate the proofs which show that the universe was created by a pre-existent and self-conscious being. The time and space should have been wasted, and the proofs should have been enumerated. These proofs are what the wisest and greatest are trying to find."

COMMENT—It is true, nevertheless, that it would be a waste of time and space to reproduce those proofs that have never been answered. It would appear that you are ignorant of those proofs, but your ignorance of them does not justify Mr. Black in exhausting the limited space given him to reply to you, in reprinting what you and every man who makes any pretensions to a knowledge of philosophy and theology are supposed to know. The wisest and greatest of mankind have known, studied, and pondered those proofs, and have been convinced by them. They and the world do not agree with you. It is a serious mistake on your part to imagine that, because these proofs are unknown to you, they are unknown to scholars in this line of thought, or that the "wisest and greatest" are trying to find them because you have not found them. You do yourself honor overmuch, in supposing that the wisest and greatest are in the same boat with you. Is it your misfortune or theirs that the best thinkers, in ancient and modern times, cannot see things in the light you see them? If you had taken Mr. Black's kind hint and studied those proofs so well known in current philosophical literature, you would have been less profligate of statement; and you would have learned that there are many things worth knowing, not dreamt of in your philosophy.

I have some advantages of Mr. Black. I am not dealing with the *North American Review*, and it is not in your power to shut me off as you did him when you wanted to stop. I can, therefore, afford to spend some space and time in try-

ing to familiarize your mind with the proof of a supreme, self-existent, and infinitely wise Being. I shall produce the argument of a philosopher for the existence of God. I do not deem it necessary or logically called for, just here, to do this; but as it may prove instructive to you I give it. It runs in this way:

I allow you to doubt all things if you wish, till you come to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe,—to deny as it does to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts, would be to doubt that you doubt, for, without intelligence, there can be no more doubt than belief. Intelligence, then, you must assert, for without intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt, then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not, cannot act.

This much, then, is certain, that however far you may be disposed to carry your denials, you cannot carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because that would be denial of denial itself. Then you must concede intelligence, and then whatever is essential to the reality of intelligence. In conceding anything, you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some object capable of being known. So, in conceding intelligence, you necessarily concede the intelligible. The intelligible is, therefore, something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real, there is and can be no possible or abstract. The abstract, in that it is abstract, is nothing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no object of knowledge or of the intellect. The possible, as possible, is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is

apprehensible only in that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is pure nullity, has no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is unintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, on the principle that what is not is not intelligible. Consequently, to the reality of intelligence, a real intelligible is necessary, and since the reality of intelligence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, and asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible being. You are obliged to assert intelligence, but you cannot assert intelligence without asserting the intelligible, and you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting something that really is, that is, without asserting real being. The real being thus asserted is either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contingent and therefore created being. One of the other we must say, for being which is neither necessary nor contingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, and cannot be asserted or supposed.

Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and eternal, or contingent and created—is either being in itself, absolute being, or existence dependent on another for its being, and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not, is not intelligible, is intelligible as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting necessary and eternal being; and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God, or that God is; and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelligence God is asserted, and that it is impossible without self-contradiction to deny His existence.*

INGERSOLL—"Logic is not satisfied with assertion."

COMMENT—Then it is not satisfied with your assertion

* Brownson's Quarterly Review.

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in reference to it. But you are evidently ignorant of what logic means. Logic as a science deals with principles, not assertions; and logic as an art deals with assertions only. Assertions are the subject matter on which it acts. It simply deduces conclusions from assertions or propositions called premises, and cares not whether these premises are true or false. Hence the very reverse of what you say is true. Logic is satisfied with assertions, and knows and deals with nothing else. Your blunder arose from your confounding *reason* with *logic*. Reason deals with principles and truths, logic with assertions. That reason is not satisfied with assertions becomes more apparent the more your article on the Christian Religion is subjected to careful analysis.

INGERSOLL—"It (logic) cares nothing for the opinion of the great."

COMMENT—If those opinions are formulated into assertions, it does care for them, because it deals with nothing else. You mean to say: *Reason* cares nothing, etc. This careless use of words and confounding of terms indicates a confused and imperfect method of thinking. He who thinks with clearness and precision, will express his thought with clearness and precision, while a slovenly thinker leaves the reader in a state of chronic doubt as to what is meant.

INGERSOLL—"In the world of science a fact is a legal tender."

COMMENT—Then, before you can assert a legal tender, you must demonstrate a fact. A fact must be established as such, before it is legal tender. Now the question between you and the Christian is this: What are the facts? The whole controversy rests on the answer to this question. What you offer as facts, the Christian may reject as fallacies and sophistries, and what he offers as facts you may reject. It follows, therefore, that until both parties agree as to what are the facts, they cannot agree as to what is legal tender. What you intended, then, as a wise saying has no practical sense in it. But for those who like that sort of thing, it is about the sort of thing they will like.

INGERSOLL—"A fact is a legal tender."

COMMENT—A counterfeit is a fact; is it legal tender? O! no. Well then a fact is not a legal tender until it is

known to be a fact. What is a legal tender? It is a promise to pay which may not be worth ten cents on a dollar, but which the law compels you to accept when offered. Is this your idea of what facts are? And do you intend the facts offered by you to be received in that light? If so, perhaps you are right.

INGERSOLL—"Assertions and miracles are base and spurious coins."

COMMENT—If this be true, then the assertion you have just made is base and spurious coin. You say all assertions are base and spurious. Is it because they are assertions or because they are false? If all assertions are base and spurious, we cannot believe anything whatever that is asserted, simply because it is asserted. I assert that two and two make four. This is an assertion. Is it false? It must be, if what you say is true. From this it appears that you again failed to say what you meant; for you will certainly admit that *some* assertions are true—your own, for instance.

Perhaps you meant to say *false* assertions are base and spurious. If so, this is on a par with your legal tender sophism, and involves the same amount of meaningless verbiage. The truth or fallacy of an assertion must be established before you can assert it to be base and spurious. But the truth or fallacy of an assertion is the question in debate. Let me illustrate: I make the assertion that the Christian religion is of divine origin. You will observe that the truth or fallacy of this assertion is the point in debate, and to assert either one or the other without proof, is to beg the question. This you do when you assert that assertions are base and spurious.

But perhaps I have misunderstood you all this time. You "probably think" that all assertions favoring Christianity are base and spurious, while all those against it have the true ring. If you meant this you should have the "courage of the soul" to say it, and not hide your insinuation in a meaningless, commonplace phrase. I notice you are fond of making curt little maxims, which on examination mean nothing, unless when they cover a fallacy. They are scattered through your article so liberally as to lead one to believe you intended them for argument. But:

INGERSOLL—"Miracles are base and spurious coins."

COMMENT—That depends. And here I must make the same distinction I made in regard to assertions. If a miracle is a fact, it is not base and spurious. Now the fact or fallacy of a miracle is the point in debate. Until that point is settled, not by assertions, but by valid arguments, you cannot say that it is spurious, for when you make that assertion you simply beg the question. To beg the question in argument is like asking a knight or a castle from your opponent in a game of chess. It is a sign of conscious weakness.

INGERSOLL—"We have the right to rejudge the justice even of a god."

COMMENT—If by "a god" you mean some deity of heathen mythology, I cannot stop to consider it. If you mean the infinite Being, whom Christians call God, I deny your right or competency to rejudge His justice, for reasons which I have already given, and which I need not here repeat. It is sufficient to say that the finite cannot be the measure of the infinite.

INGERSOLL—"No one should throw away his reason—the fruit of all experience."

COMMENT—Your purpose here is to leave the impression that, to be a Christian, a man must throw away his reason. Man's reason is a gift of God, and God requires him to exercise and use it, and not throw it away. And He will one day ask him to give a strict account of the use he has made of it. While telling us not to throw away our reason, you give a good illustration of how it can be thrown away. Thus you say:

INGERSOLL—"Reason is the result of all experience."

COMMENT—When you make reason the *result* of experience you destroy its proper entity. Experience is impossible without something that experiences. What is it that experiences? Reason? No; for if reason is the *result* of experience it cannot exist until after the experience has been completed. What then is it that experiences? The individual? But the individual *minus* reason is incapable of apprehending experience. What then is it that experiences? There must be some being that experiences, for experience cannot exist without a subject. The mind? But mind and reason are identical. Reason is the mind, in action. The fact is, human reason, or conscious mind is that which experiences; it is therefore prior

to experience, and since it is prior to experience, it cannot be a result of it. Without reason experience is impossible, and therefore when you make reason the result of experience you throw away both reason and experience. This is the logical result of your proposition. Again you say:

INGERSOLL—"Reason is the fruit of *all* experience."

COMMENT—By this "all" you mean, I suppose, the experience of all mankind together with your own. But you have barred yourself from the right to benefit by the experience of others, for that experience can be made known to you only by assertions or propositions. Now, you have declared *ex cathedra* that assertions are base and spurious coins, and rejected with contempt the statements of the dead past, by which alone the experience of the human race can be known. You have sawed off the limb on which you sit, and deprived yourself of all experience except your own.

INGERSOLL—"It (reason) is the intellectual capital of the soul, the only light, the only guide."

COMMENT—Reason is the soul or intellect itself in conscious action; hence it cannot be its own intellectual capital, or its only light and guide. You seem to forget what you have said before, namely, that reason is the *result* of experience. Now, to say that reason is the only light and guide of the soul, and at the same time the result of experience, is to contradict yourself. What lights and guides the soul while it is experiencing? Reason? No; for you have told us that reason is the *result* of that experience. A result is an effect, and an effect cannot be prior to its cause. It follows, then, from your own definition, that reason is not and cannot be the only light or guide of the soul. But even if you had not contradicted yourself egregiously, your assertion that reason is the only light, etc., cannot be accepted, for it is a pitiable begging of the whole question at issue—a denial of revelation as a guide to reason, and this you will see is the point between you and the Christian. Your statement thus cunningly assumes, as proved, that which you set out to prove. This is one of the peculiarities of your method in debate. It is on this account that I am under the necessity of analyzing almost every assertion you make.

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CHAPTER VII.

ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS; AND ART—THE WIFE AND OTHER VALUABLE PROPERTY.

INGERSOLL—"Of course it is admitted that most of the Ten Commandments are wise and just."

COMMENT—Most? Why this indefinite limitation? Is it candid to make a limitation so indefinite as to leave you room to dodge? Why not specify which, if any, are not wise and just? Christians are bound and ready to defend them all. Why not point out an unwise or unjust Commandment, that we may come to a direct issue?

INGERSOLL—"In passing, it may be well enough to say that the commandment, 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth,' was the absolute death of art, and that not until the destruction of Jerusalem was there a Hebrew painter or sculptor."

COMMENT—There are two assertions here. First, that the Commandment quoted was the absolute death of art, and second, that before the destruction of Jerusalem there was no Hebrew painter or sculptor. The first involves a question of interpretation, the second, a question of history.

Now, I deny both these assertions, and hold that they have no foundation in fact. Here is a direct issue.

As to the Commandment, it could not have been the absolute death of art unless it forbade art. But it did not forbid or condemn art, therefore it was not the death of art. Was it candid or honorable in you to suppress that part of the Commandment which explains and makes clear the meaning of that which you quoted? If you garbled the law in quoting it in a court of justice, would not the judge look upon you as an unprincipled shyster? Would he not be justified in debarring you for contempt, in trying to deceive and mislead the court? You are fond of preaching candor and honor bright. Was it candid or honorable to leave out of your quotation that sen-

tence which would have left your assertion without truth, force or point? But you were determined to make your point even if you had to garble the law you quoted, in making it. The sentence you so uncandidly suppressed is this: "Thou shalt not *adore* them (i.e. images) nor serve them." This clause, suppressed by you, explains the meaning of what goes before, showing that it was not the making of images, but the *making gods* of them, that was forbidden. That this is the meaning of the Commandment is evident from the fact that the same God who spoke in the First Commandment subsequently ordered images to be made. Moses explains the meaning still further when he says: (Exodus, 20-28) "You shall not make gods of silver, nor shall you make gods of gold." Again, the great Hebrew lawgiver was commanded to place two cherubim on the very ark in which the Commandments were kept. He was also commanded to make the brazen serpent. (Numbers 21-6 to 9). In the description of Solomon's temple we read of that prince, not only that he made, in the oracle, two cherubim of olive tree, of ten cubits high (1 Kings 6-28), but that "all the walls of the temple round about he carved with divine figures and carvings." (1 Kings 6-29 and following verses. This whole chapter abounds with descriptions of works of art.) When David imposed upon Solomon the injunction of building the house of the Lord, he delivered to him a description of the porch and temple and concluded by saying: "All these things came to me, written by the hand of the Lord, that I might understand all the works of the pattern." (1 Chronicles 28-11, 19.) Thus we see that God not only commanded the making of images but that He actually exhibited the pattern. And yet you sniffle that He killed art.

Now God who gave the Commandment, and the Jewish people who received it, had a better knowledge of its meaning than you dare pretend to have. David and Solomon understood the law, and it did not occur to them that they were breaking it when they made cherubim and other images for adornment and ornamentation.

But this Commandment, you say, was the death—and not only the death, but the *absolute* death of art. What infatuation has taken possession of you to say this in the face of that magnificent temple of Jerusalem and all the works of art it contained? Was not the temple itself a

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work of art? And those images, were they not works of art? Since the Commandment as interpreted by its maker—not by you—did not forbid the making of images, it could not have affected art, unless you claim for art the right to worship false gods and idols. If, therefore, the Jews were not artists you must seek the reason elsewhere than in this First Commandment. But if you condemn the Jews for not cultivating art why is it that you have no words of commendation for Christianity under whose inspiration and influence art was brought to its highest development?

INGERSOLL—"Not until the destruction of Jerusalem was there a Hebrew sculptor or painter."

COMMENT—"Well then who 'sculped' the cherubim and other ornamentations for the temple of Jerusalem? Who made the cherubim to ornament the ark of the covenant? Who made the golden calf and the brazen serpent? Surely, it requires all the brass of the brazen serpent to say, in the face of all this, that 'there was no Hebrew sculptor before the destruction of Jerusalem.'"

INGERSOLL—"Surely a commandment is not inspired that drives from earth the living canvas and the breathing stone—leaves all walls bare, and all the niches desolate."

COMMENT—"Surely the inventor of this curious criterion of inspiration deserves recognition of some kind. But this lachrymose ejaculation is entirely uncalled for, since the Commandment, when not garbled by you, does not forbid the living canvas or the breathing stone, the frescoed wall or ornamented niche. As we have seen, the First Commandment has nothing to do with art, one way or the other. But even if it did banish the living canvas, etc., from the earth, it would not follow that it is not inspired. Your 'surely it is not inspired' is no proof against inspiration. One who worships reason and logic should exhibit more of both."

From what you say about Art, it is evident that you do not know its meaning and scope. You limit it to sculpture and painting, because you imagine these two forms of art are forbidden by the Commandment. Art is broader than that. I will give you a definition of art, which will, if you study it well, prevent you in future from showing your ears to quiet, thoughtful men who have gone somewhat deeper than you have into philosophy and theology. Art

is the *expression* or manifestation of the Beautiful. It is an appeal by symbolism to the senses. It treats of color and form which are an appeal to vision; letters and other outlines which are an appeal to the intellect through the medium of sight; vibratory motion which appeals to the sense of hearing—called music; tangible forms which talk to the sense of feeling; and combinations which appeal to the taste.

Now, the death of Art is the destruction of all these methods of expression. Do you pretend to say that the First Commandment destroys or forbids all these methods of expressing or manifesting the Beautiful? No. Well then the First Commandment is not the death of Art, even if I should grant all you claim, which of course I do not. Poetry is an art—and where can you find more sublime specimens of it than in the Psalms of David, the Book of Job, the majestic flights of Isaiah, and the soul-piercing threnodies of Jeremiah? Here we have the highest genius and the highest art. And yet because they did not daub lecherous pictures on canvas, or cut naked Venuses out of stone, they were not artists. The commandment was the death of art!—trash.

INGERSOLL—"In the Tenth Commandment we find women placed on an exact equality with other property, which, to say the least of it, has never tended to the amelioration of her condition."

COMMENT—The relative nature of persons and things protected by law is not measured by the law that protects them. A law may forbid murder and theft at the same time without placing these two crimes on the same plane, or an exact equality. As a lawyer, you should be familiar with this fact. This Tenth Commandment forbids to covet a neighbor's wife, and at the same time it forbids to covet his property. This prohibition, you will admit, is wise and just when it refers to that which is most beloved of and sacred to man. It is equally wise and just when it protects that which is of less value or importance to him. Now, do you pretend to say that these two objects cannot be at the same time forbidden without putting them on an exact equality? If the Commandment had not mentioned a wife you would have taken advantage of the omission and held that it left the wife at the mercy of the profligate, or that it placed a higher estimate on the

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husband's horse or ox than on the wife of his bosom, or that it protected the one while it failed to protect the other. So, whether the command forbids to covet a neighbor's wife, or is silent on the subject, you are not satisfied. You are like the Frenchman who was to be hanged, neither a long nor a short rope would suit him.

But again; as a lawyer, you should know that the distinction between objects protected or forbidden by law is not to be found in the law, but in the punishment inflicted by the law. The civil law forbids alike the stealing of fifty cents and one hundred dollars. Does the law put these sums on an exact equality? No; for it sends the fifty-cent thief to jail, while it sends the more ambitious fellow to State's prison. In the same way the Jewish criminal code condemned the wife-stealer to death, while he who stole an ox was required to return it and pay a heavy fine. From the difference of punishment you can see that the Commandment, as understood by those to whom it was given, made a distinction between a wife and an ox, and did not place them on an "exact equality."

You argue like a man who places much confidence in the credulity or gullibility of his readers, and imagines that while a few may investigate and know the truth, the larger number will take his word for it, and inquire no further. This policy shows a good knowledge of human nature, for the average man is not overburdened with the faculty of discrimination. He is apt to place too much confidence in the ignorant statements of that monumental bore of modern times, the roving lecturer—admission fifty cents.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON MURDER—CANAANITES—CAPTIVE MAIDENS—WARAUIDING—
LYING SPIRITS AND FALSE PROPHETS.

INGERSOLL—"He (God) ordered the murder of millions."

COMMENT—He never authorized or ordered the *murder* of any one, from Abel to Garfield. God is the author and giver of life, and those He places on this earth He can remove at His will. No man has a right to live one instant longer in this world than his Creator wills him to remain, be he yet unborn, or innocent, or guilty. As creatures of God we are absolutely His, and can have no rights whatever as against Him. To God the death of man is but the passing from one state of existence to another, from one department to another in the same universe. Death is not annihilation, or reabsorption into the elements of matter, but a transportation from one state to another, in which man retains his individuality and conscious identity as truly and really as does he who passes from one room to another in the same house. Physical death, therefore, is a trifling circumstance in man's immortal career. Now, He who has the absolute right to transpose man from one state of being to another, has equally the right to select the method of his removal, whether by old age, disease, the deluge, the sword, or by what we call accidents. By whatever method man is withdrawn from life's fitful fever, his death is in pursuance of the original sentence passed on the race by an infinitely just Judge. This sentence awaits you, and your philosophy will not obtain you a stay of proceedings or an exemption.

But to return. He who has the absolute right to take life, cannot be guilty of *murder* in taking it, for murder is an *unjust* killing, and there is no unjust killing in the taking of life by Him who has the absolute right to take it. There is no escape from this reasoning except by denying the absolute right, and you cannot deny this but by denying God's existence; for on the hypothesis that He exists, He is Creator, and being Creator, the absolute

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right of dominion over His creatures necessarily follows. Then in the last analysis, to deny this right is to deny God's existence. But you cannot logically deny His existence, since you say in your lecture on "Skulls" that you do not know whether He exists or not.

It follows from what has been said that when God ordered the execution of the guilty Canaanites it was not a command to murder. Nor was it a violation of His own Commandment, for it was *unjust* killing that He forbade, and the destruction of that guilty people was just, because ordered by Him who had the absolute right to order it, whether they were guilty or not.

I have dwelt some length on the absolute right of dominion of the Creator over His creatures, because you harp on what you call His murders through your whole article. That which one has absolute right to take at any and all times, one cannot be unjust in taking when he pleases.

As to the Canaanites, they were guilty of death, although they were not put to death, but driven from Palestine in about the same manner that the whites are driving the Indians from the homes of their forefathers. The unparalleled wickedness and filthy abominations of the seven nations of Palestine, commonly called Canaanites, were such as to make their national expulsion or extermination a just punishment and a useful lesson to other nations. The nature of their crimes may be found in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. Read that chapter and you will understand why Jehovah held these beastly people in abhorrence. The Mormons and Oneida Communists are as pure as the driven snow in comparison with them. To give the reader an idea of their incredible debasement, I quote some verses from the end of the chapter, wherein God warns the Hebrews not to imitate their example:

"Defile not yourselves with any of these things with which all the nations have been defiled, which I will cast out before you. And with which the land is defiled; the abominations of which I will visit; that it may vomit out its inhabitants. Keep ye my ordinances and judgments, and do not any of these abominations. * * For all these detestable things, the inhabitants of the land (Canaanites, Amhorites) have done that were before you, and have defiled it. Beware of them lest in like manner

it vomit you also out, if you do like things, as it vomited out the nation that was before you. Every soul that shall commit any of these abominations, shall perish from the midst of his people."

These abominations are described in the first part of the chapter. Read it carefully that you may know the abominable wretches you sympathize with.

The author of the Book of Wisdom describes some of the sins of those people, and justifies their punishment in words that I cannot do better than quote:

"Thou chastisest them that err, by little and little; and admonishest them, and speakest to them, concerning the things wherein they offend; that leaving their wickedness they may believe in thee. For those ancient inhabitants of the holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did works hateful to thee by their sorceries and wicked sacrifices, and those merciless murderers of their own children, and eaters of man's bowels, and devourers of blood from the midst of thy consecration; and those parents sacrificing with their own hands helpless souls, it was thy will to destroy by the hands of our parents. * * Yet even those, thou sparedst as men, and did send wasps forerunners of thy host, to destroy them little by little. Not that thou wast not able to bring the wicked under the just by war, or by cruel beasts, or with one rough word to destroy them at once. But executing thy judgment by degrees thou gavest them a place of repentance, not being ignorant that they were a wicked generation and their malice natural, and that their thought could never be changed. * * Neither didst thou, for fear of any one, give pardon to their sins. For who shall say to thee: What hast thou done? or who shall withstand thy judgments? or who shall come before thee to be a revenger of wicked men? or who shall accuse thee if the nations perish, which thou hast made? For there is no other God but thou, who hast care of all, that thou shouldst show that thou dost not give judgment unjustly. Neither shall king nor tyrant in thy sight inquire about them, whom thou hast destroyed. For so much then as thou art just, thou orderest all things justly; thinking it not agreeable to thy power to condemn him who deservest not to be punished. For thy power is the beginning of justice, and because thou art Lord of all, thou makest thyself gracious to all.

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For thou showest thy power, when men will not believe thee to be absolute in power, and thou convinceest the boldness of them that know thee not. But thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favor disposest of us, for thy power is at hand when thou wilt. * * Thou hast made thy children to be of good hope, *because in judging, thou givest place for repentance for sins.* For if thou didst punish the enemies of thy servants, and them that deserved to die, with so great deliberation, *giving them time and place whereby they might be changed from their wickedness,* with what circumspection hast thou judged thy own children, * * therefore whereas thou chastisest us, thou scourgest our enemies in very many ways, to the end that when we judge we may think on thy goodness, when we may be judged, we may hope for thy mercy. Wherefore thou hast also greatly tormented them who in their life have lived foolishly and ungodly, by the same things which they worshipped. For they went astray for a long time in the ways of error, holding those things for gods which are the most worthless among beasts, living after the manner of children without understanding. Therefore thou hast sent a judgment upon them. * * But they that were not amended by mockeries and reprehensions, experienced the worthy judgment of God." (Wisdom, Chapter xii.)

Here we find that those people, whom you beslayer with your gushing sympathy, were sorcerers, murderers of their own children, offering them with their own hands in sacrifice to idols, and man-eaters. On the other hand we learn the merciful way in which Jehovah warned them and gave them time and place for repentance. When they rejected His mercy He punished them with justice, and, for doing this, you accuse Him of murder. Those who, knowing the crimes of these people, condemn the punishment inflicted on them are as guilty as they. You condemn Mormonism and Oneida communism, and yet you volunteer to advocate those bestial Sodomites of Canaan whose unnatural crimes disgraced the race to which they belonged, and contaminated the land which God had given them to dwell in.

"A fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind."

INGERSOLL—"He (God) gave captive maidens to gratify the lust of captors."

COMMENT—If I were an infidel or an atheist zealous for the success of the cause, I would counsel you to be less reckless in your statements. Every cause, good or bad, suffers from injudicious advocates. The most injudicious of all advocates is he who makes a baseless assertion or an appeal to ignorance, because he excites suspicion and brings discredit on the cause he advocates. I flatly deny the truth of your statement given above, and appeal to the only record that can give us any information on the subject, namely, the Old Testament. The Hebrew military laws *did not* abandon captive women to the insolence or brutality of captors. On the contrary, they made special provision forbidding the first familiarities of the soldier with his captives. If you study the twenty-first chapter of Deuteronomy, verses 10 to 14, you will learn that the soldier was obliged to make the captive his wife, or to respect her person and honor. Instead of tolerating that licentiousness which the customs and laws of other nations authorized, the laws of the Hebrews kept the soldier in restraint. They show that the Hebrews were far in advance of other nations in all those regulations that mitigate the horrors of war. The pagan nations of that time allowed every familiarity with captives, and afterwards they were sold as slaves, or given to the lust of slaves. This was strictly and specifically forbidden by the Hebrew law. And yet in the face of all this, you have the effrontery to charge the Almighty with permitting the Jews to do that which He forbade, and which they alone, of all ancient nations, prohibited by strict and specific laws. What will honest men of common sense think of a philosophy that has to be propped and bolstered up by such shameless misrepresentations of history?

INGERSOLL—"He (God) gave to Jewish marauders the flocks and herds of others."

COMMENT—Those marauders, as you call them, could not possibly have had a better title. God, as Creator of all, has absolute dominion over all things, and against His title there is none. The right to confiscate property is recognized as existing in all civil society; now civil society cannot possess and exercise a higher right than its Creator. Our government confiscated millions of dollars' worth of property during the late war, yet it never occurred to any one but a simian philosopher that such

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confiscation was stealing. The cause that justifies the war justifies the confiscation.

After the battle of Shiloh, I saw hundreds of wagon-loads of cotton passing North towards Pittsburg Landing. It belonged to the Southern people, and the government had taken it and sold it to Northern speculators, or marauders as you would call them. It was the Southman's flock and herd. The government had confiscated it and given it away for a consideration. You vindicate this measure, and you are right in doing so. But on what principle can you justify our government in confiscating the property of its enemies while you condemn the same measure when practised by the Hebrew government? Confiscation is a war measure, and it is a merciful one, because it tends to end war.

INGERSOLL—"He (God) sent abroad lying spirits to deceive His own prophets."

COMMENT—I will give one hundred dollars to the poor of this village if you or any of your disciples will make good your statement. I am familiar with the texts in Kings and Ezechiel which you probably imagine will bear you out, but if you carefully compare those texts with your statement you will find that your zeal has run away with your discretion, and that your hatred of your Maker is more intense than your love for the truth.

God abhors lying spirits, false prophets, false philosophers and deceivers of all kinds, ancient and modern, and yet He permits them to exist because He cannot make them impossible without destroying free will or human liberty. There were laws enacted condemning these false prophets and other popular seducers, but these laws were not enforced because the false prophets, etc., flattered the passions of the people, telling them pleasant things. They were popular lecturers in their day, and they did not die without issue.

CHAPTER IX.

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION—FREE THOUGHT AND TREASON.

INGERSOLL—"The religious intolerance of the Old Testament is justified upon the ground that 'blasphemy was a breach of political allegiance,' and that idolatry was an act of overt treason, and that 'to worship the gods of the hostile heathen was deserting to the public enemy, and giving him aid and comfort.'"

COMMENT—If these positions of Mr. Black are well taken it is difficult to see how you can escape their logical consequence. For you must admit that overt treason, breach of political allegiance, and giving aid and comfort to the enemy, are crimes that merit severe punishment. If you were a logician you would have known that to refute Mr. Black you should have shown that blasphemy and idolatry were not overt acts of treason. This you did not even attempt to do. Hence, so far as argument is concerned, Mr. Black has justified what you call the intolerance of the Old Testament. Is a government intolerant because it will not tolerate treason? If not, then the Jewish government was not intolerant, and the fact that God was its direct ruler does not change the nature of the case. Every government that is worthy of the name must be intolerant of all those things that touch its supreme authority, majesty and honor. The Southern revolt was no more treason against the United States government, than were idolatry and blasphemy against the Jewish government. You became a Colonel to assist the government to punish that attack on its supreme authority, majesty and honor. What new light has penetrated your skull that you now defend treason in Judea? Is it because God, against whom you seem to have a personal grudge, was the direct ruler there? If you should carry out your theories of toleration to their logical conclusion and realize them in overt acts in this country you would find yourself in due time dangling from a gibbet. It does not seem to have occurred to you that it was necessary to disprove Mr. Black's statement, that idolatry was treason, before you could drive him from his

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position. If you grant that idolatry was treason against the Jewish state you give away your case, and justify the punishment which that state inflicted on the idolater. No man with an atom of sense will attempt to deny this. To meet Mr. Black fully and logically you should have proved that idolatry was not treason, and if you could not do this, as most certainly you could not, you should have "walked up like a man" and admitted that the Jews were right, and not only right, but were bound to punish idolatry and blasphemy with death, as treason is punished in all times and by all nations, whether God is the immediate head of the government or not.

INGERSOLL—"According to Mr. Black, we should all have liberty of conscience, except when governed directly by God."

COMMENT—If by "liberty of conscience" you mean liberty to commit overt acts of treason, you should not need to be told that such liberty of conscience is not, and should not be, permitted to exist anywhere, not even in badly regulated lunatic asylums.

The slave-holder's conscience told him that secession was right. As long as his conscience was purely speculative the government of the United States allowed him to amuse himself with it. But when he formulated that conscience of his into overt acts, such as firing on Fort Sumpter, the government sent Col. Ingersoll and other embryo Cæsars down to interview and inform him that liberty of conscience was a good thing in its way—a something to keep his mind busy—but if he was such a consummate ass as to imagine that the United States government intended him to *practise* that liberty publicly he would have to readjust his ideas about it on a more solid basis.

Just so with idolatry and blasphemy under the Jewish government. A man might be an idolater in his heart, he might think "damn" to any extent, without becoming amenable to the Jewish criminal code, but when he formulated his conscience into overt acts of treason the sword of Gideon was unsheathed.

The Mormon heard of this "liberty of conscience," and "freedom of thought." And taking you at your word, and thinking that your motto of "honor bright" meant something, he believed he was conscience free. He concluded

to take unto him two wives. Judge of his astonishment when he heard your denunciation of him. He concluded, as every man possessing even a suspicion of brains will conclude, that all your talk about liberty of conscience and liberty of thought is mere misleading twaddle. It appears that "liberty of conscience" means, according to you, only the right to do what you approve of. You condemn polygamy. Do you not make your judgment the limit of the Mormon's liberty of conscience? Jehovah made His judgment the limit of liberty for the Jew, and you condemn Him for it, while you draw a circle of limitation around the Mormon. You should try to be consistent.

INGERSOLL—"In that country where God is king liberty cannot exist."

COMMENT—This is your conclusion, not Mr. Black's. Grant society or government, and it is of no consequence whether X. Y. or Z. is its king; the principle of its action must be the same in reference to those things which touch its authority.

The most perfect liberty exists where the most perfect government exists—that you will admit. The most perfect government is that which is directed by the most perfect wisdom and judgment, which are attributes of the most perfect being only. God is the most perfect being; that you must admit if you admit His existence. Then it follows that where God directs the government, there the most perfect liberty exists. By liberty, I of course mean the right to do right. The right or liberty to do wrong is claimed by no civilized government on earth that assumes to decide between right and wrong; nor does any government admit such right in those subject to its authority. There are individuals, of course, who claim the liberty to do wrong, but they are comparatively few. Some of them have died suddenly and prematurely, by dislocation of the neck, and some others are in the penitentiary. Poor encouragement for disciples of liberty of license and heroes of free thought.

INGERSOLL—"Within the Old Testament was no such thing as religious toleration."

COMMENT—Certainly not, and for the very sufficient reason given by Mr. Black. Religious toleration meant liberty of treason. Mr. Black told you that idolatry was treason against the state and against its recognized ruler.

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The Jewish nation could no more tolerate treason than any other government can tolerate it.

INGERSOLL—"Within that volume can be found no mercy for the unbeliever."

COMMENT—If unbelief culminates in persistent treason, it finds no mercy under any government worthy of the name.

INGERSOLL—"For all who think for themselves, there are threatening curses and anathemas."

COMMENT—This I deny. Thinking for oneself is not forbidden. Thinking is an act of which, from its nature, government can take no cognizance. The punishment inflicted by the Jewish law was for *overt acts*. Thought was punished only when it was treasonable, and when put forth in overt act. There is a huge fallacy in all this cant about freedom of thought, thinking as we please, etc. The intellect—I mean, of course, a sane intellect—is governed by motives and principles of reason, not by the whims of the will. Will to think that two and two make five, or that parallel lines will meet, and see if your reason will tolerate it.

INGERSOLL—"Think of an infinite Being who is so cruel, so unjust, that He will not allow His children liberty of thought."

COMMENT—It is because He is infinite that He cannot sanction error, idolatry, and other moral evils. Because He is infinite, He cannot permit His children to disobey His known will, or to reject His teachings as if He were a liar. The only liberty of thought which He does not allow is the liberty to think error, to meditate evil, to plan crime. Do you insist on this kind of thinking? If so, be wise and keep it carefully in your thought, for if you reduce this liberty to act it may lead to the penitentiary, where there are many philosophers of liberty of thought.

INGERSOLL—"Think of an infinite God acting as the direct governor of a people, and yet not able to command their love!"

COMMENT—It is, indeed, a subject worthy of careful thought. God freed that people from the bondage of Egypt by a series of most wonderful miracles, fed them for nearly half a century in the desert, gave them the land of Palestine to live in, and blessed them in a thousand ways, and yet He could not command their love! Verily

they were a stiff-necked people. This want of appreciation of the divine beneficence is one of the most convincing proofs of man's original fall.

INGERSOLL—"Think of the author of all mercy imbruing His hands in the blood of helpless men, women and children *simply because He did not furnish them with intelligence enough to understand His law!*"

COMMENT—"Think of a man who is always talking about "honor bright," manhood and truth, making such a false and groundless statement to intelligent readers. I have italicized the words in the above quotation which contain a blasphemous fallacy. On what evidence or authority do you assert that men, etc., were punished, *simply because they had not intelligence enough to understand the law!* What evidence have you that they did not understand the law? Did those who were punished ever make this plea in extenuation of their crimes? This calumny against your Creator and Judge is an invention of your own, pure and simple. It is a principle of revealed ethics that those who have not intelligence enough to understand the law are not bound by the law, and that idiots and the insane are not judged by the law.

You quote a passage from Deuteronomy xiii., wherein death is decreed against those who entice others to commit idolatry, and you add:

INGERSOLL—"This is the religious liberty of the Bible."

COMMENT—Now, as we have seen, idolatry was treason against the state. Do you mean by religious liberty the right to commit treason? If so, religious liberty is incompatible with social order, making all forms of government impossible. We have a case in point. Major Andre enticed Arnold to commit treason. Was Washington an enemy of liberty because he hung the spy?

INGERSOLL—"If you had lived in Palestine, and if the wife of your bosom, dearer to you than your own soul, had said: 'I like the religion of India better than that of Palestine,' it would have been your duty to kill her."

COMMENT—This is not true, for the law forbids the *enticing* to idolatry, to acts of treason. And the mere expression of an opinion, although it showed bad taste, and worse judgment on the part of the wife, yet her silly saying was not what was forbidden by the law.

INGERSOLL—"If she had said: 'Let us worship the sun,' it was your duty to kill her."

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COMMENT—Here we have a clear case of enticing to treason; which is itself treason. Idolatry was treason against the sovereign of the Jewish state. The laws of all nations punish treason with death, and we cannot see that it makes any difference whether a traitor be a man or a woman. The traitor should be removed from the body politic as you would remove a cancer from your jaw, your mawkish sentimentalism to the contrary notwithstanding.

INGERSOLL—"Is it possible that a being of infinite mercy ordered a husband to kill his wife for the crime of having expressed an opinion on the subject of religion?"

COMMENT—The law you quoted from Deuteronomy says nothing about expressing an opinion on the subject of religion. It says: "If thy brother, thy son, thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom * * *entice thee secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods.*" It seems that there is something more here than an expression of opinion on the subject of religion.

INGERSOLL—"Has there been found upon the records of the savage world anything more perfectly fiendish than this commandment of Jehovah?"

COMMENT—I do not know much about the records of the savage world, or that savages were given to keeping records, but I do know that the law which punishes treason with death is to be found upon the records of all *civilized* nations on earth.

INGERSOLL—"That is justified on the ground that blasphemy was a breach of political allegiance, and idolatry an act of overt treason."

COMMENT—And if you were possessed of average logical acumen you would see that, until you overthrow that position, the justification is complete. There are only two ways by which Mr. Black's position can be overthrown. First, by denying his statement as a historical fact, or, second, by proving that treason is not a crime, and should not be punished with death. You do not attempt either of these modes of refutation. You content yourself with giving a half-page of the softest and silliest kind of gush, in which you exhibit, to a remarkable degree, the faculty of Goldsmith's schoolmaster who, although beaten, could argue still. Here is a specimen of your style of argument;

INGERSOLL—"We can understand how a human king stands in need of the services of his people. We can understand how the desertion of any of his soldiers weakens his army; but were the king infinite in power, his strength would still remain the same, and, under no conceivable circumstance, could the enemy triumph."

COMMENT—While you are understanding so many things it would be well to understand that God does not inflict punishment because He fears the loss of power, but because He must insist upon respect and obedience to His supreme authority—He cannot permit himself to be treated as an idiot king or as a liar. You should also understand that the guilt of treason does not depend on its success. Is treason any the less criminal because it is committed against God? or must He refrain from the exercise of power to compel obedience simply because He is all-powerful?

INGERSOLL—"His strength would still remain the same."

COMMENT—Undoubtedly, but it is not a question of *strength*, it is a question of *authority*. You should understand that the strength of a king or a government is not the measure or criterion of treason. Treason is an attack on authority, or the right and title to rule. In this, and not in the failure or success, consists its malice. God does not stand in need of His people, but He insists on obedience and respect to His supreme authority. He who has the right to make the law has the right to insist on obedience to law by punishing the law-breaker.

CHAPTER X.

SOME GUSH—METHODS OF WARFARE—CHIEF—THE COLONEL
ON INFANTRY TACTICS, BABIES, AND DRY-NURSING.

INGERSOLL—"I insist that if there be an infinitely good and wise God, He beholds with pity the misfortunes of His children."

COMMENT—I insist on the same, but we must distinguish between misfortune and crime, misfortune and wickedness.

INGERSOLL—"I insist that such a God would know the mists, the clouds, the darkness enveloping the human mind."

COMMENT—He does know and take into account these disadvantages in dealing with His creatures. But are you not a little inconsistent? Some pages back you exalt the human mind, and claim for it the right to rejudge the justice of God, and now you deplore the clouds and mists and darkness that enshroud it. The highest wisdom as well as duty of the human mind, suffering under the weakness you deplore, is to hear the words of God and obey them, and not misuse the little light it has left it in denying His existence, or making Him the subject of its blasphemous jests.

INGERSOLL—"His pity, not His wrath, would be excited by the effort of His blind children, groping in the night to find the cause of things."

COMMENT—And yet you would make these blind children the judges of His justice! God does pity those who grope in darkness, or who are misled by false philosophers, and in proof of it He offers them the light of His revelation to enlighten the night and dissipate the clouds; but those who shut their eyes to it and disobey His laws, He punishes. God requires us not only to worship Him, but to worship Him alone, and in the manner He prescribes.

INGERSOLL—"An infinitely good Being, had He the power, would answer the reasonable prayer of an honest savage even when addressed to wood and stone."

COMMENT—God is infinitely just and merciful. He

knows the hearts of men, and judges them according to their lights, opportunities and circumstances. It would be in keeping with His infinite goodness to hear the *reasonable* prayer of the *honest* but mistaken savage and answer it by enlightening his mind, making known to him His will, and forbidding him to worship idols. If this savage should persist in his idolatry, after being forbidden, he would be no longer an *honest* savage, but a disobedient child deserving punishment.

INGERSOLL—"The atrocities of the Old Testament, the threatenings, maledictions and curses of the 'inspired book,' are defended on the ground that the Jews had a right to treat their enemies as their enemies treated them."

COMMENT—Here, with your usual facility, you confound and jumble together things of different natures. Mr. Black defended what you call the atrocities of the Jews recorded in the Old Testament, on the principle recognized by all peoples and nations, pagan philosophers and Christian apostles, that the right to exist implies the right to repel the opposing force that threatens destruction. If enemies come to conquer, a nation has a right to conquer them; if they give no quarter, they have a right to none; if the death of the whole population be their purpose, it is right to defeat it by putting them all to the sword if it be necessary. These principles are self-evident, and are recognized by all nations, and practised by all except Christian nations; and if the latter do not practise them it is because the benign influence of Christianity has refined the sentiments and softened the harsher features of man's nature, in which, however, something of the savage and the ghoul always remains.

As to the threatenings, maledictions, etc., they are defended on very different grounds, although you pretend to ignore the fact for the purpose of placing your opponent in a false position. God is the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe and of all men. As such, man owes Him allegiance and obedience. The threatenings and maledictions are for those who disobey, for traitors, blasphemers, and idolaters. The threatenings, etc., are only the formal announcements of punishments which will be inflicted on the transgressor. Our own government threatens death to the murderer and im-

prisonment to the thief. The form of threat may be different, but the substance is the same. These threats have no terrors for the law-abiding citizen.

Mr. Black in his reply to you said :—" In your treatment of hostile barbarians you not only may lawfully, you must necessarily, adopt their mode of warfare; if they give no quarter, they are entitled to none," etc. With your usual "candor" you evade the principle involved in this proposition. If the principle is true, it is true for all, both Christian and pagan. If it is false or unjust or barbarous you should have shown it to be so. This was the only course left to you as a logician. You do not attempt to do this, but try to meet it in this way :—

INGERSOLL—" For one who follows the Master who said that, when smitten on one cheek, you must turn the other, and again and again enforced the idea that you must overcome evil with good, it is hardly consistent to declare that a civilized nation must, of necessity, adopt the warfare of savages."

COMMENT—And this is the only reply to your opponent's self-evident proposition! Let us examine it, such as it is. First, then, the Master did not say, as you report Him, that, when smitten on one cheek, you *must* turn the other, or that you *must* overcome evil with good. He recommended his followers individually to return good for evil, but he did not forbid them to repel unjust aggression by exercising the necessary force, nor did He intend His children to be spittoons and footballs for the rest of mankind. Neither did He intend that Christian peoples or governments should lodge murderers, thieves, and savages in palaces and feed them on chicken-pie. He meant that, as individuals, we should be kind, patient, forbearing, charitable, and forgiving. He did not mean that nations as such should be so weak or imbecile as to fail to maintain their own existence, dignity and authority. Nations, however, do sometimes overcome evil by good—that is, by a good thrashing, judiciously administered to their enemies. Evil-doers, murderers, and thieves are overcome by good when the law and punishment are properly applied.

INGERSOLL—" It is hardly consistent (in a follower of the Master) to declare that civilized nations must, of necessity, adopt the warfare of savages."

COMMENT—Do you imagine that when your opponent said this, he meant the details or incidents of war? Do you believe he intended that we must, of necessity, throw away our Remington rifles, take to bows and arrows, go to wearing breech-clouts and eating raw dog, when fighting Indians? Your opponent distinctly stated what he meant by "mode of warfare," when he said:—"If the enemy come to conquer you, you may conquer them: if they give no quarter, they are entitled to none; if the death of the whole population be their purpose, you may defeat it by exterminating theirs." You do not deny or refute this position, but you pretend to believe he meant ravishment for ravishment, mutilation for mutilation, scalping for scalping, baby-braining for baby-braining. This gave you an opportunity for a display of your rhetoric, and it must not be lost. Speaking of braining babies reminds me that infants stand you to good purpose, and are made to do considerable duty in all your writings and lectures. You trot them out on all occasions, and in all conditions of *deshabille*. Those infants waddle and crawl—and so forth, through your article so promiscuously as to remind one of a foundling asylum, with yourself as peripatetic dry-nurse in ordinary. By the way, were you not once a colonel of infantry? The old soldier loves to dwell on the reminiscences of the past. But heaven help you if those infants ever live to take revenge for your worse than Herodian cruelty. When you want to reason with men on great questions, you should send the children to the nursery, with orders to have them supplied with what the old Dutch woman used to call bread and milk "poultice." This will keep them in good condition until you want to trot them out again in your next lecture on Christianity.

INGERSOLL—"Is it possible that in fighting, for instance, the Indians of America, if they scalp our soldiers we should scalp theirs?"

COMMENT—Civilized nations look more to the killing than to the manner of it, because they understand that victory depends more on the number killed than on the method of killing. This knowledge gives the civilized nation the advantage over the savage. A soldier who pays strict attention to business during the battle will send ten Indians to the happy hunting-ground for every scalp

that is taken. To stop to take a scalp is to lose precious time; and this is the reason, the only reason, why the soldier should prefer his own tactics to those of the savage. If experience proved that scalping would produce greater intimidation on the minds of the savages and cause them to stop their aggression and offer terms of peace and guarantees for good behavior in future, it would be good generalship, good policy, and good mercy to throw aside the rifle and take to scalping as soon as possible. Civilized people go to war to make peace. If that peace can be secured quicker by taking a few scalps than by taking lives, it should be done without hesitation. It is merely a question of policy as to the conduct of the war, to bring it to a speedy termination. As long as the Indian actually loses by his scalping tactics it is wise to leave him that field of enterprise.

INGERSOLL—"If they kill the babes in our cradles must we brain theirs?"

COMMENT—Here they are again—yes, by all means, brain them, tear them limb from limb, salt them, ship them to the Cannibal islands, make them read your article on the Christian Religion, or your lecture on "Skulls"—do anything with them to keep them from muddling your brains when you are reasoning with men on subjects that require all your attention.

INGERSOLL—"If they should take our captives, bind them to trees, and if their squaws fill their quivering flesh with sharpened fagots and set them on fire, that they may die clothed in flame, must our wives, our mothers, and our daughters follow their fiendish example?"

COMMENT—No, and for several reasons. There is a cheaper and quicker method of getting rid of these fiendish squaws. It is much easier to shoot them on the spot than to pack off to the wilderness of the far west "our wives, mothers and daughters" to stick sharpened fagots into them. Civilization, among other things, teaches us the science of economy; that, when killing must be done, it should be done quickly and cheaply, that the burden of the tax-payer may not be increased more than necessary.

Let us suppose a case. A hundred of "our captives" are about to be bound, to undergo the death-torture inflicted by these squaws. The sharpened fagots are ready. Now, if the braining of an Indian babe would so terrorize

these maternal squaws as to cause them to desist from their wicked purpose, would the braining of that infant be barbarous. Put yourself in the place of one of those trembling captives and answer. Will you save the lives of those hundred captives by taking one life? If you think on this for a few moments you will understand what your opponent meant when he said: "We must, of necessity, adopt their mode of warfare."

INGERSOLL—"Is this the conclusion of the most enlightened Christianity?"

COMMENT—Yes, sir; and the conclusion is of the most enlightened common sense, too. Life is practical, it is neither poetry nor effeminate philosophy. The passions of human nature, civilized or barbarous, make stern alternatives necessary and lugubrious cant will not change man's nature or the necessities that arise from it. If those fiendish squaws had lived in Palestine in the days of Josue and had been put to the sword by the Jews, you would have accused the latter of murder and made God an abettor of the crime. Much depends on the point of view from which we look at a thing.

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CHAPTER XI.

WAR—SLAVERY—SOME OF THE COLONEL'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black justifies the wars of extermination and conquest because the American people fought for the integrity of their own country, fought to do away with the infamous institution of slavery, fought to preserve the jewels of liberty and justice for themselves and for their children."

COMMENT—I submit this ebullition of eloquence to the reader for the purpose of informing him that it is a misrepresentation of Mr. Black, a misrepresentation which it is hard to imagine to have been accidental or unintentional. It is not true that Black justifies wars of extermination because the American people fought for the integrity of their country. Here is the way he justifies wars of extermination: "If they (the enemy) come to conquer you, they may be conquered by you; if they give no quarter, they are entitled to none; if the death of your whole population be their purpose, you may defeat it by exterminating theirs." You could not have been ignorant of this principle, for you quoted these very words in your article. Nor did Black justify wars of conquest because the American people fought for the integrity of their country. He quoted you as saying: "A war of conquest is simply murder." To meet this statement of yours he said: "To show how inefficacious for all practical purpose a mere sentiment is, when substituted for a principle, it is only necessary to recollect that Mr. Ingersoll is himself a warrior who stood not behind the mighty men of his tribe when they gathered themselves together for a war of conquest. He took the lead of a regiment as eager as himself to spoil the Philistine, 'and out he went a-coloneling.'" As you do not seem to have understood your opponent's argument I will put it in a more simple form. It was what is called an *argumentum ad hominem*, and syllogistically stands thus:

According to Mr. Ingersoll: "A war of conquest is simply murder."

But the war with the South was a war of conquest. Therefore, the war against the South was simply murder. Now Mr. Ingersoll participated in that war, therefore Mr. Ingersoll was a party to the crime of murder.

This was your opponent's argument in logical form. You evidently saw its force. You could not extricate yourself except by misrepresentation, and you did not hesitate a moment. Therefore you said: "Mr. Black justifies the wars of extermination and conquest, because the American people fought for the integrity of their own country."

You perpetrated this misrepresentation to make a way to escape from the trap in which you were caught, and to afford you a field for a little sentimental gush about "slavery" and the "jewels of liberty," hoping, with the instinct of the cuttle-fish, you might get away in the muddiness you had created. But, my dear sir, it will not do, for society is not entirely made up of fools. Our war with the South was a war of conquest, for a war of conquest is a war to conquer, and that is what we meant when we sent armies to the South. If conquest is murder then you are guilty of murder in proportion to your importance in that war. But you have said a war of conquest is simply murder. Then according to the adamant rules of logic you are simply a murderer. That is where your opponent landed you.

You justify the war with the South by saying that it was to maintain the integrity of the country, etc. The justification is complete; but what follows from it? Why, it follows that wars of conquest are *sometimes* justifiable, which is the very thing you denied when you said that "a war of conquest is murder." When you said that your mind was on the Jew, you wanted to lay down a principle that would surely condemn him and his God, and you did not see that you were making a murderer of yourself. *Ex parte* philosophy is poor philosophy. You are a student of the infidel philosophers of the last and present centuries, but you have not caught their genius or comprehended their bulk. You take their points here and there and depend for the rest on your wit and faculty of drollery. Men laugh with you or at you, but, after all, life is a serious affair, and when the play is over the clown is the first to be forgotten,

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INGERSOLL—"Not satisfied with having slavery in this world, Mr. Black assures us that it will last through eternity."

COMMENT—"There is but one reply to this. It consists of a vigorous English word of three letters. It is sufficient to say that Mr. Black never assured us of anything from which such an inference could be drawn. On what principle of moral rectitude do you justify this gross misrepresentation? Certainly not on that divine law which forbids you to bear false witness against your neighbor. If you had said the above under oath would it not have been perjury? Did you say this in view of the fact that you had made arrangements to prevent your opponent from replying to you?"

INGERSOLL—"And that forever and forever inferiors must be subordinate to superiors."

COMMENT—"This Mr. Black did say, but it is very different from the assurance you attributed to him just now. To say inferiors must always be subordinate to superiors, is simply to say that the inferior must always be inferior to the superior, which is a self-evident truth. You should not need to be told that to be subordinate does not mean to be enslaved. The soldier is subordinate to his superior officer, but he is not his slave. To say that your intellect is subordinate or inferior to that of Moses, St. Paul, Napoleon, Newton, or Milton is not to make a slave of you."

INGERSOLL—"Who is the superior man?"

COMMENT—"He who does not lie, or misrepresent, or blaspheme his Maker, is morally superior to him who does."

INGERSOLL—"According to Mr. Black, he is superior who lives on the unpaid labor of the inferior."

COMMENT—"Here you are again disregarding that law which requires us to make our words correspond to the truth. It is not at all pleasant to be constantly impeaching your veracity, but your wanton use of language makes it necessary. Your opponent said nothing of the kind."

INGERSOLL—"With me, the superior man is one who uses his superiority in bettering the condition of the inferior."

COMMENT—"Here you admit the fact of inferiority and superiority, and therefore subordination. The man who uses his superiority must be superior prior to its use. According to your own words, the superiority is a fact prior to the use of it. Therefore his superiority does not depend

on the use of it. Now, as the use of it in bettering the condition of the inferior is subsequent to the superiority, it cannot be the note or criterion by which superiority is affirmed. To do good to others is a *sign* of moral superiority, but not the *reason* of it. If to do good were the *reason* of superiority, all men could be superior by a mere act of the will, but superiority is a fact prior to the act of the will, and, therefore, independent of it. The definition, then, like most of your definitions, means nothing when analyzed.

INGERSOLL—"The superior man is strength for the weak."

COMMENT—Then he is superior because he is stronger, and he is *good* because he uses that strength to assist the weak. Here again the superiority is prior to the use of it, and, therefore, the use of it is not the criterion of it. You confound superiority with goodness. The *ability* to help the weak constitutes superiority; the actual helping of the weak constitutes goodness.

INGERSOLL—"The superior man 'is eyes for the blind.'"

COMMENT—His superiority does not consist in *seeing* for the blind, but in his *ability* to see. His disposition to see for the blind is evidence of his goodness. I note these small points to show that you are not an adept in the proper use of words, and that your definitions are untrustworthy.

INGERSOLL—"For my part, I would rather be the slave than the master."

COMMENT—For my part, I would rather be the master than the slave; for being the master, I would have it in my power to free the slave and cease to be the master. He who prefers weakness to strength, or inability to ability, when he has the choice, is an intellectual imbecile or a consummate hypocrite. He who prefers to be a slave has the instincts of a slave. It is more manly to will to be the master with the power of manumission, that, by a voluntary act of the will, one may reach the helping hand to the lowly and unfortunate and raise them to freedom and equality. Perhaps, in view of the proneness of man to domineer and play the tyrant, it were better to be neither the slave nor the master.

INGERSOLL—"Any man who helps another to gain and retain his liberty is superior to any infallible God who authorized slavery in Judea."

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COMMENT—Then why do you not advocate the throwing open of our prison-doors that the murderers and thieves cruelly shut up there may gain and retain the liberty they sigh for? Ah! that would be dangerous. Well then, it is not always right to help others gain and retain their liberty. It is hard for you to say anything without saying too much or too little. You are fond of making general propositions, but they are dangerous tools and should be handled with care.

INGERSOLL—"According to Mr. Black, there will be slavery in heaven."

COMMENT—I must again call your attention to that divine law which puts a discount on false witnesses. Your opponent never said anything that justifies your statement. Whatever else you may be you are certainly not a Christian.

INGERSOLL—"If some good republican would catch Mr. Black, incorporate him into his family, tame him, teach him to think, and give him a knowledge of the true principles of human liberty and government, he would confer on him a beneficent boon."

COMMENT—Why did you not catch him and teach him when you had a chance? Your opponent could retort thus: If some good Christian would catch Mr. Ingersoll, teach him to think a little deeper than the surface, give him a knowledge of the true principles of probity, impart to him a proper sense of the importance of veracity, and induce him to forego buffoonery when dealing with great questions, he would confer on him a most beneficent boon.

INGERSOLL—"Slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer, and hypocrite."

COMMENT—How does it *include* all other crimes if it be the joint product of them? A product is an effect. If slavery be a product of crimes it cannot include those crimes; for to include them it must exist prior to them, and if it exist prior to them, it cannot be a product of them. You should not contradict yourself. It shows that you have a bad memory, or that there is a screw loose in your logical machine.

INGERSOLL—"To lacerate the naked back, to sell wives, to steal babes, to breed blood-hounds, to debauch your own soul—this is slavery."

COMMENT—No, it is poetry, poor poetry of course, but

nevertheless poetry, for it is a product of the imagination. You do not seem to understand the meaning of the word. Consult Webster's Dictionary, or your law books, or any books that pretend to give definitions of things, and you will find that the definition of slavery given by you is not found in any of them. You may find something like it in the frothy ravings of lunatics, or the rhapsodies of poets, but when pure reason is appealed to we must not quote the mouthings of lunatics and poets. To lacerate the naked back is a cruelty or a punishment incident to, but not confined to the condition of slavery. To sell wives is a practice common to human society in all its stages, and not peculiar to slavery. To breed blood-hounds is no more wrong than to breed canary birds or poodles, and as to debauching your soul, that is done with facility where slavery is unknown except in name. Then slavery is none of these, although all of them may be incident to that abnormal relation between labor and capital.

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CHAPTER XII.

LIBERTY—POLYGAMY—ROUSSEAU'S OPINION OF INFIDEL PHILOSOPHERS.

INGERSOLL—"With me, liberty is not merely a means
—it is an end."

COMMENT—This is too vague. We are all in favor of liberty, as we understand it, but we do not agree as to what it is or ought to be. It is a foolish loss of time to caw over the word until we have a common idea or understanding of the thing. Do you mean by the word, the liberty Guiteau exercised, or that of the Nihilists, or that of the Mormons, or that of the thief, the robber or the murderer? All these appeal to liberty as vociferously as you do. Do you not see that this word "liberty" must be defined and limited—in other words, that it must become a known quantity before it can become a legitimate object of debate. If there is anything thoroughly detested and abhorred by logicians it is a word, or the use of a word, that has no fixed, clear and clean-cut meaning to it. You use the word "liberty" with what Shakespeare would call "damnable iteration," and in all your multifarious uses of it you have never, so far as I have seen, given a definition of it.

INGERSOLL—"Without that word all other words are empty sounds."

COMMENT—And that word without a definition—a clear and fixed meaning, intelligible and comprehensible to all in common, is the emptiest and most misleading sound that ever echoed in time and space. It is a pet word of lunatics, fools and philosophers so-called. It is like a piece of gum elastic, short or long, at the will of him who fingers it. "Oh, Liberty!" said Madame Roland, as she was carted to the guillotine, "what crimes are committed in thy name!" The Christian loves liberty as dearly as you do. He would soar from planet to planet, and from star to star, and drink in the immensity of the universe. He would dive into the centre of the world and know its secrets. He would penetrate to the ultimate molecule of

matter and know its essence. He would introvert himself and know the mystery of his own being, but the liberty to do these things evades his grasp as the ever-receding rainbow eludes the grasp of the innocent child who hopes to bathe his dimpled fingers in its rays by crossing over a field or two. The physical and the moral law stand watch on the limits of liberty and cry "halt" when we even think to go beyond our sphere.

As there are fixed laws of matter, so there are fixed laws of mind. The intellect is governed in its movements by the laws of its action, and when it acts in defiance of those laws, experts call it insanity. Besides the physical and the intellectual, there is a moral world. Man is the link between these three worlds because he partakes of the nature of all of them, and he is the only being who does. As a physical being man is subject to the laws of physical nature, as an intellectual being he is subject to the laws of mind, as a moral being he is governed by the inflexible law of morals, and if he acts in defiance of these laws theologians call it sin. Sin, in the moral world, is what insanity is in the intellectual world—a departure from normal action. There are then three laws that act in parallel on man—the physical, the intellectual and the moral, and all are equally binding. The two former bind him in such a way that he has no liberty whatever, and therefore he is, in no way, responsible for their results. The moral law remains, and it is to this law alone that every sane individual is responsible, for it is through and by this law, only, that he can possibly antagonize God's will as intellect against intellect. Man, then, is no more free in the moral order than he is in the physical or intellectual order. The difference is only this: he has it in his power to confuse the moral order, to make discord. To do this is to antagonize God's will, and to do this is to sin, and in this consists moral evil.

INGERSOLL—"We are informed by Mr. Black that polygamy is neither commanded or prohibited in the Old Testament—that it is only discouraged. It seems to me a little legislation on that subject might have tended to its discouragement. But where is the legislation?"

COMMENT—In your first article on the Christian religion you said that the Bible upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue. Your opponent met your assertion with a

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denial that the Bible so held or taught. Here a direct issue was made, a question of veracity raised. And how did you meet it? Did you stand by your statement and proceed to prove it? Not at all; you reply by saying that the Bible did not legislate against it. This is an admission that your statement could not be sustained—a raising of the white flag.

INGERSOLL—"In the moral code (of the Old Testament) not one word is found on the subject of polygamy."

COMMENT—Then why did you say that the Bible taught polygamy as the highest form of virtue? If you look in Genesis, Chap. II., verse 24, you will find the following words: "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his *wife*, (not wives), and they shall be *two* in *one* flesh." This is the law in the case; is it not against polygamy? This one text is sufficient to upset all your talk about the Bible teaching polygamy.

But on what principle do you condemn polygamy? Christians say and believe it is wrong because God has forbidden it. But by what right do you say it is wrong? You ignore God and teach: "if there is anything of value it is liberty. Liberty is the air of the soul, the sunshine of life; without it the world is a prison and the universe an infinite dungeon. Liberty is not only a means—it is an end. Without that word, all other words are empty sounds." Now, in the light of this doctrine of liberty, how dare you to obtrude yourself and your notions between any man and woman. By what right do you limit a woman in her selection of a man, even though that man be the husband of other wives? If liberty is what you say it is, why do you persist in playing Paul Pry, and inserting your nose into other people's business? Deny God and assert unlimited liberty, and where is the wrong in polygamy? Why should a man not have all the wives he wants, if there is no God to forbid it, and no woman to refuse? If man is only an animal destined to perish like the beasts of the forest, why should he not follow his instincts as they do? You rob him of every reason of self-denial, rob him of his immortal soul and his God, reduce him to the level of the beast, and then try to govern him by frothy sentimentalism! Eliminate Christian teaching and divine revelation from human thought,

and where is the wrong in polygamy? Find a principle outside of revelation that forbids it. There is none. Take God away, and His moral law, and there is no reason left why we should not exercise every passion and faculty we possess, to their fullest extent. If men do not use this unlimited liberty which you preach, it is because God's Moral Code permeates Christian thought, and makes a healthy public opinion which governs even those who deny that code. It is this healthy Christian sentiment you appeal to when you condemn polygamy. You steal the weapons of Christians to combat that which cannot be combatted by your infidel principles.

INGERSOLL—"All languages of the world are not sufficient to express the filth of polygamy."

COMMENT—Until you produce argument for this statement, your opinion is no better than that of the Mormon, the Turk, or the Hindoo. In fact the opinion of these is preferable, since they have had experience. Your idea is derived from Christian teaching, by which you are unconsciously influenced. In opposing polygamy from an infidel point of view you have no right to make use of that popular sentiment or judgment which is the result of a religion you repudiate. Having rejected the Christian religion you cannot consistently or logically make use of its weapons in opposing polygamy. You cannot appropriate the triumphs of Christianity as victories of infidelity, or unenlightened human reason. If Christians are disposed to accept your statement it is on account of their convictions, founded on Christian teaching, and not because of any argument you have or can produce, from an infidel point of view, against polygamy.

INGERSOLL—"It (polygamy) makes man a beast and woman a slave."

COMMENT—Here again you appeal to a sentiment or public opinion which is produced by and founded on Christian principles which you reject. This is illogical. Your infidel position requires you, in opposing polygamy, to use arguments that would convince a Turk or a Mormon. But polygamy makes a man a beast, you say. Then it is as bad but no worse than your modern infidel philosophy. This philosophy makes man a beast by denying the immortality of his soul and asserting that he is evolved from the monkey or protoplasm. If he is a de-

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scendant of the monkey or the goat where is the impropriety of imitating the propensities of his ancestors? You tell him there is nothing above him or beyond him, neither a God nor a future. Why then should he aspire when there is no object worthy of his aspirations? You point to the oyster or to the libidinous ourang-outang as his origin, and tell him his future is a blank. Why, then, should he curb his passions or limit his impulses? Is it worth the effort? You make man a beast when you make his origin and destiny the same as that of the beast. Polygamy can do no more than this. And if man is a beast, and if there is no future, what is to prevent him from following the instincts of his animal nature? Reason? Reason must forbid polygamy if it can be shown that there is anything in it contrary to the first principles of nature. By first principles of nature I mean the object, end, and purpose of marriage, the continuance of human life on earth, etc. Does polygamy antagonize any of these objects? When you prove it does, you will have proved that it is contrary to reason—not till then.

INGERSOLL—"Certainly, Jehovah had time to instruct Moses as to the infamy of polygamy."

COMMENT—There is no sense in this, except on the assumption that you know more about the subject than Jehovah—that your crude notions of virtue and propriety should govern His actions.

Rousseau, an infidel like yourself, but an honest and abler man, has given a description of the class of philosophers to which you belong, and it is highly worthy of attention just here. He says:—

"I have consulted our philosophers, I have perused their books, I have examined their several opinions, I have found them all proud, positive and dogmatizing even in their pretended scepticism, knowing everything, proving nothing, and ridiculing one another, and this is the only point in which they concur, and in which they are right. Daring when they attack, they defend themselves without vigor. If you consider their arguments, they have none but for destruction. Where is the philosopher who, for his own glory, would not willingly deceive the whole human race? Where is he who, in the secret of his heart, proposes any other object than his own distinction? Provided he can raise himself above the com-

monalty, provided he can eclipse his competitors, he has reached the summit of his ambition. The great thing for him is to think differently from other people. Among believers he is an atheist, among atheists he is a believer. Shun, ahup, then, those who, under pretence of explaining nature, sow in the hearts of men the most dispiriting doctrines, whose scepticism is far more affirmative and dogmatical than the decided tone of their adversaries. Under pretence of being themselves the only people enlightened, they imperiously subject us to their magisterial decisions, and would fain palm upon us, for the true causes of things, the unintelligible systems they have erected in their own heads; whilst they overturn, destroy and trample under foot all that mankind revere, snatch from the afflicted the only comfort left them in their misery, from the rich and great the only curb that can restrain their passions; tear from the heart all remorse of vice, all hopes of virtue; they still boast themselves benefactors of mankind. 'Truth,' they say, 'is never hurtful to man,'—I believe that as well as they, and the same, in my opinion, is proof that what they teach is not the truth."—Rousseau, as quoted by Gaudin, in his defence of the Ancient Faith.

This quotation is somewhat long, but it is so true, so apt to the present occasion, that I have given it place here. You infidels have not changed much since Rousseau's time, and his description fits you so perfectly that one might imagine he had you in his n in 's eye when he penned the above eloquent and truthful passage.

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CHAPTER XIII.

WOMAN'S RIGHTS—MOTHERHOOD—WOMAN'S CONDITION AMONG
JEWS AND PAGANS—SOME OF MR. INGERSOLL'S MIS-
STATEMENTS, ETC.

INGERSOLL—"Where will we find, in the Old Testament, the rights of wife, mother and daughter defined?"

COMMENT—They are found in the warp and woof of the whole book. But, before particularizing, it is necessary to know what you mean by these "rights" and if your notions on the subject are correct. What you may affirm as "rights" I may deny. Until these rights are determined rightly and independently of your or my sentiments or feelings, the question as to what the Bible says on the subject cannot be intelligently discussed.

INGERSOLL—"Even in the New Testament she (woman) is told to 'learn in silence and all subjection.'"

COMMENT—Most excellent advice for man, woman and child. How can you learn otherwise? Would you have the learner pert and impertinent?

According to the Christian idea, the husband and wife are two in one flesh. They are united by an intimate and mutual love in God, and should edify each other in peace, in fidelity, and mutual support. The husband is the head of the wife, whom he should love, esteem, and respect as himself, and protect. The wife is, within the circle of her duties, at the side of the man, not subject to him as the child is to its father, or as the slave to the master, but as the mother, side by side with the father, having, no less than he, sacred and imprescriptible rights. But as in every company or corporation it is necessary that some hold superior rank and authority that order and peace may prevail, so in that association of man and woman called marriage, in which the parties are bound one to the other, there must be a superior, while each, according to rank, has necessities, duties and rights. The woman thus raised above that condition of absolute subjection and low esteem which she occupies outside of

Christendom, takes honorable and imposing rank by the side of her husband. Nevertheless, she is, in certain respects, subject to his authority. She should, according to Christian law, obey her husband as a superior, not as if in slavery, but freely, in the same way that the Church obeys Christ, her head. A loving, pious, moral, interior, laborious life is the glory of the woman. The duties of the husband are described by St. Paul. "But yet neither is the man without the woman: nor the woman without the man in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman: but all things of God." (1 Cor. 11, 12.) Again: "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it. * * So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hateth his own flesh: but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church. Because we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. * * Nevertheless, let every one of you in particular love his wife as himself." (Ephesians v. 25 to 33.) These are the doctrines that have liberated woman.

INGERSOLL—"According to the Old Testament, woman had to ask pardon, and had to be purified for the crime of having borne sons and daughters."

COMMENT—No race on earth ever held motherhood in higher esteem than the Jewish race. This you must have known unless you are utterly ignorant of the history of that remarkable people as it is recorded in the Bible. Motherhood was the glory of the matrons of Israel, and the childless wife mourned her unhappy fate, and wept, and prayed the God of Abraham to take away her reproach. Read the Canticle of Anna at the birth of her son Samuel (Samuel ii.), and you will learn what you seem not to know, that to become a mother in Judea gave occasion for thanksgiving and rejoicing, and to be childless was considered an affliction and a judgment of an angry God. When the mother of Samuel came to offer the sacrifice of purification she placed him in the hands of Heli, the high-priest, and said: "For this child did I pray, and the Lord hath granted me my petition, which I asked of him. Therefore I also have lent him to the Lord. And they adored the

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Lord there. And Anna prayed and said: My heart hath rejoiced in the Lord. * * There is none holy as the Lord is, for there is none other beside thee, and there is none strong like our God."

Here is a subject for a painter. These sweet, joyful, grateful words come from a happy mother's heart. Does she ask pardon for having borne a son? Is there anything here to suggest that she had been guilty of a crime? Compare this prayer of an Israelite mother with your untruthful words, and how coarse and vulgar you appear in her sacred presence. You taint the atmosphere of sacredness and mystery with which God has surrounded motherhood.

INGERSOLL—"According to the Old Testament, woman had to ask pardon for the crime of having borne sons and daughters."

COMMENT—"This is an untruth. I leave you to say whether it was intentional, or made through ignorance."

INGERSOLL—"But 'woman had to be purified.'"

COMMENT—"Yes, but this purification had no reference to crime or guilt. There were many purifications required in the Jewish ritual. To be ritually unclean was no crime or disgrace. A physician who touched his patient, for instance, to count his pulse, became unclean by that act. (Lev. xv. 7). He who performed the charitable act of burying a dead body became unclean, as did he also who served in some of the sacred offices. When, therefore, you imagine that 'unclean' means guilt or crime, and talk about the crime of bearing sons and daughters, you simply show your ignorance of what you so flippantly talk about. Pope was right when he said:

"A little learning is a dangerous thing."

INGERSOLL—"The doctrine that woman is the slave or serf of man—is savagery, pure and simple."

COMMENT—"No, it is not savagery; it is a false doctrine, pure and simple. But as neither Jew nor Christian believes that woman is a slave or a serf, I cannot see the purpose of your remark."

INGERSOLL—"In no country in the world had woman less liberty than in the Holy Land."

COMMENT—"It depends on what you mean by 'liberty.'"

It is true, women in Judea had not the liberty to do many things that were permitted to the women of pagan nations, just as virtuous women have not the liberty of the depraved and fallen. It is this fact that gives the laws of Moses a pre-eminence over the laws of pagan nations. The honor of wives and the modesty of daughters were protected in Judea. The women of Egypt, Chaldea, Persia, Greece, etc., had the liberty to marry their uncles, brothers, fathers, and even mothers were free to marry their own sons. How cruel in Moses to forbid these liberties to the women of Judea! Pagan women had the liberty to sacrifice their virtue at the lewd altars of Venus and Cybele. A description of the wickedness and impurity the worship of these heathens involved can be read by no virtuous Christian without a shudder. Moses forbade these abominations, in honor of God and human nature, and for this you accuse him of taking away the "rights" of women. It is to the honor of Hebrew women that they did not practice such "liberties," and to Hebrew legislation that they were not permitted. If you had read and studied the historians Herodotus and Strabo in reference to the condition of women in Babylon, Lydia, Thrace, Armenia, Medea, India, Egypt and Greece, you would have less to say about their "liberties." I refer you to these authors, as it would not be proper to quote their descriptions of life, manners, and worship in those countries, in a book intended for modern civilized readers. The lives of mother and child were protected in Judea. In those countries I have mentioned they were at the mercy of the husband who was master. This was also the case in ancient Rome.

INGERSOLL—"The position of woman was far better in Egypt than in Palestine."

COMMENT—This is one of those bold, reckless statements which characterize all your lectures and writings. According to Strabo, who traveled in Egypt before the Christian era, women were the toilers and the tillers of the soil. Their condition was somewhat analogous to that of the squaws among the Indians of our western territories.

Egypt is the land of silence and of mystery. Its origin, ancient religion, customs and laws are at the best matters of conjecture to the hieroglyphic archaeologist. The stone-

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lipped sphinx is its true symbol. Beyond the seventeenth dynasty of Manetho, when Joseph was premier of the land, there is no reliable or intelligible history. Egyptologists, from Clement of Alexandria down to Champollion, Young, and Wilkinson, have exhausted their learning and genius in vain to unravel the mystery of the silent valley of the Nile, to make the footprints of that mysterious people tell us something of the past—whence they came, their laws, social customs and habits. The sphinx smiles a rigid, stony smile, the sands of ages gather about the bases of the pyramids, and man is about to give up the mystery in despair, when suddenly and unexpectedly the long-lost light breaks forth in all its brilliancy—Ingersoll speaks, and all is light. "The position of woman was far better in Egypt than in Palestine," says he. But, dear sir, how or where do you learn this? The history of Egypt before the time of the Ptolemas is mere conjecture. The writings of Hermes Trismegistus are apocryphal. Manetho is fragmentary. You have then nothing left but the Old Testament, Herodotus and Strabo, and the two last only echo the dying agonies, the death sighs of a once powerful people as they sunk before the rising glories of Greece and Rome. These writers only record the last act in the drama of old Egypt. But what they do record contradicts your statement.

INGERSOLL—"Upon ancient tombs husband and wife are represented as seated in the same chair."

COMMENT—This is of no consequence whatever; but I quote it for the purpose of asking you how you know they were represented as *husband and wife*?

INGERSOLL—"In Persia women were priests."

COMMENT—Yes, but a woman-priest meant one who, if she lived in New York at the present day, would be sent to Blackwell's Island.

INGERSOLL—"At the advent of Christianity, in all pagan countries, women officiated at the sacred altars."

COMMENT—Yes. Strabo relates that there was a temple of Venus at Corinth so rich that it maintained above a thousand harlots, sacred to her service. That is the way they "officiated." It was high time for the advent of Christianity—or hell,

INGERSOLL—"They guarded the eternal fire."

COMMENT—"And they will probably continue to do so."

INGERSOLL—"From their lips came the oracles of fate."

COMMENT—"Just as they continue to come from the lips of female mediums of questionable reputation, fortune-tellers, gypsies, etc."

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CHAPTER XIV.

MORE ABOUT WOMEN—BIBLE AND REVELATION—MORE MISREPRESENTATION.

INGERSOLL—"Under the domination of the Christian Church woman became the merest slave for at least a thousand years."

COMMENT—This is too general and indefinite. General statements can be met only by general denials and a call for proofs and specifications. Christianity found woman in the pagan world at man's feet, and it raised her up and placed her at his side as a companion, where she belongs, and from whence she came.

INGERSOLL—"It was claimed that through woman the race had fallen."

COMMENT—Claimed by whom? Christianity does not hold that the race fell through woman or the disobedience of Eve, for Eve was never the responsible agent of humanity, as Adam was. It was through him, as St. Paul informs us, that the race fell. "By one man, sin entered into the world, and by sin, death."

I believe your father was a Presbyterian, and he, no doubt, taught you the Presbyterian distich:

In Adam's fall
We sinned all.

There is no mention of woman here. I quote this, not to adopt its doctrine, but to show that you were not taught that the race fell through woman. Eve was the occasion not the cause of the fall, just as Mary was the occasion or instrument of man's redemption. Adam fell, and humanity fell with and by him; Christ rose, and humanity rose again with and by Him. This is the Christian doctrine on the subject in a nutshell.

INGERSOLL—"And that her loving kiss had poisoned all the springs of life."

COMMENT—Fudge.

INGERSOLL—"Will Mr. Black have the kindness to state a few of his objections to the devil."

COMMENT—He is the prince of liars, full of sophistry and deceit, misleading and unreliable—a purveyor of Dead Sea apples.

INGERSOLL—"Again I ask, why were the Jewish people as wicked, cruel and ignorant, with a revelation from God, as other nations were without?"

COMMENT—This question is based on a false hypothesis. I deny that the Jews were as wicked, cruel and ignorant as other nations of their time. They were angels in comparison with the diseased, rotten and pestiferous races about them.

INGERSOLL—"Why were the worshippers of false deities as brave, as kind, and generous as those who knew the only true and living God?"

COMMENT—Because they were not. If the Canaanites were as brave as the Jews why did they permit the latter, hungry and exhausted from the desert, to kick them out of Palestine at the toe of their sandals?

INGERSOLL—"Will you tell me why God failed to give the Bible to the whole world?"

COMMENT—God did not fail to give his revelation to the whole world. In the beginning, He revealed Himself and His will to man, who afterwards to a great extent forgot that revelation. Man began on this earth with a true knowledge of the true God, but subsequently fell into idolatry. The wise sayings and moral precepts of the philosophers in the remoter ages were but the echoes of that original divine revelation. The nearer we approach to the origin of the human race the purer we find both doctrine and morals. This has been demonstrated by Thebaud in his remarkable work on *Gentilism*.

God then gave mankind originally a revelation, but man, in the course of time, failed to keep it in his memory and fell into ignorance, idolatry and barbarism. He became a victim, not of evolution, but of devolution.

INGERSOLL—"If Jehovah was in fact God He knew the end from the beginning. He knew that His Bible would be a breastwork behind which tyranny and hypocrisy would crouch."

COMMENT—Granted. What then? Because He knew that His revelation would be abused, misrepresented and ridiculed by some, must He therefore refuse it to the world? Every gift of God—food, life, health, ability,

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reason, are abused by some. Must He deny to man, groping in error, the light of revelation because He knew the hypocrite would deny it and blaspheme?

INGERSOLL—"God knew that it would be the defence of robbers called kings, and hypocrites called priests."

COMMENT—He knew that it would be misquoted in defence of tyranny, and that it would be misrepresented by hypocrites called infidels, but that is no reason why He should not give His revelation to man.

INGERSOLL—"He knew that He taught the Jewish people but little of importance."

COMMENT—You only imagine that you know this. You must not confound your knowledge with that of Jehovah. How do you know what He knew? You evidently do not need to pray the old Scotch dominie's prayer:—"O Lord, gie us a gude conceit o' oursel'."

INGERSOLL—"He knew that He found them free and left them captives."

COMMENT—He knew that He found them in Egyptian slavery and made them a powerful nation.

INGERSOLL—"He knew that He had never fulfilled the promises made to them."

COMMENT—He knew that the promises made to the Jews were expressly and distinctly conditional on their obedience to His commands and laws, and that they had disregarded those commands and broken those laws. They disobeyed Him and in consequence fell again into bondage—the sceptre passed from the hands of Israel.

INGERSOLL—"I here take occasion to thank Mr. Black for having admitted that Jehovah gave no commandment against the practice of polygamy, that He established slavery, waged wars of extermination, and persecuted for opinion's sake even unto death."

COMMENT—First. You must have been in a very gushing humor when you so formally thanked your opponent for admitting what no Christian ever dreamt of denying. Your opponent said that "if you were a statesman instead of a mere politician you would see good and sufficient reasons for the forbearance to legislate directly on this subject (polygamy)," and that "it would be improper for him to set them forth" in an article intended for the general reader. Not being a statesman, a moralist, or a physician, you, of course, do not see those

things to which your opponent delicately directs your attention.

Second. When you say Mr. Black admitted that Jehovah established slavery, you say what is not true. It is the height of un wisdom to make a statement that is so easily refuted. Your thanks were premature, as Mr. Black never, at least in the article you reply to, admitted anything of the kind. He said:—"Jehovah *permitted* His chosen people to hold the captives they took in war or purchased from the heathen as servants for life." That is, He permitted the Jews to follow the custom of the times in this matter. Is this an admission that Jehovah established slavery? Like a lawyer more "cute" or cunning than able, you change the word *permitted* to *established*. You do not need to be told that there is a difference between to *permit* and to *establish*. It is very unbecoming to the great apostle of "candor" and "honor bright" to thus misrepresent his antagonist, and it must bring the blush of shame even to *your* cheek to be caught in such petty chicanery.

Third. To exterminate, from *ex* and *terminus*, means to drive from the border, to expel, to drive out. This the Jews did to the Canaanites, just as we are exterminating the Indians from this continent. It is the logic of migration, the law of human movement. The race in its movements on the surface of the earth is governed by laws of social dynamics of which individuals and nations are unconscious. Some gushing philosopher of the future will condemn us of the nineteenth century as bitterly for exterminating the Indian, as you condemn the Israelite for dispossessing the Canaanite. And he will have as much influence on his age as you have on yours—and no more.

Fourth. When you say your opponent admitted that Jehovah persecuted "for opinion's sake even unto death," you again misrepresent him. God, as God, holds His intelligent creatures responsible for every thought, but God as the temporal monarch of Judea inflicted punishment only for overt acts. There is no punishment mentioned in the Jewish criminal law for sins of thought, or mere opinions. Therefore it is not true to say that God punished or persecuted for opinion's sake. Crimes cognizable to the Jewish criminal code were acts capable of proof—

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subjects of evidence. Thoughts and opinions, unless made overt, are not capable of being evidenced or proved. Therefore no one was punished in Judea for opinion's sake.

INGERSOLL—"Most theologians endeavor to putty, patch and paint the wretched record of inspired crime, but Mr. Black has been bold enough and honest enough to admit the truth."

COMMENT—Here you transfer your misrepresentations from Mr. Black to the theologians; and Mr. Black will doubtless appreciate your compliment at its true value when he reflects that the admissions, for which you are so anxious to credit him at the expense of the theologians, were never made by him. True, your opponent has been bold enough and honest enough to admit the truth, but he has not been so stupid or so asinine as to admit what you attribute to him, while you have not been true enough or honest enough to correctly state what he does, in fact, admit. Mr. Black is evidently not a theologian. He has made some admissions, not of fact, but of principle, which he should not have made, and taken certain positions which he cannot hold successfully; and singular as it may seem to him and you, those positions are the very ones that are not Christian. One instance will suffice. Mr. Black says that the creation was a miracle. Theologians do not agree with him in this.

Now as to the theologians, at whom you take your fling over Mr. Black's shoulders, I will say this of them: If they were guilty of as much puttying and patching, misrepresentation, low trickery, cunning, deceit, flattering of popular passions and errors, as you have perpetrated in this one article of yours, I would be disposed to look upon them as sharpers of the meanest order who were inspired, not by the genius of Christianity, but by the spirit of infidelity.

You deem it no offence against decency to accuse theologians of intention to perpetrate and perpetuate fraud, to call them hypocrites, etc., and if they turn on you and call you a speculator who turns falsehood into dollars, a fraud, and a liar, you begin to whimper about the Master who tells them to turn the other cheek. You are a brave man. You challenge to mortal combat, and on the field you seriously tell your opponent he cannot, and must not,

according to his principles, blow your brains out; while you claim the right to shoot him through the heart, if you can. There is no epithet in your vocabulary low or venomous enough to fling at priests and theologians, but when a "policeman" like Mr. Black ventures to catalogue you, you are up in indignation, and whine and whimper about decency and the etiquette of debate.

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CHAPTER XV.

OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS—SLAVERY AND CHRISTIANITY—
THE APOSTLES NEITHER LUNATICS NOR IMPOSTERS.

INGERSOLL—"In this age of fact and demonstration it is refreshing to find a man who believes so thoroughly in the monstrous and miraculous, the impossible and immoral."

COMMENT—Here you assume to determine what is monstrous, miraculous, impossible and immoral. It is refreshing in this age of general education to see an infidel offering his crude notions as ultimate principles or axioms. To say your opponent believes in the monstrous, impossible and immoral, is to decide the question in your own favor—to play the counsel for the prosecution and the judge at the same time—a thing not permissible.

The words "fact" and "demonstration" are to you what the red flag is to the Spanish matadore; you flout them in the face of the people as the matadore flouts the red flag in the face of his intended victim, and you imagine they will throw down their heads, shut their eyes and rush at them—and be taken in. You are mistaken. You may deceive some—but the people on the average are not fools.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black comes to the conclusion that the Hebrew Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament."

COMMENT—Mr. Black came to no such conclusion. It is no doubt true that the Old and New Testaments "are so connected together that if one is true the other cannot be false." This is your opponent's statement and it is very different from what you represent him as saying.

INGERSOLL—"It hardly seems possible to me that there is a right-minded, sane man, except Mr. Black, who believes that a God of infinite kindness and justice ever commanded one nation to exterminate another."

COMMENT—It, no doubt, appears strange and hardly possible to you, after your prodigal use of deceit and sophistry, that any one should believe anything at all.











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When God commands one nation to exterminate another the Christian believes that there is very serious reason for it. He believes that God knows more than he; and does not think that to be a philosopher it is necessary to exhaust the resources of his lachrymal glands on every guilty wretch and law-breaker whom the God of justice deems it proper to lash or exterminate. God makes instruments of nations to punish nations.

INGERSOLL—"In his (Black's) efforts to show that the infallible God established slavery in Judea, he takes occasion to say that 'the doctrine that slavery is a crime under all circumstances was first started by the adherents of a political faction in this country less than forty years ago.'"

COMMENT—*First.* Mr. Black never made any efforts to prove that God established slavery in Judea, notwithstanding your inverted commas.

Second. In your blundering haste to reply you fail to catch your opponent's meaning. Black says: "The doctrine that slavery is a crime under all circumstances, was first started, etc., less than forty years ago." When Black made this statement he took it for granted that you knew the difference between that which is wrong in itself, and that which is wrong by circumstances—*malum in se* and *malum per accidens*. Your opponent is too good a historian to say that the anti-slavery movement began only forty years ago.

Since the advent of Christianity, slavery has been considered a social and circumstantial evil, an improper relation between labor and capital, but it was never considered by men of healthy brains an evil *per se*, an evil in its nature or essence. This is what Mr. Black meant by "all circumstances," but you were in such a hurry you did not see it. This distinction takes the pith out of all your eloquence on this point. The anti-slavery movement is as old as Christianity. The councils of the Christian Church have, age after age, labored to abolish it, or to mitigate its severities. It did not begin forty years ago. Mr. Black does not say it did. He says that the doctrine that slavery was wrong under all circumstances, was first started forty years ago. In this he is, for all practical purposes, correct. With this distinction in view, your argument on this point loses its wind. The Christian Church, during eighteen

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centuries, has fought against slavery, and taught that all men are equal before God. It was this teaching that in part brought about the persecutions of Christians in the Roman Empire. The law-makers of Rome at that time were slaveholders. They did not relish the doctrine preached by the Apostles, that all men are equal, and they enacted laws of coercion and repression. But the genius of Christian liberty smiled at their imbecile efforts, knowing that she would live to look back through centuries at the forgotten urns of these law-makers, and consider their acts as matters of ancient history.

When I say Christianity antagonized slavery I do not mean that it was by a general, indefinite sentiment, but by actual legislation. I will, in proof of this, give some of the councils which legislated to protect the slave. The council of Elvira, held in the year 305; the council of Epaon, year 517; the council of Toledo, year 694; the fifth council of Arles, year 549; Emerita, 686; the eleventh of Toledo, year 675; Worms, 868; second of Macon, 585; the 5th of Paris, 614; the third of Toledo, 589; the fourth of Toledo, 688; of Agde, 506; Rheims, 625; the third of Lyons, 588; the council of St. Patrick, celebrated in Ireland in 450, required church property to be used in redeeming captives; the second council of Vernuil, 844, did the same. The second council of Lyons excommunicated those who enslaved others. A council held in 922 declared that he who sold another into slavery was guilty of homicide. A council held in London in the year 1102 forbade the selling of men in that city, and called it an infamous traffic. Pope Gregory XVI., in 1839, published Apostolic letters against the slave trade. I might mention many other councils, but I have given enough to show the spirit and tendency of Christianity on the subject of slavery, and that anti-slavery is a Christian thought.

INGERSOLL—"It will not do to take the ground that the rapid rise and spread of religion demonstrates its divine character."

COMMENT—Certainly not, and that is the reason why Mr. Black did not take that ground, although you labor to make your readers believe he did. Theologians do not teach that rapidity of rise and spread, taken alone, is evidence of the divine character of Christianity. Hence your several pages devoted to show the unsoundness of

that position are just so much waste paper. It is a loss of time, as well, to overthrow a position that no one holds—that has no existence except in your vivid imagination.

That it may be seen that your adversary does not hold the position you ascribe to him, I will here quote his argument in its completeness:

"When Jesus of Nazareth announced himself to be Christ, the Son of God, in Judea, many thousands of persons who heard His words and saw His works believed in His divinity without hesitation. Since the morning of creation, nothing has occurred so wonderful as the rapidity with which this religion has spread itself abroad. Men who were in the noon of life when Jesus was put to death as a malefactor lived to see Him worshipped as God by organized bodies of believers in every province of the Roman empire. In a few more years it took complete possession of the general mind, supplanted all other religions, and wrought a radical change in human society."

This is a succinct statement of the *facts* in the case. Mr. Black next proceeds to give the remarkable *circumstances* under which this rapid change took place; and these circumstances are an integral part of the argument, for it is by them that the rapid rise of Christianity is distinguishable from that of other religions. It is the rise of Christianity in the face of these circumstances that constitutes the evidence of its divine origin. Mr. Black continues:

"It did this in the face of obstacles which, according to every human calculation, were insurmountable. It was antagonized by all the evil propensities, the sensual wickedness, and the vulgar crimes of the multitude, as well as the polished vices of the luxurious classes; and was most violently opposed even by those sentiments and habits of thought which were esteemed virtuous, such as patriotism and military heroism. It encountered not only the ignorance and superstition, but the learning and philosophy of the time. Barbarism and civilization were alike its deadly enemies. The priesthood of every established religion and the authority of every government were arrayed against it. All these combined together, and roused to furious hostility, were overcome, not by the enticing words of man's wisdom, but by the simple presentation of a pure and peaceful doctrine, preached by obscure strangers, at

the daily peril of their lives. Is it Mr. Ingersoll's idea that this happened through chance? If not, there are but two other ways to account for it; either the evidence by which the Apostles were able to prove that the supernatural origin of the Gospels was overwhelming and irresistible, or else its propagation was provided for and carried on by the direct aid of the Divine Being himself. Between these two infidelity may take its choice."

This, Mr. Ingersoll, is your adversary's argument in full, and the reader will see why you try to twist it out of shape before you attempt to answer it, and why you notice one part and ignore the other.

Your reply is, that other religions arose and spread with equal rapidity. Granted, for argument's sake. But did they arise under like circumstances, and did they meet and overcome like obstacles? Christianity met and overcame obstacles "which, according to every human calculation, were insurmountable," says Mr. Black. You do not deny this, and you cannot assert it of other religions.

INGERSOLL—"Imagine a Mohammedan answering an infidel; would he not use the argument of Mr. Black, simply substituting Mohammed for Christ, just as effectually as it has been used against me?"

COMMENT—No, because a Mohammedan could not use it with truth or force. It would be equally groundless in the mouth of a Brahmin or a priest of Isis and Osiris, for the rise and spread of these false religions have nothing in common with the rise and progress of Christianity, except perhaps rapidity, and this is not given by Mr. Black as a proof of the divine origin of Christianity. You evidently set about answering his argument before you got a good hold of its full force and meaning.

INGERSOLL—"Do you not see that your argument proves too much, and that it is equally applicable to all the religions of the world?"

COMMENT—No; the flickering and uncertain glare of your light does not enable me to see it. A better light, that of reason, together with a little knowledge of the facts in the case, will convince your readers that it is applicable to Christianity *alone* of all religions that ever claimed the attention of man. Your efforts to make the

argument fit Buddhism, Brahminism, and Mohammedanism can succeed only by misrepresenting it, which, by the way, you have not hesitated to do.

INGERSOLL—"The old argument that if Christianity is a human fabrication, its authors must have been either good men or bad men, takes it for granted that there are but two classes of persons—the good and the bad. There is at least one other class—the *mistaken*."

COMMENT—"Then you must belong to this newly-invented class. The *mistaken* must be either good or bad. If they are honestly mistaken, they are good so far as the subject of the mistake goes; if they are dishonestly mistaken they are bad. Don't you see we must come back to the two classes which "the old argument takes for granted"?"

INGERSOLL—"The history of the world is filled with instances where men have honestly supposed that they had received communications from angels and gods."

COMMENT—"How do you know that they honestly supposed? Must you not, from the nature of the case, take their words for the honesty of their supposition? Then it is their *claim* to have received communications that constitutes the instances with which you say history is filled. Now, a claim is something tangible, something that can be tested. When a man claims to have received a communication from God, Christians and all other sensible people require some evidence in proof of the truth of his claim, and it is this test that enables us to distinguish between real and imaginary, true and pretended communications. History is full of instances where men have claimed to have received divine communications; it is also full of instances where these claims were rejected for want of sufficient evidence of their truth."

INGERSOLL—"What we must say is that, being good men, they were mistaken."

COMMENT—"Then you know more about events that transpired nearly two thousand years ago than those who were eye-witnesses to them! Whatever else a modern infidel may lack, he is never found wanting in assurance. It is his strong point."

The Apostles claimed a divine communication and mission. They worked miracles in proof of their claim. These miracles proved both to themselves and to those

who witnessed them that there could be no mistake about their claim. "What we must say is, that you are mistaken," when you assume to be a better judge, a more reliable witness, of events that transpired nineteen hundred years ago in Judea than those were who then lived, and saw those events with their own eyes, or heard them with their own ears. Would your statements, under the circumstances, be taken against theirs in any court of justice?

It is true that there have been insane people and fanatical enthusiasts who imagined that they had a mission from God, but this does not prove that sane men have not had real commissions and missions from God. A false prophet does not destroy the possibility of recognizing a true one, as a counterfeit note does not destroy the value of a genuine note. There are many presidents of the United States and Queen Victorias in our insane asylums. Do their hallucinations vitiate the real president's title or prove that there is no such person as Queen Victoria? Or does the delusion of Guiteau destroy the claims of a Moses or a St. Paul to a divine commission? Yet this is the assumption and drift of your argument against the mission of the Apostles! Your reasoning stated in form is this:

Some men have been mistaken.

Therefore the founders of Christianity were mistaken.

A boy who could reason no better than this ought to have his ears boxed—if boxes large enough could be found.

CHAPTER XVI.

WHO WROTE THE GOSPELS?—CHARACTER OF THE EVANGELISTS—MIRACLES OF CHRIST—LAZARUS, COME FORTH.

INGERSOLL—"We are told that 'there is no good reason to doubt that the statements of the Evangelists, as we have them now, are genuine.' The fact is, no one knows who made the 'statements of the Evangelists.'"

COMMENT—The fact is, there can be no reasonable doubt whatever that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John wrote the Gospels attributed to them. Your statement to the contrary has not a particle of evidence to rest on. You have as good reason, and no better, to say that no one knows who wrote Shakespeare, *Paradise Lost* of Milton, the *Divine Comedy* of Dante, *Cæsar*, *Livy*, *Tacitus*, *Josephus* or *Homer*. No one ever doubts that those books were written by the authors to whom they are attributed. The same kind of evidence that establishes the authenticity of these, proves the authenticity of the Gospels in a higher degree. Historical evidence, common tradition, and a concatenation of circumstances, are all we have to prove the genuineness of *Hamlet* and *Othello*, *Paradise Lost*, *Livy*, *Tacitus*, and *Josephus*. And they are abundantly sufficient. Now this historical evidence, common tradition and concatenation of circumstances are equally strong for the authors of the four Gospels. They are stronger; for the facts treated of in the Gospels have changed the course of human history, and in consequence the attention of mankind has been more particularly directed to them. The more important the contents of a book are to mankind, the more surely will its genuineness be admitted or denied from the beginning. It is a remarkable fact that the authenticity or genuineness of the four Gospels was never brought in question until modern times, and then only by a few infidels; and even these confine themselves to bold, naked, groundless statements. These Gospels were received in the earliest times as genuine, and were quoted by the earliest Christian writers as the works of Matthew, Mark, Luke,

and John. All the enemies of Christianity, Jew, Pagan, or heretic, who wrote against the Christian religion, admitted without a shadow of hesitation or doubt the genuineness of these Gospels.

Celsus who lived in the second century, and was as rabid an enemy of the Christian religion as you are, not only mentions by name, but also quotes passages from the books of the New Testament, so that it is certain we have the identical books to which he referred. In all his writings extant he never suggests the slightest doubt of the genuineness of the books he quotes from, and whose doctrines he opposes. Porphyry (A.D. 233), another anti-Christian writer, in his objections takes for granted the genuineness of the Gospels. Julian the Apostate, (A.D. 363), another enemy of the Church, calls the Gospels by the name they now bear, and nowhere questions their genuineness or authenticity. Neither Celsus in the second century, Porphyry in the third, nor Julian in the fourth, doubted the authenticity of these books, or ever insinuated that Christians were mistaken in the authors to whom they ascribed them. Not one of them expressed an opinion on this subject that was different from that held by the early Christians. There is much more evidence that could be adduced for the authenticity of the Gospels and the other books of the New Testament, but it is needless. Those who wish to read them in full can consult Horn's introduction to the Holy Scriptures, vol. I., Chapters III. and IV., and DuClot's Sainte Bible Vengée, vol. III. Those who will examine these books may see what value is to be placed on your statement that "no one knows who made the statements of the Evangelists."

INGERSOLL—"There are three important manuscripts upon which the Christian world relies, * * the Codex Vatican, * * the Codex Alexandrine, * * and the Sinaitic Codex."

COMMENT—These Codices are simply the oldest known manuscripts of the Sacred Scriptures. They are not original manuscripts; only the completest copies *extant*, and they are all more or less imperfect. These manuscripts are venerable and useful, but it is not true to say the Christian world relies or depends on them. If they were all swept out of existence to-morrow, it would not

have any effect whatever on Christianity, which existed before them, and will survive them.

BLACK—"Nothing was said by the most virulent enemies against the personal honesty of the Evangelists."

INGERSOLL—"How is this known?"

COMMENT—It is known from the fact that neither in tradition nor history is there anything directly or indirectly throwing the least suspicion or shadow of doubt on their honesty, integrity, and holiness of life. The Apostles certainly have a right to the same protection that you claim for your own character. You will not deny them this. Now, suppose a friend of yours said:—"Nothing is said by the most virulent enemies against the personal honesty and virtue of Mr. Ingersoll." What would you think of the man who would reply by saying:—"How is this known?" You would say he was a coward and a contemptible sneak, with the heart of an assassin without his courage. Is not your honesty and virtue to be taken for granted until there is evidence to the contrary? Is not that man a criminal who attempts to rob you of your character by hints or winks or insinuating questions? Christianity teaches that he is, whatever you may think, with your code of morals. The world, after nearly twenty centuries, has found nothing but holiness in the character of the Apostles, and they have lived during all that time in the calcium light of history. The infidels and Christ-haters of all times have found nothing against them, and yet, after this long trial, when their personal honesty is asserted, you, the apostle of fair play and "honor bright," ask:—"How is this known?" How small men can become when led by one overmastering passion or delusion.

INGERSOLL—"If Christ performed the miracles recorded in the New Testament, why would the Jews put to death a man able to raise the dead?"

COMMENT—The miracles of Christ recorded in the New Testament were admitted by the Jews. It never occurred to Jew, Gentile or Pagan to doubt the fact of those miracles. Celsus, Porphyry and Julian admitted them and tried to deprive them of their significance and force by saying that Christ was a magician who had learned the black art in Egypt while He dwelt with Mary His mother on the banks of the Nile. The Jews also accounted for His power, which they admitted, by saying He had stolen

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the unspeakable word from the temple; and some of them said he worked miracles by the power of the devil. These explanations of his miracles are the strongest evidence of their reality. Porphyry (A.D. 270) said: "Jesus having been raised obscurely, went to Egypt, where having learned to perform some miracles, he returned to Judea, and proclaimed himself to be God."

Julian the Emperor and Apostate (361) said: "He (Christ) did not do anything worth speaking of, unless we consider it a great thing to have cured the deaf and blind and to have expelled the demons from those who were possessed in the villages of Bethsaida and Bethany." The miracles of Christ were so striking and so public that the anti-christian philosophers were driven to the necessity of admitting them and trying to explain them away. Thus, Hierocles, a pagan philosopher, and governor of Alexandria under the Emperor Dioclesian, was not satisfied with persecuting the Christians, but he must, to prove his loyalty, no doubt, write a book in which he compared the pretended miracles of Apollonius Thyanæus to those of Christ. There were no lecture bureaus at the time, and no *North American Review*, so Hierocles had to write a book. He wrote his book in which he said as follows, and in which the reader will recognize a certain Ingersollian twang:

"The Christians make a great noise and give great praise to Jesus because he gave sight to the blind, and did other wonders. * * We have better reason in attributing like works to many great men, such as Aristæus, Pythagoras, Apollonius."

After having described the wonders worked by Apollonius, this pagan philosopher continues:

"I speak of these wonders to show that we think more wisely than the Christians; we do not regard as a God, but as a friend of the gods, a man who has worked such great wonders; the Christians, on the contrary, publish that Jesus is God on account of the trifling prodigies he performed. Peter, Paul, and some others of that sect, liars, ignorants, and magicians, have boasted of the actions of Jesus, but Maximus Degens, the philosopher Darius, Philostratus, wise men and lovers of truth, have told us of the miracles of Apollonius."

According to Arnobius the pagans held that Jesus had

stolen from the sanctuary of the Egyptians the names of the powerful genii, and the secrets by which he performed his wonders.

Now, Mr. Ingersoll, do not all these attempts of ancient philosophers to belittle and explain away the works of Jesus Christ, prove that those works were real—that they were known and admitted? These men knew the facts better than you do, and instead of denying them as you do, they tried to make little of them or explain them away.

INGERSOLL—"If Christ performed the miracles recorded in the New Testament, why would the Jews put to death a man able to raise their dead?"

COMMENT—The argument of this question is, that because the Jews put Christ to death, they did not believe in His miracles as recorded in the Gospels. But this conclusion is false. The Jews believed that God had forbidden them to abandon the law of Moses, even if a prophet performing miracles required them to do so. From the time of Christ down to the present, the Jews have always and uniformly believed in the reality of the miracles of Christ. If you do not believe this, consult their Talmuds.

Well, then, you will ask, if they admitted the fact of His miracles, why did they not accept Him as the Messiah? While they admitted the miracles, they did not believe that they proved Him to be the Messiah. Their prophets had performed miracles under the Mosaic law. They had even raised the dead. The Jews in the time of Christ could not understand how miracles could be worked to abrogate that law. Fixed habits and prejudices, then, caused them to reject the *evidence* of His miracles while they admitted the *fact* of them. They attributed them to Beelzebub. Again, they believed that the promised Son of David was to be a great temporal prince, that He was to free the Jewish people and establish a great Jewish empire, restore the Jewish nobility, and raise the Aaronic priesthood to its ancient preeminence and glory. His preaching and humble life gave no encouragement to these hopes, and they refused to believe in Him as the promised Messiah, even while they admitted His miracles. And they put Him to death, as they had put to death their acknowledged prophets.

INGERSOLL—"Why should they attempt to kill the master of death?"

COMMENT—"To prove that He was not master of death.

INGERSOLL—"How did it happen that a man who had done so many miracles was so obscure, so unknown, that one of His disciples had to be bribed to point Him out?"

COMMENT—"If He was so obscure and unknown why was Judas bribed to point Him out at all? That was not an age of weekly pictorials, by which the faces of public men are made familiar to the people. If you were to be arrested to-morrow for murder, the law requires that some one formally identify you.

INGERSOLL—"Is it not strange that the ones He had cured were not His disciples?"

COMMENT—"It would be strange if true; but how do you happen to know they were not? Is it not strange that you should know more about those who were cured than history knows? Where did you get your information? How do you know that the son of the widow of Naim was not a disciple of Christ? or Lazarus, or the deaf, the blind, and the lame? You simply know nothing whatever about it. And yet with your infidel brass you say they were not!

INGERSOLL—"Can we believe on the testimony of those about whose character we know nothing, that Lazarus was raised from the dead?"

COMMENT—"Yes, we can, and must, just as we believe the facts of all history. We believe that Caesar was assassinated by Brutus; that Philip was king of Macedon; that Alexander his son was a great conqueror; that Homer lived and wrote a book on the Trojan wars; that Virgil wrote the adventures of Æneas; that Demosthenes thundered against Philip, and that Cicero tore the veil of hypocrisy from the brow of Cataline and aroused the Romans to the dangers of his conspiracy; that the Roman empire existed and fell, and that Christian nations rose out of its ruins. All these and a thousand other facts we do and must believe, and yet what do we know about the character of the witnesses who testify to them? The principle that destroys the credibility of the Gospel histories destroys at the same time the credibility of all history and the credibility of the human race.

INGERSOLL—"What became of Lazarus?"

COMMENT—It is probable that he lived an honest life, and did not spend his time in asking foolish questions.

INGERSOLL—"We never hear of him again."

COMMENT—The world has not ceased to hear of him to good purpose for the last nineteen hundred years.

INGERSOLL—"It seems to me he would have been an object of great interest."

COMMENT—So it has proved, although he was not the first man who was raised from the dead, as we learn from the Old Testament.

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CHAPTER XVII.

MIRACLES OF CHRIST—JOSEPHUS.

INGERSOLL—"How is it known that it was claimed, during the life of Christ, that He had wrought a miracle?"

COMMENT—It is known from four histories written by four well-known historians who were contemporaries of the Jewish historian Josephus. Their names are Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. These historians, whom the world has always believed, tell us that the Jews accused Christ of working miracles by the power of Beelzebub, and that Christ reasoned with them to prove that His miracles were not worked by such power. This is the way it is known that it was claimed and admitted, during the life of Christ, that He wrought miracles. These historians give many other instances that I might adduce, but it is not necessary.

INGERSOLL—"And if the claim was made, how is it known that it was not denied?"

COMMENT—There is contemporary evidence that the claim was made and admitted, and there is no evidence whatever that it was ever denied. On the contrary, all history takes those miracles as facts that have been passed upon as no longer legitimate subjects of dispute.

As you have adduced no ancient historian who denies the miracles of Christ, it must be taken for granted that there is none. If there was a single line of Jew or Pagan denying these miracles, you infidels would hammer on it as persistently as the gentlemanly waiter hammers on the Chinese gong at the railroad depot—twenty minutes for refreshments. Failing to find any evidence of this kind what do you do? It is almost incredible, but nevertheless true; you actually call on Christians to prove that no such evidence ever existed! You say: "How is it known that it was not denied?" The Devil himself, in the highest flight of his genius, never surpassed this piece of supreme impertinence. You are a lawyer, and as such you are supposed to know something about legal logic at least.

Now what would you say of the counsel for the prosecution in the star route cases if, after failing to find any evidence of the guilt of the accused, they should require you to prove that no such evidence ever existed? Suppose Merrick, your able opponent in the star route suit, should, after failing to produce evidence of guilt, say: "How is it known that such evidence does not exist?" What would you feel like saying of him? What would the court think of him? This is the predicament you place yourself in when you ask: How is it known that the miracles of Christ were never denied?

INGERSOLL—"Did the Jews believe that Christ was clothed with miraculous power?"

COMMENT—They did. And they believed that their prophets were also clothed with miraculous power, even that of raising the dead, and this was the reason why the miracles of Christ did not convince them that He was God or the Messiah.

INGERSOLL—"Is it not wonderful that Josephus, the best historian the Hebrews produced, says nothing about the life or death of Christ?"

COMMENT—Nothing? Here is what he says:

"Now, there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call Him a man: for He performed many wonderful works. He was a teacher of such men as received the truth with pleasure. He drew over to Him many of the Jews, and also many Gentiles. This man was the Christ. And when Pilate, at the instigation of the principal men among us, had condemned Him to the cross, those who had loved Him from the first did not cease to adhere to Him. For He appeared to them alive again on the third day; the divine prophets having foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning Him. And the tribe of the Christians, so named from Him, subsists to this time."—*Antiquities of the Jews*, Book 18, chap. 8.

This is something about the life and death of Christ, is it not?

INGERSOLL—"The paragraph in Josephus is admitted to be an interpolation."

COMMENT—Admitted by whom? By you, and Paine, and Voltaire, and other infidels, Tooley street tailors. The paragraph is so strong and direct that the infidel

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fraternity cannot get over its force except by denying its genuineness. And this they do accordingly. After this denial, which in itself is of no weight, however, they proceed to the next step in infidel tactics and say, "it is admitted." Now, sir, it is not admitted that this paragraph is an interpolation. On the contrary, it is held to be genuine, and for the best of reasons. It is found in all the copies of Josephus's works now extant, whether printed or manuscript; in a Hebrew translation preserved in the Vatican Library, and in an Arabic version preserved by the Maronites of Mount Libanus. It is cited by Eusebius, the most ancient of Church historians, by St. Jerome, Rufinus, Isidore of Pelusium, Sozomen, Cassiodorus, Nicephorus, and many others. Eusebius was the first to quote this passage, and it is morally impossible that he could have forged it without being detected. No objection was made to this passage in the early ages by any of the opponents of the Christian faith. The paragraph is then genuine, according to all rules of evidence and all the canons of sound criticism.

INGERSOLL—"Is it not wonderful that no historian ever mentioned any of these prodigies?"

COMMENT—The prodigies you refer to are, 1st, the massacre of the infants by Herod; 2nd, the Star of Bethlehem; 3rd, the darkness at the time of the crucifixion, etc.

The first is referred to by Macrobius, a heathen historian, in such a manner as to leave no doubt as to the universal belief in the fact.

The second is mentioned by Chalcidius, a Platonic philosopher, who attests the fact in almost the same words as the gospel:—

This Platonist says:—"There is another history most worthy of our religious veneration, which notes the apparition of a star destined to announce to men, no disease or terrible mortality, but the advent of a God who came down for the salvation and happiness of the human race." Julian the Emperor and Apostate admitted the truth of the account of this star which led the wise men, by saying that it was the star *Asaph*, observed by the Egyptians as making its appearance every four hundred years.

The third (the darkness) is mentioned by Phlegon of Trallium, a pagan who lived in the middle of the second

century, i. e., about the year of our Lord 150. He says:—"The fourth year of the two hundred and second Olympiad, there was an eclipse of the sun, the grandest that had ever been hitherto. About the sixth hour of the day a night so obscured that the stars in the heavens became visible. A great earthquake took place, which overturned many houses in the city of Nice in Bythania." This 202nd Olympiad, year 4, corresponds with the 88rd year of the Christian era. This is the year and time of the crucifixion. But let us go back a little. You say:—"Josephus is the best historian the Hebrews produced." Now, I ask you, on what principle do you accept the works of Josephus as genuine, while you reject the works of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John? They were contemporaries. If the evidence for the authenticity or genuineness of the histories attributed to the Evangelists is not sufficient to give them the stamp of veracity, what more evidence have you for the genuineness and veracity of Josephus? Why do you reject the works of the Evangelists and admit the works of Josephus? It is useless to ask the question and expect an answer. The real answer is this:—You imagine Josephus does not antagonize your infidel theories, and the Evangelic historians do. This accounts for your enmity for the one and your admiration for the other.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

MR. INGERSOLL AS A HERMENEUTIST—JOSEPHUS AGAIN—THE ASCENSION—LAST WORDS OF CHRIST—GENEALOGY.

INGERSOLL—"Is it not more amazing than all the rest, that Christ himself concealed from Matthew, Mark and Luke the dogma of Atonement, the necessity of belief, and the mystery of the second birth?"

COMMENT—*First.* Atonement is the expiation of sin by the obedience and personal sufferings of Christ—redemption. Now, Matthew says:—"Even as the son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many."—xx. 28. Mark makes the statement word for word.—x. 45. Luke says:—"But those things which God had foretold by the mouth of all the prophets, that His Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled."—Acts iii. 18. In the face of these facts how can you say that Christ concealed this dogma from these Evangelists?

Second. The necessity of belief.

On this Mark says:—"He that believeth not shall be condemned."—xvi. 16. Luke, in his book called *The Acts of the Apostles*, says:—"Believe in the Lord Jesus: and thou shalt be saved, and thy house."—xv. 81. Why did you say Christ concealed the necessity of belief from Mark and Luke?

Third—The mystery of the second birth.

On this Matthew says:—"Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."—xxviii. 19. Mark teaches:—"He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved,"—xvi. 16. It does not appear that this doctrine was concealed from these Evangelists.

INGERSOLL—"When we remember that eighteen hundred years ago there were but few people who could write, and that a manuscript did not become public in any modern sense, it was possible for the Gospels to have been written with all the foolish claims in reference to miracles without exciting comment or denial."

COMMENT—The Gospels and the other writings of the New Testament were better known in the age in which they were written than any other books, sacred or profane. Other books were written for the few, the learned; the books of the New Testament were written for the people. They were read every Sunday to the people, and their teaching became their rule of conduct and life, while the writings of philosophers and profane historians were known only to the student; they did not enter into the lives and habits of the people. This is one reason why so few of these historians have survived the lapse of ages, while the writings of Apostles have come down to us in all their completeness. They were therefore public, and the miracles recorded in them did excite comment and caused the conversion of thousands of both Jews and Gentiles.

INGERSOLL—"There is not, in all the contemporaneous literature of the world, a single word about Christ and His Apostles."

COMMENT—Whatever it may have been, there is little of the literature of that time now extant. But, little as it is, we have enough to prove your statement false. Josephus was a contemporary of the Apostles. He was born in the year 37. In my last article I quoted his testimony in reference to Christ: "Now, there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man * * * He drew over to him many of the Jews, and also many of the Gentiles. This man was the Christ," etc.

INGERSOLL—"The paragraph in Josephus is admitted to be an interpolation."

COMMENT—No, sir, it is not admitted, nor even claimed, except by a few interested critics like yourself. Learned critics have demonstrated that this paragraph is genuine, and that it could not have been interpolated. But there is still another passage in Josephus, the genuineness of which has never been questioned or even suspected.

In his *Antiquities*, Book 20, chap. 9, sec. 1, he says: "Ananias assembled the Jewish Sanhedrim, and brought before it James, the brother of Jesus who is called Christ, with some others, whom he delivered over to be stoned as infractors of the law." The James here spoken of was the first bishop of Jerusalem, and an Apostle.

The writings of Suetonius are contemporary literature.

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This author was born in the year 72. He refers to Christ when he says that Claudius Cæsar expelled the Jews from Rome, because they raised continual tumults *at the instigation of Christ*."—*In Claudio*, chap. 25.

The historian Tacitus, born in the year 56, says: "The author of that sect (Christians) was Christ, who, in the reign of Tiberius, was punished with death as a criminal by the procurator Pontius Pilate."—Tacitus, *Annals*, Book 15, chap. 44.

Pliny the younger, born in the year 62, in his celebrated letter to the Emperor Trajan, says that Jesus was worshipped by His followers as God—"They sing among themselves, alternately, a hymn to Christ as to God."

Now, sir, in view of these testimonies, what are we to think of your assertion that "there is not, in all the contemporaneous literature of the world, a single word about Christ and His Apostles?" And what will the reader think of your character for veracity?

INGERSOLL—"Neither will it do to say that 'the statements made by the Evangelists are alike upon every important point.'"

COMMENT—"It will do to say it, because it is true, and because you have given no evidence to the contrary, as we shall see."

INGERSOLL—"If there is anything of importance in the New Testament, from a theological standpoint, it is the ascension of Christ."

COMMENT—"Granted."

INGERSOLL—"Are the statements of the inspired witnesses alike on this point?"

COMMENT—"Yes. But your opponent does not say 'inspired witnesses.' Christians do not teach that the Apostles were *inspired witnesses* of the events they narrate. It does not require inspiration to witness a fact. This is an illustration of your art in changing words to introduce into the question false ideas. The Apostles witnessed the events in the life of Christ, as others witnessed them. But, unlike others, they were inspired to give a narration of the events they witnessed. You are fond of words of double meaning. They give room for sophistry. A witness may mean one who has seen an event take place, or it may mean one who gives testimony of what he has seen. The Evangelists were the inspired narrators of

what they witnessed. I mention this merely to show how carefully you are to be watched. The statements, then, of the "inspired witnesses" are alike on the ascension.

INGERSOLL—"Let us see."

COMMENT—Certainly, your desire for information is praiseworthy.

INGERSOLL—"Matthew says nothing upon the subject."

COMMENT—Your opponent said the statements *made* by the Evangelists were alike, etc. He said nothing of statements that were *not made* by this or that Evangelist. Matthew's history ends with the resurrection and the commission of the Apostles, and does not extend to the ascension.

INGERSOLL—"To this wonder of wonders Mark devotes one verse: 'So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them He was received up into heaven, and sat at the right hand of God.'"

COMMENT—Is not one verse sufficient to state an important fact? You, no doubt, would have devoted many words to this fact, but that was not Mark's style—he was not a romancer. The difference between him and you is this: He was inspired to write the truth, while you are not—at least your writings give no evidence of it.

INGERSOLL—"Luke, another of the witnesses, says: 'And it came to pass, while He blessed them, He was parted from them and carried up into heaven.'"

COMMENT—Well, is not this statement and that of Mark alike?

INGERSOLL—"John corroborates Matthew, by saying nothing on the subject."

COMMENT—John "corroborates" St. Matthew by saying: "And no man hath *ascended* into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven."—John iii., 13. This is saying something on the subject, is it not? Why did you overlook this text?

INGERSOLL—"Now, we find that the last chapter of Mark, after the eighth verse, is an interpolation."

COMMENT—Where do you find that? You have said assertions are spurious coins, and yet you would palm your "we find" on the reader as genuine truth. Now, "we find" nothing of the kind, and when you say you have found it, you simply take a dishonest advantage of your ignorant admirers. That they deserve no better treatment

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at your hands is no excuse for you. The verses in the last chapter of St. Mark, which you say are interpolated, are found in almost all the ancient manuscripts. The most ancient of the fathers admit them, as St. Irenæus, Tertullian, St. Clement, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and others. All the oldest Latin, Syriac, and Arabic copies have them. They must, therefore, be considered genuine until we have some better reason for rejecting them than your "we find."

Let us now sum up:

INGERSOLL—" (1) Either the ascension of Christ must be given up, or (2) it must be admitted that the witnesses do not agree, and (3) that three of them never heard of that stupendous event."

COMMENT—*First.* The ascension of Christ will not be given up. It should never have been believed if it could be overthrown by the silly trash which you advance as arguments.

Second. The evidence of the three Evangelists whom I have quoted, does agree, and no man of sense and unbiased judgment will pretend to the contrary. They all bear unequivocal and uncontradictory evidence to the fact of the ascension.

Third. There are only four Evangelists. Three of them speak of the ascension, as is seen by the above quotations. Now where do you find your *other* three who never heard of it?

But you contradict yourself. According to your reasoning only one of the Evangelists mentions the ascension; the rest are silent, or never heard of that stupendous event. Now, if only one of four witnesses speak, how can they contradict each other? There is such a thing as being too smart. You should not let your zeal for godlessness run away with your judgment. The conclusion from all this is that the Evangelists do not contradict each other, and that their testimony is alike on the ascension.

INGERSOLL—"Again, if anything could have left its 'form and pressure on the brain,' it must have been the last words of Christ."

COMMENT—No doubt of it. What then?

INGERSOLL—"The last words, according to Matthew, are: 'Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of

the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world."

COMMENT—Now, these are not the last words of Christ according to Matthew, and Matthew does not say they were the last words. Why do you interpolate into the gospel of Matthew a statement he never made? Is it through stupidity, or ignorance, or a desire to deceive? You must excuse me, but I must talk according to the facts; your statement is absolutely false. Matthew does not pretend to give the last words of Christ. The words: Go ye, etc., are simply the last words reported by Matthew.

INGERSOLL—The last words, according to the inspired witness known as Mark, are: 'And these signs shall follow them that believe: in my name they shall cast out devils,' etc.

COMMENT—What I have said above in reference to the last words of Matthew are equally applicable here. St. Mark does not report these words as the last utterances of Christ. They are simply the last words he (Mark) reports. You can be excused from bad faith here only at the expense of your intelligence.

INGERSOLL—"Luke tells us that the last words uttered by Christ, with the exception of a blessing, were: 'And behold I send forth the promise of my Father upon you,' etc.

COMMENT—Luke tells us nothing of the kind; and it is hard to believe that you did not know you were misrepresenting Luke when you said so. You must have an unlimited faith in the credulity of this age, and in the bottomless ignorance of the class to which you appeal when you make such a statement. It is not at all surprising that great and learned Christian theologians do not care to meet you. The reason of their silence is evident to men of sense. It is not their duty or business to turn aside to meet every blatant blasphemer who wags his tongue against Christianity for dollars, under the pretence of being a philosopher. They decline to talk with you about theology on the same principle that a Marshall, a Taney, or an Evarts would decline to discuss Common Law or the Code Justinian with a mountebank.

INGERSOLL—"The last words according to John, were:

' Peter seeing Him, saith to Jesus : Lord, and what shall this man do ? ' " etc.

COMMENT—It is needless to tell the reader, after what I have said in reference to , our falsifications of the other Evangelists, that your assertion as to what St. John says is utterly false and without a shadow of foundation. You are squandering your reputation too cheaply.

INGERSOLL—" An account of the ascension is also given in the Acts of the Apostles ; and the last words of Christ, according to that inspired witness, are : ' But ye shall receive power,' " etc.

COMMENT—This is equally as false as what you have said about the Gospels.

INGERSOLL—" Luke testifies that Christ ascended on the very day of his resurrection."

COMMENT—Luke nowhere testifies that Christ ascended on the very day of his resurrection. On the contrary, he tells us in his *Acts of the Apostles*, that " He (Christ) showed himself alive after his passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them and speaking of the kingdom of God."—i. 8. Here Luke testifies explicitly as to the time of the ascension, whereas in his Gospel he specifies no time.

INGERSOLL—" These depositions do not agree."

COMMENT—It is your travesty of them that does not agree. The depositions are alike when fairly and truthfully represented.

INGERSOLL—" Two of the witnesses, Matthew and Luke, give the genealogy of Christ. Matthew says that there were forty-two generations from Abraham to Christ. Luke insists that there were forty-two from Christ to David, while Matthew gives the number as twenty-eight. It may be said that this is an old objection. An objection remains young until it has been answered."

COMMENT—It is indeed an old objection, and in this it is like all the objections you have made. They are all, thus far, merely the old, oft-repeated, and oft-answered ones varnished and revamped into modern parlance. They lose some of their force in the translation, but what they lose that way is made up by flippancy and verbal flummery.

Your objection is that Matthew and Luke contradict each other in the number of generations. Generation has

two meanings. It means first, the actual number of persons in direct line, as father, son, grand-son, great-grand-son, etc. Generation in this sense gives us no measure of time, since every individual in the above series may have lived from twenty to five hundred years or more. This kind of generation is therefore of no use whatever in calculating time or historical epochs. It is too indefinite. It is, however, of use to prove legitimacy, and the right of inheritance. It is generation in this sense that St. Luke traces, because it was his purpose to show that Christ was of the direct line of the elder branch of the royal family, and that He was the person who, if royalty had continued in the family of David, would have legally inherited the throne. Luke was dealing with the question in reference to legitimacy and inheritance—and with no reference to historical times or epochs.

The second meaning of generation has reference to *time*, and denotes the *average life* of man, which at present is supposed to be thirty-three years. As men lived longer in the early history of the race than now, the average life or generation was much longer. Now Matthew uses the word generation in reference to *time*—to the average duration of life when the prophecies concerning the coming of Christ were written—to prove that these prophecies were verified. His purpose was to show two things; first, that the time announced by the prophets had been completed at the advent of Christ, and, second, to show that Christ was of the royal line of David. Generations of *time* then, in the sense used by Matthew, might contain two, three, or four generations of *individuals* in the sense of Luke. It follows, then, that as these two Evangelists were writing about two different things they did not contradict each other. Luke spoke of *individual life*, Matthew of *average life*.

INGERSOLL—"Is it not wonderful that Luke and Matthew do not agree on a single name of Christ's ancestors for thirty-seven generations?"

COMMENT—It is wonderful only to those who are ignorant of the fact that Matthew traces the ancestors of Joseph, while Luke gives the ancestors of Mary, the Mother of God.

Are your ancestors on your mother's side all Ingersolls? Must your maternal and paternal ancestors necessarily

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have the same name? A careful study of Christian writers on these subjects would save you a good deal of ignorant blundering.

INGERSOLL—"There is a difference of opinion among the witnesses as to what the Gospel of Christ is."

COMMENT—I think the reader has discovered by this time that it is not safe to accept your statements without proof of some kind to verify them. Experience has proved that something more than your word is necessary. You must specify these differences of opinion, quote the conflicting texts, and give their references. After you have done this it will be time to consider your statement. We have had enough of loose, indefinite declamation.

INGERSOLL—"According to these witnesses, Christ knew nothing of the doctrine of Atonement."

COMMENT—In the preceding chapter I quoted from those three witnesses texts referring to Atonement. This was in answer to your statement that those Evangelists knew nothing of that dogma. You now repeat the same idea in another dress. This time it is Christ himself who knows nothing about it, and you give as evidence the three Evangelists, whom you assert never mentioned the subject!! Now, if it were true (as it is not) that these Evangelists never referred to the doctrine of Atonement, how can you quote them as witnesses that Christ knew nothing of that doctrine? Your statement is false, and without a shadow of evidence of any kind whatever to give it even the appearance of truth. Is this the kind of stuff you expect the Christian scholar to stoop to meet?

INGERSOLL—"To my mind the failure of the Evangelists to agree as to what is necessary for man to do to insure the salvation of his soul, is a demonstration that they were not inspired."

COMMENT—It would be a demonstration to the mind of the Christian as well, if there was any such failure to agree as you assert.

If the Evangelists disagreed, or conflicted in their testimony, it would follow that they were not all inspired. But thus far your effort to prove that they disagree is a miserable failure. If you have nothing better to offer than what you have already given to prove disagreement among these Evangelists, your case is in a bad way indeed.

INGERSOLL—"Neither do the witnesses agree as to the last words of Christ, when He was crucified."

COMMENT—"You are positive about this. Now let us see."

INGERSOLL—"Matthew says that He cried: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'"

COMMENT—"Does Matthew say that these were the last words of Christ? The words are the last reported by Matthew, but he does not report them as the last words of Christ."

INGERSOLL—"Mark agrees with Matthew."

COMMENT—"Then, as Matthew reports no words as the last spoken by Christ, it follows that Mark did not. So much for your 'last words' thus far."

INGERSOLL—"Luke testifies that His last words were: 'Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit.'"

COMMENT—"Luke 'testifies' to nothing of the kind. These are the last words reported by Luke, but he does not report them as the last words of Christ."

INGERSOLL—"John states that He cried: 'It is finished.'"

COMMENT—"True, but he does not state that these were His last words. The fact is, none of the Evangelists report any words as the last words of Christ. It is at best a matter of inference what the last words were. Therefore when you quote the Evangelists as reporting the last words of Christ, you misrepresent them; and the contradictions, which you pretend were made by them, exist only in your ignorant or unprincipled misrepresentations of the Gospels. It would be interesting to know by what code of morals you are governed, if any. Gautama, Confucius, or Koang-Foo-Tzee, Zoroaster, Lao-Tzu, Hermes Trismegistus, Moses, and Mahomet, all forbid lying in their moral codes. What code do you follow, anyhow?"

INGERSOLL—"John says that Christ, on the day of His resurrection, said to His disciples; 'Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.' The other disciples do not record this monstrous passage."

COMMENT—"The other disciples do not record this passage, eh? Matthew was an apostle and a disciple was he not? Well, Matthew says: 'Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven,

and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven."—xxviii. 18. And again:—"I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven," etc.—xvi. 19.

This is enough to prove you ignorant or dishonest, and you may take your choice of position. You should not forget that you are not only sacrificing your own dignity and veracity, but are sacrificing and humbling in the dust, so far as one man can do it, the dignity of our common manhood, by your false, foolish, and reckless statements.

INGERSOLL—"They (the Apostles) were not present when Christ placed in their hands the keys of heaven and hell, and put a world beneath the feet of priests."

COMMENT—When you say, "They were not present when He placed in their hands the keys," etc., you intended to perpetrate one of those side-splitting jokes which are wont to set your audience in a roar. The idea of their not being *present* when he placed in their *hands* the keys, is droll, when we come to think of it. But the subject is very serious, and the joke is out of place. When we want to enjoy such things we go to the circus or to the minstrels. But let us return. You say that that commission which Christ gave to His Apostles to pardon sinners "puts a world beneath the feet of priests." Does the power of pardoning criminals, which is reposed in the hands of the governor, place the people of this State at his feet? Reflect on this for a moment, and you will learn that there is more sound than sense in your observation,

CHAPTER XIX.

CONTRADICTIONS—INGERSOLL'S METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR THEM—HOW TO BE SAVED—INGERSOLL'S NEW PATENT.

INGERSOLL—"It is very easy to account for the differences and contradictions in these 'depositions' by saying that each one told the story as he remembered it, or as he heard it, or that the accounts have been changed, but it will not do to say that the witnesses were inspired of God."

COMMENT—It is easy to account by "saying."—Yes, this is the way you account for almost everything. It is easy indeed, but it has this disadvantage, it does not account for everything. It has been the misfortune of your theological career that you have placed too much reliance on "saying" and too little on proving.

It will be time to account for the contradictions of the Evangelists when those contradictions are made apparent. Thus far you have not made them visible. Hence your cunning method of accounting for them by "saying" is gratuitous, uncalled for, and entirely inconsistent with Christian principles. Christianity must be defended by straight, true, and correct methods, or none. It cannot afford to be defended in the spirit in which you attack it. It must not use sophistry, or cunning, or wit, or jokes, or lies. Its platform is truth, and if that ground sinks it must go under with it.

INGERSOLL—"Why should there be more than one inspired Gospel?"

COMMENT—The fact that there were four inspired Gospels written is sufficient evidence that there was reason for four. God does not act without reason. But your question shows that you do not understand what is meant by inspiration. An *inspired* history is not necessarily a *complete* history. The inspiration has reference to what is said by an inspired writer, and not to what is not said by him.

While the four Gospels are inspired histories, they are not complete and full narrations of all the events and

circumstances of Christ's life on earth. While inspiration impelled the Evangelists and other authors of the New Testament to write, and protected them from error in writing, it did not impel any of them to write everything that could be possibly said on every subject of which they treated. If inspiration meant this latter, there would be no need for more than one Gospel, and there would be some sense in your question: but as it does not mean this, your question shows that while you talk glibly about inspiration you do not know what it means.

A history of the United States, written for the Chinese, for instance, must be different from one written for the American reader. I say different, not contradictory. The history for the Chinese must take no common American or Anglo-Saxon tradition as granted. It must state facts and circumstances in such a way as to meet their thoughts. To do this requires much explanation. Many things must be said that need not be said in a history written for the American reader. This is so evident that further illustration is unnecessary. Now carry that idea into sacred history, and you will see a sufficient and satisfactory reason for four instead of one inspired Gospel. A Gospel written for the Jews would merely refer to facts, traditions, prophecies, customs, and habits of life, etc., all perfectly familiar to them. A Gospel written for the use of the Gentiles would have to explain many things of which those people were ignorant. Again, if disputes arose as to certain points, the historian would naturally devote more attention to those points than he would have done had the disputes not arisen. The inspired writers were governed by these considerations. They wrote under different circumstances and for different purposes; and in writing, each was inspired to write what he wrote, and nothing more.

Matthew wrote for the Jews, and he devoted himself to applying to Christ the prophecies of the Old Testament in order to convince the Jews, who believed them, that Christ was the Messiah—that in His person the predictions of their prophets had been accomplished. St. Mark wrote his Gospel for the Gentile converts at Rome. His object was to prove that Christ was the Sovereign Master of all things, and he therefore devotes

almost all his chapters to a recital of the works of Christ, which show His divine power. St. Luke wrote his Gospel more particularly for Theophilus, a pagan convert. His design was to prove that Jesus of Nazareth is the true Saviour of men, as the facts and circumstances of His life prove. For this purpose he makes known certain facts omitted by Matthew and Mark. St. John wrote his Gospel to refute the heresies of the Corinthians, Ebionites, and Valentinians who attacked the divinity of Christ and denied many of His acts and words which the other Evangelists had omitted. His primary object was to prove the divinity of Christ, and for this purpose he begins his Gospel with these sublime words: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The Evangelists then differ in their recitals according to the different circumstances in which they wrote and the objects in view.

INGERSOLL—"There can be only one true account of anything."

COMMENT—There can be as many true accounts of an event as there are points of view to consider the event, or circumstances that surround it. You confound *true* with *complete* or *adequate*. A history that does not give all the events and circumstances of a man's life, and their relations with others, is true history if its statements are true, although it may be incomplete, inadequate, and defective. The four Gospels are true histories, although none of them are complete, for none of them give *all* the events in the life of Christ—in fact, all of them taken together do not. They are all true, different, yet not contradictory. The truth of a history depends on what it says, not on what it does not say. When I say: "Washington was born, lived, and died," I give a true account. It is not as full, complete and adequate as that of Irving or Sparks, but it is as true what there is of it. You may object that it is short, which I will not deny, but you cannot say it is not true. You simply confound *true* with *complete* or *adequate*. A school-boy writing his first composition might be excused for an improper use of adjectives, but a philosopher should be more careful—or more honest.

INGERSOLL—"That which is a test of truth as to ordinary witnesses is a demonstration against their inspiration."

COMMENT—The test of truth in the case of ordinary witnesses is the fact of their agreement. The fact that the Evangelists agree in the statements made by them is evidence of their truth, just as it is in the case of ordinary witnesses. Now, how the evidence of their veracity can be a demonstration against their inspiration is difficult to understand. You have said if they *disagree* they cannot be inspired, and you are right. But you are not satisfied; you now try to prove that if they *agree* they cannot be inspired. Any remarks of mine on this reasoning of yours would only draw the reader from a contemplation of its sublimity. So we will pass in silence to other points.

INGERSOLL—"My doctrine is that there is only one way to be saved, and that is to act in harmony with your surroundings—to live in accordance with the facts of your being."

COMMENT—Then you have changed your "doctrine" considerably since you began your article. Your "doctrine" in the first part of it was that there is no God, or at least that we cannot know whether there is or not; that a future life was "invented" by Christians to give God a chance to rectify the mistakes of this. Your "doctrine" now is that there is one way at least, to be saved—it is "to act in harmony with your surroundings." Well, your surroundings are certainly Christian. If you lived among Mormons you should be a Mormon; if in Turkey you should have a harem and sit cross-legged like a tailor; if among Thugs you should be a Thug; if among assassins, an assassin; if among thieves, a thief! This theory has the advantage of being in harmony with the "elastic cord of human feeling."

But you explain. To live in harmony with your surroundings is to live—"in accordance with the facts of your being." Good. This is precisely what Christianity demands of us. But what are the facts of our being? There's the rub. This question brings the whole controversy back to the starting-point. It is time you should understand that the whole question between you and the Christian, as well as between the heathen, the pagan, the barbarian, and the Christian, is: *What are the facts of our being?* This question is the root or foundation of all the difference of opinion that ever existed in the world as to

man, his duties and his obligations. It is the question that philosophers in all ages have tried in vain to solve, and which the Christian believes unaided reason cannot solve.

What am I? Whence came I? Whither am I drifting? Your answer to these questions is: I do not know. Your reply is true, although no answer.

It is a common understanding among men of sense that when a man confesses ignorance of a subject, he should not force himself to the front and confuse investigation by his ignorant, garrulous talk. If he confessedly knows nothing of the subject under investigation, it is incumbent on him, as a man of sense, to hold his tongue. Ignorance is no disgrace where it is not one's own fault, but there is nothing so admirable in an ignorant man as a quiet tongue and an attentive ear: and there is nothing more pitiable and detestable in God's universe than an ignorant man trying to play the role of a teacher of mankind.

What are the facts of our being?

It is the mission of the true religion to answer this question. And by God's help it has been answering it and dinnning it into the ears of humanity, as it surges by, generation after generation, from the time of Adam down to the year of our Lord 1884, and it will continue to do so until the angel of eternity calls the muster-roll of time. Voltaires, Frerets, Gibbons, Diderots, Paines and Ingersolls will appear from time to time to curse the moral world, as plagues, small-pox, leprosy, and insanity have cursed the physical world. But Christianity is destined to survive the one, as the human race survived the other.

CHAPTER XX.

THE HONEST INFIDEL—THE UPRIGHT ATHEIST—LUNATICS AND
IDIOTS—JUDAS ISCARIOT—HOW ?

INGERSOLL—"For the honest infidel, according to the American Evangelical pulpit, there is no heaven."

COMMENT—The cook-book says: The first step in cooking a hare is to catch it. I do not believe any infidel will ever be damned for his honesty. I have no authority to speak for the American Evangelical pulpit, but I suppose if it could be convinced of the "honesty" of an infidel, and his decency in the other respects, it would check him through as a victim of defective phrenal development.

INGERSOLL—"For the upright atheist there is nothing in another world but punishment."

COMMENT—The upright or downright atheist will no doubt be treated as the upright rebel or traitor is treated by the government whose laws he defies, and whose authority he rejects. Christianity teaches that God loves the honest man, that He will never punish him for his honest convictions; it teaches also that God, who is infinitely wise, knows the difference between an honest man and a loquacious demagogue. Christianity teaches that honesty is an affair of the heart and conscience, and not a matter of word-spinning or gush.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black admits that lunatics and idiots are in no danger of hell."

COMMENT—That should be a consolation to many, for we are told that the number of fools is infinite.

INGERSOLL—"This being so, his God should have created only lunatics and idiots."

COMMENT—He has in His inscrutable ways created more than we poor finite creatures can understand the reason for, and He permits them to play their antics before high heaven to an extent that can be explained only by reference to His infinite patience.

INGERSOLL—"Why should the fatal gift of brain be given to any human being, if such gift renders him liable to eternal hell?"

COMMENT—Reason was given to man to be used, not to be abused. According to your theory no man should be allowed to possess anything that could render him liable to pain, suffering, or misfortune of any kind. Reflect for a moment and see where this leads. You should not be trusted with a pistol, or a razor, or a knife, for you might blow your brains out with one, or cut your throat with the others. A man should not be permitted to learn to write because it renders him liable to commit forgery; his hands should be cut off because they render him liable to steal or murder, and to the consequent punishment. You should not have the dangerous liberty of eating, lest you might eat too much and be sick; and your tongue should be dumb, lest you might be liable to talk nonsense or commit perjury. What would you think or say of God if, to free us from all possible danger, He should deprive us of every faculty that may be abused, of everything that constitutes us men—everything that makes life worth living?

INGERSOLL—"Better be an idiot in this world, if you can be a seraph in the next."

COMMENT—Better be an idiot saved than a philosopher damned. But fortunately for men of common average sense, there is a middle course. Idiots and philosophers are extremes—phenomenal and exceptional. The majority of mankind are neither, while they are sometimes the victims of both.

INGERSOLL—"A being of infinite wisdom has no right to create a person destined to everlasting pain."

COMMENT—Passing the question of right, which is to no purpose here, who holds that God created any being to be damned? God created man to enjoy happiness forever, and no man will be damned but he who damns himself.

INGERSOLL—"For nearly two thousand years Judas Iscariot has been execrated by mankind; and yet, if the doctrine of the Atonement is true, upon his treachery hung the plan of salvation."

COMMENT—Judas is justly execrated, because he was a traitor and gave away his friend. His treason has nothing to do with the doctrine of Atonement. Judas was a free agent. The plan of salvation involved the death of Christ, but not by the treason of Judas.

INGERSOLL—"Suppose Judas had known of this plan—

known that he was selected by Christ for that very purpose, that Christ was depending on him."

COMMENT—Suppose that he was *not* selected for this very purpose; that Christ was *not* depending on him. Where did you learn that Judas was selected for this very purpose, or that Christ depended on him?

INGERSOLL—"And suppose."

COMMENT—No, sir; we must suppose nothing. I want facts, and not suppositions or guesses.

INGERSOLL—"Are you willing to rely upon an argument that justifies the treachery of that wretch (Judas)?"

COMMENT—No, I am not, any more than I am ready to rely upon your assertions. Judas was a bad man, but there are worse men living than he. He did not go lecturing about Judea, boasting of his crime, and ridiculing the Christ whom he had betrayed—he went and hanged himself. I do not commend his desperate act, because suicide is murder, but the fellow showed some respect for the opinions of his fellow-men by ridding them of his detestable presence. He loved money, but in this he was not alone. There were no lecture bureaus in those days, and he felt that his career was at an end. Had he known that others would come to continue his work he might have been terrified, and perhaps repented, but not foreseeing this he only hanged himself.

INGERSOLL—"I insisted upon knowing how the sufferings of an innocent man could satisfy justice for the sins of the guilty."

COMMENT—It would have been wiser to have insisted upon knowing the *fact* than upon knowing the *how* of it. There are many facts that you know and admit, and yet if you were asked the *how* of them you could not answer. How do you *think*? How do you apprehend a thought? How do you know that you are, or that you are Ingersoll? Would it be just to infer that you know nothing because you cannot explain "*how*" you know! This is precisely what you expect of your opponent. You ask, *how* can the sufferings of the innocent satisfy for the sins of the guilty? Your opponent replies by saying that the answer involves a question of metaphysics. He is, in my opinion, wrong in this, because he confounds the supernatural with the metaphysical. These terms are not synonyms. To answer your question he had no need to appeal to

metaphysics; in doing so he appealed to the wrong court. His appeal should have been to *reason*; he should have confined himself to the *fact*, or the possibility of it, and not to the *how* of it. We don't know the "how" of anything; and the philosopher who asks it and expects an adequate answer is nothing better than an end man in a minstrel show. Conundrums are associated with tam-bourine and burnt cork. Lecturers who make pretensions to philosophy should not infringe on the amusing trade of honest minstrelsy.

INGERSOLL—"I insisted upon knowing how the sufferings of an innocent man can satisfy justice for the sins of the guilty."

COMMENT—Logicians tell us that most disputes and misunderstandings arise from an abuse or misuse of words—the common symbols of thought. Honest words are often drafted into the service of sophistry and made to do duty under false colors. The art of refuting fallacies consists mainly in liberating these words from enforced service. The only difficulty in your question arises from the use or misuse of the word *justice*. Until that word is made to express a *definite idea* common to your mind and mine, your question is unintelligible, and not susceptible of an intelligent answer. If I should give an answer based on some one of the many meanings of the word, it might not be the meaning which you attach to it, and hence my answer, right or wrong, could not meet your thought, or the difficulty as it exists in your mind. This shows with what great care intelligent men should use words.

What then do you mean by the word *justice* as used in your question? Do you mean justice in the abstract? Justice in abstract is a mere abstraction, having no entity of its own. A pure abstraction can induce no obligations, no duties, no sufferings of innocent or guilty.

Do you mean what theologians call *original justice*? Original justice is the subjection of the body to the mind, the subjection of the will to reason, and the subjection of reason to God. This is the justice that was lost by Adam's fall and restored by the sufferings of Christ.

Do you mean *divine justice*? That, so far as creatures are practically concerned, is the *will* of God, and he is free to determine the nature of atonement.

Do you mean justice in its theological sense? In that sense it is a moral virtue or influence constantly inclining the will of man to render to every one his own. This meaning can have no application to your question.

Do you mean *legal* justice? Legal justice is that which co-ordinates the parts or individuals of a community in reference to the whole, and inclines the individual to render to the community what is necessary for the common good.

Do you mean *distributive* justice? This directs the whole in reference to its parts—the community in its action towards the individual.

There remain *commutative* justice, which regulates the actions of the citizen to his fellow-citizen, and *vindictive* justice, by which the superior visits punishment on the guilty. You see the word *justice* has many meanings. As you are a theologian, philosopher, and lawyer, you should be able to say in what sense you use the word, and you must not imagine your opponent to be fool enough to commit himself to any answer till he knows what you ask.

The fallacy of your question consists in this: It supposes justice to be a thing existing independent of God and man, whereas it is an attribute, in different degrees, of both God and man, and has no existence outside of them.

But I am not done with your question yet. You ask:—How can the sufferings of the innocent *satisfy* for the sins of the guilty? What do you mean by "satisfy?" Do you mean it in the sense of an equivalent? If so, no sufferings of the innocent or the guilty can satisfy for sin; for suffering, whether voluntary or enforced, is not an equivalent or an equation of sin. The murderer does not "satisfy" either God or man by yielding up his life at the end of a rope; nor would a volunteer substitute "satisfy." His death is no equivalent for his crime. If sufferings were an equation of crime, crime would cease to be crime to him who accepts the punishment. The murderer would cease to be a murderer, the thief cease to be a thief on the infliction of punishment. If suffering *alone* could "satisfy" for sin, there would and could be no eternal hell, for a time would necessarily come when the suffering would square with the offence. Mere suffering, then, of innocent or guilty, does not satisfy

for sin; and this fact takes the bottom out of your question.

Again. You ask:—How can the sufferings of the innocent satisfy for the *sins* of the guilty? The mere sufferings alone of the innocent *do not* satisfy for the *sins* of the guilty. They can, however, satisfy for the *sufferings* due the sins of the guilty, which is quite another thing. You can pay a fine of five dollars for a loafer who has committed an assault, and save him the sufferings of six months in the workhouse; but while your vicarious sufferings to the extent of five dollars remit the punishment, they do not "satisfy" for the offence. I think by this time the reader sees that the question upon which you "insisted" means nothing when cleared and cleaned of its sophistry and words of double meaning. Mr. Black was wrong when he said it raised a "metaphysical question." He should have said it raised a psychological or phrenological question involving the condition of your mind or brain, when you asked it.

INGERSOLL—"To answer an argument, is it only necessary to say that it raises a metaphysical question?"

COMMENT—No; but a question, to deserve an answer, should have some sense in it.

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CHAPTER XXI.

MULISH STUBBORNNESS VERSUS RATIONAL OBEDIENCE—
STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG, WHAT IS IT?—MR.
INGERSOLL'S FOOT-LIGHT DEFINITIONS WORTHLESS—IS
MURDER A CRIME OR A VIRTUE?

INGERSOLL—"The idea of non-resistance never occurred to a man who had the power to protect himself. This doctrine is the child of weakness, born when resistance was impossible."

COMMENT—This is one of your soft, indefinite generalities. Let us see what it means and what it is worth practically.

Non-resistance to what? Resistance or non-resistance has place only where there is aggression. Aggression may be just or unjust, and the lawfulness of resistance to it depends on this distinction. Aggression is any infringement whatever on your natural rights. Your natural rights are necessarily limited or infringed on by society. The individual must yield to society many of his natural rights for the common good. Without this, society would be impossible. Society is necessary for human life, for man is a social being, and cannot live out of society. Therefore the aggression which society makes on the natural rights of the individual is just, and therefore the individual yields them up, not because he *must*, but because he *ought* to. It is a question of *duty*. Now society aggresses on your natural rights for the common good. You yield because you consider the benefit you derive from living in society a fair set-off to the rights which you give up. You do not resist, because common sense tells you you would be wrong if you did. Then the idea of non-resistance must have occurred to you, otherwise you would not consent to the arrangement. Again. Society, to exist, must have government, which costs money. To meet the expenses the tax collector aggresses on you. You feel that the demand is just, and you yield and pay, not because you know you can be made to pay, but because you know you *ought* to—here again the idea of non-resistance.

The idea of non-resistance occurs to every honest man who lives in society, and who believes in his duty to *obey* the laws and support his government. Woe to that government whose citizens obey only because they must, or because they cannot protect themselves against the power that enforces law. Such citizens cannot be trusted in time of danger. They are latent rebels, every one of them. Resistance to the just requirements of law is sinful, and non-resistance a duty. Hence the idea of it should and does occur to every honest, loyal citizen.

You will say that you meant non-resistance to unjust power or tyranny. Probably you did. But you did not say it, and a man of your power of talk is expected to say what he means.

INGERSOLL—"I do not believe in the doctrine of non-resistance."

COMMENT—Non-resistance to what? As you reject the doctrine of non-resistance without limitation, it follows that you hold the opposite doctrine without limitation, which is that you believe in resistance to everything. But you are not original in this. The world is familiar with men of this kind, and has provided for them as comfortably as circumstances will permit.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black insists that without belief in God there can be no perception of right and wrong and that it is impossible for an atheist to have a conscience."

COMMENT—Mr. Black makes no such statement—insists on neither of the things which you attribute to him. Why this persistent misrepresentation? To give the reader an idea of your sense of "honor bright," and your method of meeting an opponent, I will here quote Mr. Black's words on this point. He says: "Here let me call attention to the difficulty of reasoning about justice with a man who has no *acknowledged standard* of right and wrong. What is justice? That which accords with law; and the supreme law is the will of God. But I am dealing with an adversary who does not admit that there is a God; then for him there is no *standard* at all; one thing is as right as another, and all things are equally wrong. Without a sovereign ruler there is no law, and where there is no law there can be no transgression. It is the misfortune of the atheistic theory that it makes the moral world an

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anarchy, it refers all ethical questions to that confused tribunal where chaos sits as umpire, and 'by decision more embroils the fray.' But through the whole of this (Ingersoll's) paper there runs a vein of presumptuous egotism which says as plainly as words can speak it that the author holds *himself* to be the ultimate judge of all good and evil; what he approves is right, and what he dislikes is certainly wrong. Of course I concede nothing to a claim like that."—*North American Review* for August, 1881, page 185.

This is the only paragraph in your opponent's article referring to this subject. Where does he insist that without a belief in God there can be no perception of right and wrong—no mention of conscience in the whole paragraph. He says that you, denying God, have no standard of right and wrong. Now it does not require much brains or education to distinguish between a perception of right and a standard of right. A perception of right is as different from the standard of right as the perception of length is from a yardstick, by which length is measured. Your next statement illustrates this.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black, the Christian, the believer in God, upholds wars of extermination. I denounce such wars as murders."

COMMENT—Now how is this difference of opinion between you and Mr. Black to be determined? Your conscience tells you that such wars are murders; his conscience tells him the contrary. Whose conscience teaches the right? His opinion of right and wrong is evidently different from yours. Which of you is right? And how is it to be determined? He will not yield his judgment to yours; you will not yield yours to his. What is to be done? Will you appeal to reason? But his reason and yours have already drawn their conclusions, and they are opposed to each other. Will you appeal to force? Then might makes right. Then slavery is right as long as it can be enforced: and polygamy is right in Turkey and in Utah, since it prevails in those places, and that which prevails has, for the time at least, the superior force behind it. Do you appeal to popular sentiment? If so, polygamy is right in Turkey and Utah, since popular sentiment is in its favor; and for the same reason slavery was right in the South. All these appeals failing to solve the difficulty,

you and your opponent must fix upon a *standard* or measure, or norm of right and wrong.

To illustrate Black's idea more clearly, let us suppose that the difference of opinion between you and him is in reference to the length of a piece of cloth. You hold it is fifty yards long; he that it is only ten. It cannot be determined by loud talk or eloquent denunciation. You must both appeal to a common measure known to and admitted by both of you—a yardstick, for instance. The measure is applied to the cloth, and its actual length is determined. It was the want of a common measure or standard like this that Mr. Black called attention to as an insurmountable obstacle in debating ethical questions with you. He had a standard, the *will* of God; you have none. Between him and you, then, there is no *common* standard, and hence the difficulty of arguing with you.

INGERSOLL—"Yet I am told that I have no knowledge of right and wrong."

COMMENT—"Until you have a criterion, or standard of right and wrong, you cannot determine what is right or what is wrong; and as long as you cannot do this, you cannot claim knowledge on the subject. You may have 'notions' or 'opinions,' but knowledge you cannot claim."

INGERSOLL—"What is right, or what is wrong?"

COMMENT—"That cannot be determined without a standard or common measure, no more than the question, what is lawful, can be answered without a knowledge of what is law."

INGERSOLL—"Everything is right that tends to the happiness of mankind."

COMMENT—"Granted. But who is to determine what tends to the happiness of mankind? Is every action of your life governed by that vague rule? Do you, before performing an act, pause to reflect whether that act, in the long run, in all the eventualities of human existence here and hereafter, will tend in the general sum to the happiness of mankind? Of course you don't. Such a calculation is beyond the power of man, hence your definition of right is vain and profitless."

INGERSOLL—"And everything is wrong that increases the sum of human misery."

COMMENT—"Certainly. But who is to determine which of all and every act of his increases the sum of human

misery? Your definition of wrong is as vague and unsatisfactory as your definition of right.

INGERSOLL—"What is conscience?"

COMMENT—From the answer you give to your own question it is evident that you do not know what it is, and I will therefore give you a definition of it as understood by Christians. Conscience is a practical judgment which passes on each and every act of our life, and determines, before we perform the act, whether it is right or wrong. It does not determine what is right or wrong in the abstract—that is the office of the moral intellect. It is not the power of realizing vividly the sufferings of others, as you dogmatically state. The word for that is *sympathy*, or *philanthropy*, not conscience.

INGERSOLL—"Consequences determine the quality of an action."

COMMENT—This, then, is your standard by which to determine whether a human act is good or evil, wicked or holy. It is a remarkable coincidence that the assassin of President Garfield justified his act on this very principle. His last words on the scaffold were "Only good has come from it."

Let us examine this standard and see what it means, and what it is practically worth. According to this standard or criterion, the quality of a human act cannot be determined until all its consequences are known. But the full and ultimate consequences of no act can be known by man, for the *consequences* of an act become in their turn the *causes* of other acts, whose consequences are the causes of other acts still, and thus on indefinitely. To determine the quality of an act, one must know whether the sum of all these consequences is good or bad; or, if any one consequence can indicate the nature of the act, it is necessary to know *which* of this almost limitless multitude of effects is the one which does so. Now, no man can know this; and hence, according to your criterion, no man can know the nature of any given act. Your standard then affords man no practical information as to the nature of any act which he may be called upon to perform. It is, therefore, utterly worthless.

Again: even if it were granted that consequences determine the quality of an action, the difficulty still remains, for what or who is to determine the quality of these consequences themselves?

INGERSOLL—"If consequences are good, so is the action."

COMMENT—According to this dictum, you cannot say a cold-blooded murder or an assassination is good or bad until you have learned the consequences of it! The consequences of Garfield's taking off can never be known to man. Then, according to your philosophy, it can never be known whether his murder was a crime or a virtue! Are you not afraid that your philosophy may put a bee into the head of some religious fanatic, who, misled by your teachings, might consider his killing of you a virtuous and holy act, foolishly imagining that the result of it might, in its consequences, prove beneficial to society and religion? I, as a Christian, condemn that act beforehand, as a crime deserving the eternal torments of hell; but you cannot consistently condemn it, because, according to your infidel theory, the act cannot be said to be evil or wicked till its consequences are known. As the consequences of your death cannot be known, it follows that your murder might be a good or bad act! This is the result or consequence of your philosophy. From a Christian point of view it is a very bad consequence, and therefore, if there is any virtue in logic, your philosophy is bad. The Christian holds not only that murder is a crime, but that even the intention, determination, or unactuated resolve is a crime, deserving of hell. It is thus that the Christian religion strikes at the very root of this murderous propensity in man, and kills the dragon before he issues from his innermost den in the human heart. The doctrine that acts take their nature and quality from their results is a logical and necessary consequence of the denial of God. It destroys individual responsibility and is subversive of all government and social order. It denies all appeal to right, and destroys not only justice, but the very idea of it. It contemplates nothing but results—physical, cognizable results.

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CHAPTER XXII.

ACTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES—EXPERIENCE NO STANDARD OF RIGHT OR WRONG—SOME OF MR. INGERSOLL'S PLAUSIBLE NONSENSE—HIS CHARACTER IN A FOCUS—A CHALLENGE TO THE GLIB LITTLE WHIFFETS OF THE INGERSOLL SCHOOL.

INGERSOLL—"If actions had no consequences, they would be neither good nor bad."

COMMENT—Which is the same as saying if actions were not actions they would not be actions. Actions are as inseparable from consequences as they are from their actors. You can no more imagine an act without a consequence than you can an act without an actor. In fact, the consequences of acts are simply the acts themselves continued under new forms. But while every act has consequences, it does not follow, as we have seen, that it takes its quality from those consequences.

INGERSOLL—"Man did not get his knowledge of consequences of actions from God, but from experience and reason."

COMMENT—As man has not an adequate knowledge of all the consequences of actions, it follows that he did not get it from experience and reason; and no Christian ever held that man gets his knowledge of consequences of all acts from God. Our knowledge of results even of physical acts is limited to a very narrow circle. As there are two orders of acts, physical and intellectual, so there are two orders of results, physical and intellectual, or moral. Man cannot tell the ultimate result of the simplest purely physical act. Cast a pebble into the ocean, and what are the consequences? If we apply Newton's law of gravitation to this simple physical act we find that in time it will change the relative positions of every atom of all the waters on the face of the globe. Not only this, it will change the relations of every molecule of matter in the universe, change the course of the moon, which recognizes the event by an actual and real, though immeasurable, perturbation. These changes will con-

tinues as long as matter and its law last, for the arrangement of the molecules of matter will never again be the same as they would have been if that pebble had not been cast. This is a mere general outline of the limitless results of that act. Now, who can tell or know, but God, these results in detail?

The results of moral or human acts are still more difficult to know, for a human act, that is an intellectual act, has its countless effects in the intellectual world in time and eternity. A false principle taught to a child will grow with it and spread from it to others, and from these others to yet others, and thus on through the ages, and when time ceases it will continue into eternity and affect heaven and hell. Thus this one act of a false teacher changes the current and harmony of the world. This is a general outline; but who can tell us the nature of each individual result—of each link in the endless chain? To know all these consequences by experience we must actually experience them; we must not only experience them individually and in detail, but we must also experience their united and combined result. This is a task beyond the power of the human race combined. Hence to talk of learning results by experience is to babble nonsense like an infant. That man did not get all his knowledge of the consequences of physical acts from God directly we admit, with astonishment that a man of your calibre should deem it necessary to state it. We must, however, assert that man cannot associate facts with prior facts, in the relation of cause and effect, without an intuition or primary revelation of that relation between two events which is called cause and effect. In other words, the human mind could never associate two events in the relation to each other of cause and effect unless the idea of this relationship had been revealed by God in some manner. As the fashion of denying everything is so popular we may as well join in the rout and deny that there is any such relation as cause and effect, or cause and consequence. And as long as you deny the existence of the first cause we must deny *in toto* that sequence of events known as cause and effect. Then until you prove that there are such things as causes and effects, the standard of morality which you deduce from them is but the baseless fabric of a dream. Denial, you will observe, is a two-edged

sword. You seem to have taken it into our head that Christians admit anything and everything that brings grist to your infidel mill, and that anything you "admit" needs no further proof. In this you are mistaken. The Christian grants you nothing—absolutely nothing. And unless you admit a *first* cause, God, he denies the existence of all causes whatsoever, and therefore of all effects. If you deny God you deprive yourself of the right to base a standard of morals on causes and effects, because without God, the first cause, they are inconceivable.

INGERSOLL—"If man by actual experience discovered the right and wrong of actions, is it not utterly illogical to declare that they who do not believe in God can have no standard of right or wrong?"

COMMENT—As man cannot by actual experience discover the right and wrong of actions, it follows that he must learn it in some other way, and as there is no other way left but to learn it from God, it is most logical to declare that they who do not believe in God cannot have the true standard of right and wrong. Man cannot learn the right and wrong of actions by experience, for all human experience is necessarily incomplete, and all knowledge derived from incomplete experience must be incomplete also. Hence a standard of right and wrong that is derived from incomplete experience must necessarily be incomplete, imperfect, defective—in a word, worthless.

We may learn some things from the experience of the past, but if you deny divine teaching how can you know that the experience of the future may not cause us to reject all those things which you imagine the experience of the past has taught us? How do you know but that the experience of the future may demonstrate that polygamy and slavery and wars are right, because in the long run they may prove beneficial to society? How can you assert, with any show of consistency, that these are wrong, since experience has not as yet spoken its last words about them?

INGERSOLL—"Consequences are the standard by which actions are judged."

COMMENT—Then since the consequences of acts cannot be known, this standard cannot be known. Philosophers heretofore held that effects took their nature from their cause, and not the cause from the effects. They could

not see how that which is could take its nature from that which is not, or how an effect could be the cause of its own cause's nature. They were keen-sighted enough to see that this involved the dogma of Lord Dundreary, that the tail wags the dog.

INGERSOLL—"God or no God, larceny is an enemy of industry."

COMMENT—To say an act is a larceny is to determine its nature—its quality. You have said that the quality of an action is determined by its consequences. How then can you assert that any given act is a larceny till its consequences are known? To assert larceny, you must assert it of particular acts, for larceny in the abstract is simply nothing, and can have none but abstract consequences, which are no consequences at all, and therefore cannot be an enemy of industry, unless it be industry in the abstract, which again is no industry at all. Larceny, to injure industry, must be larceny in act and practice—the act of A., B. or C. But how can you assert that the act of A., B. or C. is evil or larcenous till its consequences are known? for, according to your philosophy, the nature of the act of A., B. or C. can be known and judged only by its consequences.

INGERSOLL—"Industry is the mother of prosperity."

COMMENT—Industry, aside from industrious acts, is an abstraction, having no more reality than larceny aside from a larcenous act. Industry, to exist, must exist as the acts of A., B. or C. But here you are again met by your philosophy that "consequences determine the quality of actions," and you cannot assert that the actions of A., B. or C. are industrious or idle till you know the consequences.

INGERSOLL—"Prosperity is good."

COMMENT—According to your *standard* prosperity is good only when its consequences are good. But the philosophy of history teaches that prosperity leads to the downfall of nations as well as of individuals. What did prosperity do for Egypt, Greece, and Rome? It made the people luxurious, voluptuous and imbecile, and buried the monuments of hardier ages in ruins. It was the siren that led Hannibal, Alexander and Cesar to untimely graves, and Napoleon to Moscow and Waterloo. Prosperity leads to decay, national, individual, intellectual,

moral and physical. When prosperity is at its zenith, decay is at the door; when the tree is in full bloom there is but one step to the bare and yellow leaf. Prosperity has evil consequences; and if, as you say, consequences determine the quality of actions, how can prosperity be good?

Again. Prosperity, aside from those who prosper, is an abstraction, nothing, and therefore the good you assert of it is equally an abstraction, a delusion and a snare.

INGERSOLL—"God or no God, murder is a crime."

COMMENT—It is a bad thing for one to forget one's own principles. You have said that "consequences determine the quality of actions." How then can you assert that murder is a crime until you know the consequences of it? Murder in the abstract is at best only a crime in the abstract, which is no crime at all. Murder, to exist, must be the act of A., B. or C. But how can you assert that the act of A., B. or C. is murder or a crime, until you know its consequences? According to the new standard of right and wrong set up by you, I have the same right to assert that murder is a virtue as you have to assert it is a crime, until all the consequences of the so-called murderous act are known, since these consequences must determine the nature of the act.

INGERSOLL—"There has always been a law against larceny."

COMMENT—Yes, but the law is unjust if larceny be a virtue. And you cannot assert it is not, as long as all the consequences of the larceny are not known, since they are, according to you, the standard by which the act is to be judged. If there is no God the law against larceny has no moral or binding obligations, for if made by man it must have been made by those who had, against those who had not.

But those who have not are in the majority in the world, and a minority have no right to impose laws on the majority. If there is no God, the real thieves are those who have and hold the goods of this world from the great majority who have not. This is in fact the doctrine of your infidel *conferees*, the communists of France. Proudhon, a prophet of infidelity, lays it down as a maxim that "property is robbery." The difference between you and Proudhon is this: he denies God and carries that denial

to its logical consequences, while you, without an atom of logic in your head, deny God and yet assert the sacredness of property. If there be no God, Proudhon is right; but God or no God, you are wrong.

INGERSOLL—"As long as men object to being killed, murder will be illegal."

COMMENT—Convicted murderers object to being killed; is it therefore murder or illegal to execute them? But here again you show a bad memory. Only five lines above you say:—"Consequences are the standard by which actions are judged," and now you tell us that the *objection* of men to being killed constitutes the illegality of murder! Now, which of these statements do you intend us to believe? Of course we cannot believe them both, since they are contradictory. This is the consequence of trying to reason without a standard of truth and morality.

INGERSOLL—"According to Mr. Black, the man who does not believe in a Supreme Being acknowledges no standard of right and wrong."

COMMENT—You ought to be ashamed to misrepresent an honourable antagonist. Mr. Black never said that, nor anything like it, nor anything from which such an inference could be drawn. He complained of the difficulty of arguing with a man like you who had no acknowledged standard of right and wrong. That his complaint was just is evident from the fact that in your reply to him you give *half a dozen different standards, and all contradictory*, as we have just seen.

INGERSOLL—"Is it possible that only those who believe in the God who persecuted for opinion's sake have any standard of right and wrong?"

COMMENT—Only those who believe in the true God, whom you falsely accuse of persecuting, can have the *true* standard of right and wrong. That those who do not believe in Him may have *some* standard is evident from the fact that you have laid down *half a dozen* standards, such as they are; and no doubt you could give more if the exigencies of your argument required it. But when Mr. Black spoke of a standard he did not mean India rubber strings. Every man has, or ought to have, some *one* standard by which to regulate his conscience and his acts, but you have half a dozen worthless ones; hence the difficulty of knowing where to find you. Mr. Black's

complaint is that you have no standard that holds you, or that prevents you from acting like the little joker in the game of thimble—now you see it, and now you don't.

INGERSOLL—"Were the greatest men of all antiquity without *this* standard?"

COMMENT—Which standard? Do you refer to the *true* standard, or to *some* standard? These great men had a standard—the will of the gods. They thus recognised a very important truth; namely, that the standard of morals should be a *will* superior to the human will. They erred in *locating* this superior or supreme will, but they recognised its necessity *somewhere*. In doing this these great men paid a magnificent tribute to the true God and to human reason. These men whose genius the world honors were too great to be atheists. They believed in the existence of God, and failed only to *identify* Him, or understand His nature. They honored the true God when by mistake they accepted a false one, as you would honor a genuine United States bond by accepting a counterfeit through ignorance. They had then a standard of right and wrong, and although it was not the true one, yet they were consistent and held themselves amenable to it in their lives and in their logic. Their philosophy and theology begun where yours end. It is your misfortune that you never studied them profoundly, as they deserve to be studied, for they were giants, these men of old.

INGERSOLL—"In the eyes of the intelligent men of Greece and Rome, were all deeds, whether good or evil, morally alike?"

COMMENT—No, sir. As we have seen, they had a standard—the will of the gods—and therefore all deeds were not, in their eyes, morally alike. Their standard, not being the true one, did not enable them to correctly distinguish the right from the wrong, but it taught them that there was a right and a wrong. In this their standard was superior to any you have advanced; for your denial of God destroys all difference between right and wrong, and leaves the words crime and virtue without a meaning. These men of Greece and Rome were not so stupid as to believe your theory that consequences determine the nature of actions. They never stole the truths, beauties and magnificent results of the Christian religion and tried to make believe they were the fruits of Pagan-

ism, as modern infidels try to make it appear that those magnificent results are the fruits of reason and experience. These intelligent men of Greece and Rome had their faults, but they were not given to that kind of lying.

INGERSOLL—"Is it necessary to believe in the existence of an infinite intelligence, before you have any standard of right and wrong?"

COMMENT—Yes. Deny the infinite intelligence, or God, and all deeds are morally alike; there is no right, no wrong, and of course no distinction between them. Where there is no right or wrong there can be no standard of right and wrong. Where there is no standard there cannot be any standard. It will not do to say that Christians admit a difference between right and wrong, for they do not admit it, if there is no God; on the contrary, they deny it.

INGERSOLL—"Is it possible that a being cannot be just and virtuous unless he believes in some being infinitely superior to himself?"

COMMENT—You have constructed this question very adroitly—to catch gudgeons. It is not necessary for every being to believe in some being infinitely superior to himself, but it is necessary for every *created, finite* being to so believe, in order to know what justice and virtue are and conform his life to them.

INGERSOLL—"If this doctrine be true, how can God be just and virtuous?"

COMMENT—Ah! Precisely. This question supposes you caught a gudgeon. Is this play upon words worthy the subject you are treating of? Is it worthy a philosopher whose motto is "honor bright"? As your answer does not contain the doctrine you thought your prior question would necessarily elicit, your last question is simply ridiculous. God is just *because* he is *Justice*; and justice and virtue are justice and virtue because He is, and without Him there is neither justice nor virtue, nor anything else. I merely indicate here Christian principles; to enter into a discussion of their metaphysical basis with you would be to degrade a magnificent science, of which you manifest an ignorance which is only commensurate with your brazen egotism.

INGERSOLL—"Does He (God) believe in some being infinitely superior to Himself?"

COMMENT—It is not at all necessary. After the trickery of your former question has been exposed, there is not timber enough in this last one to nail an answer to.

INGERSOLL—"If there is a God, infinite in power and wisdom, above Him, poised in eternal calm, is the figure of justice."

COMMENT—It is no pleasant task to reason with a man who talks in this way. The man who can talk only in this manner has no idea whatever of God. He is too intellectually blind to see that to place an *abstraction*, called *justice*, above God, is to destroy God. Justice has no existence of its own. To exist, it must exist as a quality, or mode, or form of something. Aside from that which is just, justice is a pure abstraction—a nonentity. This needs only to be said. And yet you would have us believe that a *mode* is superior to the *real*, without which modes are impossible.

INGERSOLL—"There is no world, no star, no heaven, no hell, in which gratitude is not a virtue, and where slavery is not a crime."

COMMENT—Let us confine ourselves to this world. It is the only one you professedly know anything about. You have given a standard of right and wrong, to which I hold you. You say: "Consequences determine the quality of actions." As long as you hold yourself bound by this standard, your talk about virtue and crime is unmitigated hypocrisy; for, until the consequences of acts are known, there is no difference whatever between virtue and crime.

INGERSOLL—"I have insisted, and still insist, that it is impossible for a finite man to commit a crime deserving infinite punishment."

COMMENT—A little more reason and a little less assertion would be more becoming in a philosopher. What you insist on here is correct, however, and no Christian ever thought of asserting the contrary. Finite man can no more experience infinite suffering than he can experience infinite happiness, for between the finite and the infinite there can be no equation. We have had occasion to call your attention to this patent fact before. You will, no doubt, be astonished to learn that what you insist on so vigorously is asserted with equal vigor by Christian philosophy. But you had a purpose and a meaning in your statement. You are arguing against everlasting punish-

ment; and you begin by stating a self-evident proposition. This being admitted, you proceed to juggle in another, and very different idea. Here is your argument in short: Finite man cannot suffer *infinite* punishment; therefore he cannot suffer *everlasting* punishment. Why do you confound these terms? Was it through ignorance or design? If through ignorance, you are to be pitied; if through design, you are not honest. Infinite and everlasting are not convertible terms. Man cannot, because he is finite, suffer *infinite* punishment; but it does not follow, as you seem to think, that he cannot suffer everlasting punishment. With this distinction your whole argument on this point collapses like a punctured balloon. Happiness and misery are limited by the capacity of the receiver; a *finite* receiver cannot receive *infinite* happiness or punishment, but an *everlasting* receiver can receive *everlasting* happiness or misery. Man is everlasting, and therefore capable of everlasting happiness or punishment; and all your "insisting" to the contrary is of no consequence.

INGERSOLL—"Of the supernatural we have no conception."

COMMENT—If you have no conception of it, how can you affirm or deny anything about it? To admit that you have no conception of the supernatural after having talked about it through thirty-five pages of the *North American Review* is to advertise yourself a thoughtless gabbler. A moment's reflection should show you that it is *absolutely impossible* to think or say anything whatever—even nonsense—about that of which you have no conception. That of which we have no conception is to us that which is not, and that which is not, is not, and cannot be, the object of human thought or intelligence. It is not surprising then, under the circumstances, that you have said many curious and wonderful things in your reply to Mr. Black.

INGERSOLL—"Mr. Black takes the ground that if a man believes in the creation of the universe * * he has no right to deny anything."

COMMENT—This is mere trifling, and shows what an infidel philosopher is capable of when put to the stretch. There is not a word of truth in what you say, and you *knew* it when you said it. Mr. Black takes no such ground as you, in utter disregard of the obligations of veracity, attribute to him.

INGERSOLL—"We should remember * * that the early Christians believed everything but the truth, and that they accepted Paganism, admitted the reality of all the Pagan miracles."

COMMENT—In making and printing this statement you lose all claim to respectful consideration. We must brand it in the whole and in all its parts as a falsehood; and he who made it is ignorant or malicious, or both. And yet this falsifier talks glibly of "honesty" and "honor bright." We charge Mr. Ingersoll with *falsehood* in making the above statement. We call on him to verify it, or stand as a convicted falsifier. A falsifier cannot be trusted; his glib talk of honesty and virtue must be looked upon as a snare, like that of the profligate who talks of virtue to his intended victim. We can respect an enemy, but when we find deceit and falsehood in his methods, we relegate him to that disreputable class which affords remunerative employment to detectives and policemen. A falsifier is a manufacturer of base coin, a counterfeiter, a fraud.

We here conclude these notes, believing we have accomplished what we undertook to do. We have said enough to convince our readers that Mr. Ingersoll is profligate of statement; that he is not to be trusted; that he is unscrupulous; that as a logician and metaphysician he is beneath contempt; that he is a mere galvanizer of old objections long ago refuted; that he is ignorant and superficial—full of gas and gush, in a word, that he is a philosophical charlatan of the first water, who mistakes curious listeners for disciples, and applause for approval.

Of course we do not expect him to reply to us, and for several reasons. First, he will not want to; second, he cannot; third, he can pretend not to notice an obscure country pastor. Very well. Then let some of his disciples or admirers try to rehabilitate his smirched character. We hold ourselves responsible to him, and to all the glib little whiffets of his shallow school.

NOTE TO SEVENTH EDITION.—As I anticipated, Mr. Ingersoll has publicly declined to reply.

